Did Russia and Georgia Make a Deal Over Ajaria?

Aslan Abashidze's peaceful departure from power in the Georgian territory of Ajaria marks a significant victory President Mikheil Saakashvili and his effort to reunify the country. At the outset of the Tbilisi-Batumi confrontation, few believed that it would end without violence. Many were also surprised to see Russia cooperating with Georgia in convincing Abashidze to leave for Moscow. Some observers continue to wonder whether Tbilisi granted any concessions to Russia in exchange for Moscow's assistance in resolving the Ajaria crisis.

As the Tbilisi-Batumi confrontation played out in early 2004, Georgia came close to civil war on several occasions. Given that Tbilisi had strong legal grounds for pursuing a military option to restore control over Ajaria, several of Saakashvili's advisors reportedly pressed him to resort to force. There was a strong desire in some political circles in Tbilisi to demonstrate the effectiveness of four new US-trained Georgian army units.

At first, violence nearly broke out when Ajaria's illegal armed forces prevented Saakashvili from entering the region on March 14. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Had it not been for the prudent refusal of US-trained military officers to participate in a military operation, the crisis might have taken a violent turn then and there. The Georgian president himself sent contradictory signals on the question of an armed solution. His rhetoric was often confrontational, even though he several times ruled out the use of force. Pressure from the United States on Saakashvili's administration reportedly helped keep the peace during the confrontation. [For additional information click here].

Russia perhaps played an even more important role in preventing violence. Indeed Russia's stance on Ajaria caught many Tbilisi political analysts by surprise. Moscow has a reputation of being a meddler, rather than mediator in Georgian domestic affairs, frequently manipulating separatist movements in Georgia to weaken the central government in Tbilisi. For example, during the 1992-93 armed conflict in Abkhazia (another of Georgia's separatist Black Sea provinces), Russian military support for the separatists was instrumental in the Georgian defeat. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. During the Ajaria crisis, most regional analysts feared that Russia might try to protect Abashidze. In the event of a conflict, some thought Moscow might lend Abashidze troops and weapons from the Russian military base in Batumi, or supply mercenaries to fight on his behalf, like it did in Abkhazia.

Russian President Vladimir Putin confounded expectations. Instead of trying to set Russia up as the arbiter of the Ajarian question, and thus increasing Moscow's leverage over Tbilisi, Putin worked with Saakashvili to ease Abashidze out. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. On the surface, such action by Putin seemed to run counter to Russia's interests in the Caucasus, as the outcome enhanced Georgia's sense of cohesiveness, making it harder for the Kremlin to exert influence over the country.

Russia's unexpected behavior is prompting some in Tbilisi to ask whether a deal has been struck between Saakashvili and Putin? If yes, what is the concession that Moscow obtained in return for its help on Ajaria?
The Georgian government insists no deal was made. Meanwhile in Moscow, Russian leaders have spoken about their alleged desire to start a new, friendly relationship with Georgia. Officials in Tbilisi view Russia's cooperation on Abashidze as proof that Putin is serious. Unfortunately, this scenario sounds too good to be true.

Russian National Security Council Secretary Igor Ivanov, the man who brokered the terms of Abashidze's exile, also served as the midwife for the new Georgian administration during the Rose Revolution. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. As a repayment for Putin's help, after taking office Saakashvili backtracked on a number of longstanding Georgian positions vis-à-vis Russia. In February, while visiting Moscow, the Georgian president agreed to joint patrolling of the Georgian-Russian border in an effort to contain Chechen militant incursions. [For additional information see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Saakashvili also retreated on a demand that Russia quickly close down its two remaining military bases on Georgian territory. [For additional information see the Eurasia Insight archive].

This fall, Putin and Saakashvili hope to sign the long-delayed framework agreement between the two countries. This treaty would finally determine the future of Russian bases in Georgia. In early May, Georgian Foreign Minister Salome Zurabishvili confirmed reports that Moscow, in return for its military withdrawal, is seeking a guarantee that Tbilisi will not permit another foreign country to establish a military base on Georgian territory once Russian forces are gone.

Russia has long feared that American forces will move in after Russian troops leave Georgia, and Moscow appears determined to do its utmost to prevent this scenario from unfolding. Yet, it would be absurd for Georgia to agree to such a demand, given that such a commitment would undermine Tbilisi's efforts to integrate into Western economic, political and security structures, especially NATO.

Some experts in Tbilisi worry that a Georgian no-US-base guarantee was the cost of Putin's cooperation on Ajaria. Stoking such concerns is the fact that Zurabishvili did not immediately reject Russia's base demand during her early May visit to Moscow; instead, she declared that that Tbilisi needed to consider this idea.