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EURASIA INSIGHT

ISLAMIC RADICALS REGROUP IN CENTRAL ASIA
Artie McConnell 5/15/02

With the US military ensconced in Uzbek bases, the Central Asian nation’s president, Islam Karimov, has proclaimed Uzbekistan safe from incursions by Islamic militants this summer. However, authorities remain concerned about Islamic radicals, especially those affiliated with the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). Some regional analysts say the IMU is now regrouping after suffering substantial loses during the US-led offensive against terrorism in Afghanistan.

Official anxiety over the IMU’s combat capabilities is heightened by the uncertainty surrounding the fate of Juma Namangani, the movement’s military leader. Namangani was initially reported killed in November during the anti-terrorism blitz in northern Afghanistan. [For more information see the Eurasia Insight archive>]. But several local media outlets, including the Megapolis newspaper in Kazakhstan, have reported in recent months that Namangani is alive. "Reports of his death � are misinformation he invented himself," Megapolis asserted in February.

In April, Karimov told Uzbek television that there was no chance of the IMU carrying out insurgent actions on Uzbek territory in the coming months. For the past three summers, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan had grappled to contain insurgent raids, launched from IMU bases in Afghanistan. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. "As far as we know, there are still some remnants of the Taliban and al Qaeda and other groups on the territory of Afghanistan," Karimov said. "But they lack opportunities to make incursions into Central Asian countries that they had in the past."

"There could be some kind of sabotage and other kinds of acts," Karimov continued, "but the organized intrusions that have taken place in the past three years are not expected in 2002."

Although not expected to be active militarily, the IMU is working to recruit new fighters and rebuild logistical capacity. According to a March report in the Kazakhstani newspaper Karavan, Uzbekistan’s ongoing economic difficulties serve to encourage young men to join the ranks of the IMU. In addition, Karimov’s decision to grant basing rights to US forces may be benefiting IMU recruiting efforts. The US military’s presence is reportedly opposed by many Uzbeks, especially those in the strongly Islamic Ferghana Valley. "It is getting increasingly easy for the IMU to set up new detachments under the slogan: �Tashkent has completely sold itself to the infidels,’" the report in Karavan said.

As for Namangani, the IMU leader was supposedly buried near Kabul, according to some accounts. Tajik officials reportedly said in late December that an expert examination would be conducted to locate Namangani’s remains. Yet six months later, Namangani’s corpse has not been positively identified. While American officials publicly maintain that Namangani is dead, Russian intelligence sources believe that Namangani is alive and is trying to regroup his forces in Tajikistan.

Information about Namangani is difficult to corroborate, yet there is no doubt that the IMU network, though crippled, is still intact and operational, analysts say. IMU fighters were active during the intense battles of Operation Anaconda, and American officials privately concede that small contingents of Taliban and IMU fighters continue to launch minor guerilla strikes against coalition forces in Pakistani border areas. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Many of the recovered bodies have been subsequently identified as being of non-Afghan Central Asian nationalities.

During the anti-terrorism campaign, a large number of the IMU’s fighters apparently decided to avoid combat. Some analysts suspect that many militants found refuge in Tajikistan, where the IMU reportedly maintained training and supply bases. Experts also suggest IMU sympathizers in the Ferghana Valley could be providing shelter and supplies to fighters arriving from Afghanistan.

US intelligence sources have estimated that the IMU is capable of recruiting and training a multinational force of up to 5,000 guerillas within a year. The rapid expansion of opium and heroin trafficking out of Afghanistan indicates that Islamic radicals will have access to funds to pay and equip new recruits.

IMU militants are also reportedly active outside of Central Asia. Intelligence obtained by the US Central Command places several groups of IMU militants in Iran, where US officials claim they are receiving training and support from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard. Other IMU fighters, including political leader Tahir Yuldashev, are believed to be hiding, possibly in tribal areas of Pakistan, or in Saudi Arabia.

The IMU still appears to pose a security threat in Central Asia, regardless of Namangani’s fate. At the same time, reports of Namangani’s ostensible resurrection underscores a more insidious threat. By stoking the perception of danger, the IMU is effectively fomenting tension in Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, as well as complicating these states’ relations with Russia, Iran and Pakistan. The perceived security threat helps the IMU by causing regional governments to maintain the crackdown on religious freedom, which, in turn, is radicalizing many Islamic believers.

Editor�s Note: Artie McConnell is a Central Asian affairs analyst currently based in Moscow.

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