EurasiaNet Eurasia Insight - Akayev’s Legacy in Kyrgyzstan Proving Difficult to Overcome

EURASIA INSIGHT

AKAYEV’S LEGACY IN KYRGYZSTAN PROVING DIFFICULT TO OVERCOME
David Gullette 5/10/05
A EurasiaNet Commentary

After Kyrgyzstan gained independence in 1991, it cultivated a reputation as "an island of democracy," based in large part on then-president Askar Akayev’s academic background and his image at the time as a progressive reformer. Starting in the late 1990s, however, Akayev increasingly relied on authoritarian methods, and Kyrgyzstan joined other Central Asian nations in limiting democratization. The March revolution aims to put Kyrgyzstan back on a democratization course. But overcoming the Akayev era’s legacy of corruption and malfeasance is perhaps proving more difficult than initially expected.

Akayev will be remembered mostly for allegedly using his governmental influence to enrich himself, his family and his close political associates. He’ll also be remembered for trying to stifle Kyrgyzstan’s political development. In 2000, rather than compete in a presidential election, Akayev had his main rival, Feliks Kulov, arrested on what were widely seen as politically motivated charges of abuse of power. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Akayev also is believed to have engineered the 2002 arrest of Azimbek Beknazarov, the current prosecutor-general in the provisional government, in an effort to squelch opposition to the transfer of Kyrgyz territory to China. A protest in March 2002 over Beknazarov’s arrest turned into the infamous Aksy riot, during which police killed six demonstrators. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. The mass demonstrations this year that culminated in Akayev’s ouster could trace their origin to the Aksy events, some political analysts contend.

While Akayev sought to monopolize economic and political opportunities, Kyrgyz citizens suffered. Many Kyrgyz live on roughly $25 per month, often with their wages months in arrears. Prior to the March revolution, resentment had been building for years over the Akayev administration’s lack of responsiveness to the country’s general economic plight. One of the detonators for the explosion of popular frustration in March was an article published February 8 in the opposition-oriented MSN newspaper, which detailed the extent of Akayev’s personal wealth, and shed light on the vast network of businesses in which the president and his family members had interests.

Akayev’s improper accumulation of wealth was only part of Kyrgyzstan’s overall corruption picture. During his administration, graft became so embedded in the political culture that it severely eroded public confidence in government. Akayev conducted a high-profile anti-corruption campaign in 2003, but it produced few results other than to reinforce public skepticism, thereby fuelling apathy with politics. Corruption reached a point where police officers would openly stop individuals on the street without probable cause solely to solicit bribes. Public patience with such practices ultimately reached the tipping point.

In an article published by the ResPublica newspaper on March 23, which turned out to be the last day of the Akayev era, Jenishbek Nazaraliev, who runs a drug treatment and rehabilitation centre in Bishkek and had been encouraging people to protest, blamed Akayev for treating the Kyrgyz people as "fools." Indeed, many people appeared to feel personally offended by Akayev’s arbitrary actions during the last years of his tenure.

Akayev has left the political stage, but the hard feelings remain. Many Kyrgyz are deeply suspicious of politicians. Perhaps the provisional government’s most important task is to rebuild the sense of trust that ought to exist between the political leadership and the governed. Such a sense, along with a willingness by Kyrgyz citizens to participate in the political process, is essential if Kyrgyzstan is ever to get back on the democratization path.

It remains to be seen what the interim government and the future government will do to address the escalating poverty and low trust in politicians. The initial indicators are not encouraging, as interim President Kurmanbek Bakiyev has faced growing criticism over his personnel policy.

Unless Kyrgyzstan’s new leaders are able to address the popular frustration linked to Akayev’s legacy, they may end up suffering fates similar to that of the ousted president. Tackling corruption and improving the economy will require political unity. Unfortunately, as the country prepares to hold a special presidential election on July 10, the current political trend seems to be taking the political establishment in the opposite direction. The two leading candidates, Bakiyev and Kulov, are running increasingly combative campaigns. The mutual rancor stands to complicate the challenge of achieving political consensus during the post-election period. Unfortunately, back-stabbing and political sniping seems set to be a part of Kyrgyzstan’s political life for the foreseeable future.

Editor’s Note: David Gullette is a Central Asian expert at the University of Cambridge.

The Central Eurasia Project aims, through its website, meetings, papers, and grants, to foster a more informed debate about the social, political and economic developments of the Caucasus and Central Asia. It is a program of the Open Society Institute-New York. The Open Society Institute-New York is a private operating and grantmaking foundation that promotes the development of open societies around the world by supporting educational, social, and legal reform, and by encouraging alternative approaches to complex and controversial issues.

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