Uzbekistan: No Good Political Options in Sight

Uzbekistan stands at a crossroads, where all routes seem to be dead-ends. The continuation of President Islam Karimov's rule would appear to promise more repression, increasing the probability of a social explosion. His replacement by someone from within the Uzbek administration, in all likelihood, would merely mean a continuation of authoritarianism. Meanwhile, the nature of the existing Uzbek political system ensures that opposition groups – both radical Islamic and democratically oriented – are unlikely guarantors of stability in the event that the incumbent regime collapsed.

Karimov is coming under increasing international criticism over the Andijan events, which, by the most reliable accounts, left over 700 people dead. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Rising international pressure forced Karimov's administration on May 17 to upwardly revise the government's death tally. Yet, the Uzbek leader doggedly insists that the Islamic militants are responsible for the violence, despite ample evidence that government forces indiscriminately shot at civilians who were demonstrating for better living standards, and who had no connection to radical Islamic beliefs. [For background see the Eurasia Insight]. Given Karimov's intransigence, it is improbable the he will take action voluntarily that addresses the root economic causes fueling popular frustration. Instead, he seems destined to depend on brute force in his attempt to retain power.

Provided that Karimov adheres to his current political course, a popular uprising would appear inevitable, some political analysts say. "By crushing the Andijan protesters, Karimov may have bought himself so time," said Abdumannob Polat, a political analyst who was formerly a leader of the Uzbek opposition party Birlik and also who has been a human rights activist. "But the underlying causes [fueling the popular desire to revolt] – especially the poor economy and corruption – have not disappeared." [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

Under current conditions, the chances of preventing upheaval seem slim. Karimov is unlikely to introduce to necessary reforms, as are his chief lieutenants and possible successors, including Interior Minister Zokir Almatov, secret police chief Rustam Inoyatov and Ismail Jurabekov, a presidential aide. There is always the possibility that a reformer inside the administration could come forward. But such a figure, if he/she exists, remains in the shadows.

Beyond Karimov's regime, there is no good leadership option that is currently visible. Karimov has used the Islamic militant threat as justification for his repressive policies. [For additional information see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Some observers believe the Uzbek president has overstated the strength of Islamic militants. Nevertheless, there is no denying that Islamic radicals pose a serious threat to stability. Analysts are divided over whether radical Islamic organizations, such as the underground group Hizb-ut-Tahrir, have the ability to exert power across Uzbekistan. Islamic militants, however, seem capable of establishing control in selected locations, especially in the Ferghana Valley, where conservative Islamic traditions are firmly embedded. This is a frightening prospect, as it could open the way for broad regional instability, while infusing the international terrorist movement with momentum.

Three democratically oriented political movements are presently active in Uzbekistan – Birlik, Erk and Ozod Dekhkonlar. But experts, and even party leaders themselves, openly admit that no democratically oriented force is currently in position to assume power and preserve stability. "The opposition is weak and divided," Polat said. "This is the harsh reality."

Karimov's administration has persecuted its political opponents, severely restricting the space in which opposition parties can operate. The government, for instance, refused to register any of the three main opposition parties so that they could field candidates for the December 2004 parliamentary elections. Going back to the early and mid-1990s, many leaders of Birlik and Erk were either arrested or driven into exile.

In recent years, pro-democracy activists have labored in Uzbekistan in relative obscurity. Repression forced many activists to go into a dormant state. But the rise of the Islamic militant movement in the late 1990s prompted a shift in Karimov's focus, and government resources were redirected to the effort to neutralize radical groups, including the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and Hizb-ut-Tahrir. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Accordingly, the Uzbek government slightly eased pressure on the democratically oriented opposition. "To say that it [the democratic opposition] is non-existent is an exaggeration," claimed Polat, whose brother, Abdurahim, is the leader of Birlik. "The [Uzbek] government became been relatively tolerant after September 11. It didn't register [opposition parties], but neither did it persecute too hard."

The facts that Erk held a congress in October 2003, albeit after considerable government harassment of party leaders, and, in December of the same year, Ozod Dekhkonlar formally came into being, lend credence to Polat's contention. And while they were prevented from contesting the parliamentary election, opposition activists operated openly in 2004, engaging in other activity needed to submit registration applications. Polat said his brother, the Birlik leader, "knew the chances of registration were low, but he used the effort to reorganize the movement."

Unification of the opposition parties would likely represent the fastest way toward the creation of a viable political alternative to Karimov's administration. But, so far, Birlik, Erk and Ozod Dekhkonlar have demonstrated little willingness to merge. Birlik's Abdurahim Polat and Erk's leader, Mohammad Solih, are rivals who have long shunned cooperation. The latest attempt at the unification, announced in April, is dubbed the Sunshine Coalition. At present, the coalition essentially comprises Ozod Dekhkonlar representatives, along with a smattering of human rights activists.

"We want to establish the widest coalition possible," said an activist who spoke on condition of anonymity. The activist indicated that coalition leaders would consider establishing contacts with the radical Islamic opposition. "It is probably better to engage them than to ignore them," the activist said.

Already, however, it appears the Sunshine Coalition will fail to realize its goal of unifying anti-government forces. Birlik and Erk have both already rejected it. Polat explained that substantial tactical differences exist among representatives of all three main opposition parties. He also described Ozod Dekhkonlar leaders as "too emotional."

Perhaps the only way out of Uzbekistan's current predicament depends on the international community. Polat and other experts suggested that the international community must either convince opposition leaders to set aside their personal differences and cooperate, or compel Karimov to implement reforms.

Even if the international community convinced opposition leaders to join forces, time would be needed for a united opposition to build up a support base, and Uzbekistan, at this point, may not have such time. Meanwhile, forcing Karimov to change promises to be difficult, if not impossible. The United States, European Union and international financial institutions have long leaned on the Uzbek leader to promote economic and political reforms. Karimov has repeatedly promised to implement reforms, only to renege. So far, Western powers have never tried to hold Karimov accountable by conditioning future assistance on Uzbek reform compliance. Even if the West gets serious after Andijan, the threat of punitive measures may be unable at this stage to produce the desire result.

In recent months, Karimov has taken action to reduce his vulnerability to Western economic pressure by promoting closer Uzbek-Russian relations. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. It would now seem that coercing Karimov into a policy change would require Russia to join the Western powers in exerting pressure for change. Russia has long been concerned about the maintenance of stability in Uzbekistan, but it remains unclear whether President Vladimir Putin is willing to act in concert with Washington and EU governments in demanding reforms.