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EURASIA INSIGHT

UZBEKISTAN: TURNING AWAY FROM THE WEST
Igor Torbakov 5/06/05

Uzbekistan has formally withdrawn from GUUAM, a regional grouping of states that also comprises Georgia and Ukraine. Political analysts say the move confirms a geopolitical turn by Uzbek leader Islam Karimov away from the United States towards Russia.

The revolutionary trend in the former Soviet Union, which has produced regime change in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan over the past 18 months, heavily influenced Uzbekistan’s decision, regional analysts believe. Distancing Uzbekistan from GUUAM appears to be part of Karimov’s strategy to diminish the revolutionary pressure on his regime. Since the start of 2005, Uzbeks have become increasingly bold in protesting what many view as the government’s draconian political and economic policies. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. The March revolution in Kyrgyzstan, a neighbor of Uzbekistan, seems to have heightened Karimov’s sense of political insecurity. [For additional information see the Eurasia Insight archive].

Uzbekistan notified Moldovan authorities on May 5 of Tashkent’s desire to quit the regional cooperation organization. Moldova currently holds the rotating chairmanship of the group. The fifth member of GUUAM is Azerbaijan. Since its formation in 1997, GUUAM has existed mainly only on paper, as member states failed to put mechanisms in place that could promote substantive trade and political cooperation.

Prior to Ukraine’s Orange Revolution in late 2004, few political analysts believed GUUAM would ever develop into a viable organization. Of late, however, member states, led by the new administrations in Georgia and Ukraine, have expressed renewed interest in GUUAM, seeing it as a potential vehicle to promote integration with Western economic and political structures.

Uzbekistan joined the group in 1999, but over the past three years Tashkent has been only a nominal participant in GUUAM’s affairs. In formalizing its withdrawal, Uzbek officials asserted that the organization had "significantly changed [its] initially declared goals and tasks." In effect, Karimov wants nothing to do with the two leading figures of the revolutionary trend, Georgia’s Mikheil Saakashvili and Ukraine’s Viktor Yushchenko.

Russian political analysts and policy makers generally welcomed Uzbekistan’s announcement, characterizing the withdrawal as a "friendly gesture towards Moscow." Some observers expect Russia to respond by seeking to expand economic and political cooperation with Tashkent.

The Uzbek withdrawal from GUUAM underscores a contradiction evident in Tashkent’s relationship with the United States. On one hand, Uzbek officials appear increasingly suspicious of US intentions, as they consider Washington to be a supporter of the regime-change trend in the former Soviet Union. At the same time, Uzbekistan continues to host an American air base at Karshi-Khanabad. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

According to Konstantin Zatulin, a Russian lawmaker and director of the CIS Institute, Karimov’s decision to leave GUUAM is a "consequence of the activity of the young presidents of Georgia and Ukraine, specifically, of their desire to spread the �color revolutions’ and turn GUUAM into an anti-Russian organization."

Zatulin added that Karimov has lost interest in Uzbekistan’s alliance with the United States, apparently reaching the conclusion that Washington cannot, or will not provide a solid guarantee for the preservation of his regime. Having realized this, Zatulin added, "Uzbekistan demonstrated it didn’t want to be [part] of an anti-Russian front."

Meanwhile in Tashkent, several men taken into custody on May 3 after authorities forcibly broke up a protest outside the US embassy remain incommunicado, relatives say. Roughly 60 individuals staged an unprecedented demonstration outside the embassy, calling on the government to honor a privatization deal concerning a farm in southern Kashkadarya Province. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

When authorities broke up the protest in the late hours of May 3, they separated men from women and children. The women and children were shipped back to Kashkadarya Province. But no one has reported seeing or talking to any of the 11 arrested men since they were taken into custody. All the protesters were part of the Choriyev clan, which has sought to pressure the government to honor a privatization deal. In 1999, the clan gained control of the Kesh farm in Shakhrisabz, a town in Kashkadarya Province, only to see the government arbitrarily nullify the deal several years later.

Shortly before police moved in to break up the May 3 protest in Tashkent, several protesters indicated that they would seek to foment "a popular wave [of protest] in Shakhrisabz and Karshi," the provincial capital of Kashkadarya.

"We are not going to step back," the protesters shouted. "We have nowhere to step back. We do not want to beg for our bread." Some of the women who had been forcibly returned from Tashkent to Kashkadarya tried to do just that on May 6, but authorities preemptively arrested the leaders of the planned protest.

Editor�s Note: Igor Torbakov is a freelance journalist and researcher who specializes in CIS political affairs. He holds an MA in History from Moscow State University and a PhD from the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. He was Research Scholar at the Institute of Russian History, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow; a Visiting Scholar at the Kennan Institute, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington DC; a Fulbright Scholar at Columbia University, New York; and a Visiting Fellow at Harvard University. He is now based in Istanbul, Turkey.

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