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EURASIA INSIGHT

UZBEKISTAN: TASHKENT IS UP TO ITS OLD GEOPOLITICAL TRICKS
5/20/08

Encouraged by improving ties to the West, Uzbekistan seems to want to wriggle out from Russia’s warm embrace � again. In recent weeks, Tashkent has made a series of gestures that signal a cooling in its relations with Moscow.

Perhaps the clearest sign of trouble in Uzbek-Russian ties was the May 13 signing of a production sharing agreement between the state energy concern Uzbekneftegaz and Malaysia’s state gas concern Petronas. The deal, worth upwards of $1.5 billion, covers three fields, Urga, Kuanysh and Akhchalak, in the northern part of Uzbekistan’s Ustyurt Plateau � an area that has been actively explored by Russian energy companies. Gazprom, the Kremlin’s key money-maker, had sought the development rights for the fields � and had been promised them several times since 2004 � only to be disappointed in the end.

Several other developments suggest, when considered collectively, that Tashkent is souring on the Kremlin.

On May 12, Yuri Shafranik, board chair of the Union of Russian Oil & Gas Producers, accompanied by Russia’s ambassador to Uzbekistan, Farid Mukhametshin, attended opening ceremonies for three medical facilities in Tashkent � a polyclinic, a TB dispensary and a skin and venereal diseases clinic � worth an overall $4 million, and built with funds provided by the Russian energy company Soyuzneftegaz. The event was notable because no one from Uzbekistan’s Ministry of Health, or any other government agency, was in attendance. It is unlikely that the conspicuous absence of Uzbek officials occurred without a high-level order, political observers in Tashkent said.

In other symbolic actions with telling political implications, Tashkent authorities authorized the renaming of Pushkin Street � the last prominent thoroughfare in the Uzbek capital named in honor of a Russian historical figure. The new name is Independence Street. And to ensure that the meaning of the move was not lost on Moscow, Uzbek officials announced the change on May 7, the day of Russian President Dmitry Medvedev’s inauguration. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

The official Uzbek press also failed to publish President Islam Karimov’s inaugural congratulations to his Russian counterpart, although it prominently published Medvedev’s congratulations to Karimov on the Victory Day, the Uzmetronom news website reported. Given Tashkent’s exceptional attention to political protocol, such forgetfulness appears intentional.

Ever since gaining independence amid the Soviet collapse in 1991, Tashkent has had a prickly relationship with Moscow. For much of the 1990s, President Islam Karimov strived to keep Moscow at arm’s length as he consolidated his own power. Following the September 11 terrorist tragedy, Karimov made a sharp turn from Russia and forged a close strategic relationship with the United States. But US-Uzbek relations hit the skids amid the fallout over the Andijan events in 2005. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

In Andijan’s aftermath, Karimov once again entered into close security and economic relations with Russia and, to a lesser extent, China. Dependence on Moscow, however, appears to make Karimov nervous, and in recent months Tashkent has responded favorably to US and European Union overtures to repair relations. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. The prospect of renewed Western support for his regime � deemed one of the most repressive in the world � appears to have emboldened him to de-emphasize his Kremlin connection for a second time.

Uzbekistan’s efforts to distance itself from Russia are extending to multilateral organizations. At a May 15 meeting of Shanghai Cooperation Organization defense ministers in the Tajik capital Dushanbe, Uzbekistan was the only Central Asian state to be represented by a deputy minister, although the Uzbek minister of defense was in Tashkent and did not seem to have any scheduling conflicts. In addition, Uzbekistan did sign a cooperation agreement discussed at the meeting.

Tashkent’s latest moves concerning Russia are consistent with a recently stated policy, in which Tashkent seeks to reduce "external influence" over its policy decisions. In keeping with this stance, Uzbekistan reportedly approved a NATO proposal on establishing an inter-continental railway to facilitate the stabilization of Afghanistan without coordinating its response first with Moscow. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Uzbekistan’s participation in the project was deemed essential for it to be viable, and Karimov was the only Central Asian president to make an announcement about the rail link apart from Russian leader Vladimir Putin at the NATO summit in April. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

Russia has expressed its displeasure with Tashkent’s maneuvering by taking retaliatory trade steps. The Russian Ministry of Agriculture’s food and commodity inspectorate recently imposed a temporary ban on Uzbek agricultural exports to Russia, including cotton. Russian officials attributed the ban to the discovery of khapra beetles in Uzbek agricultural imports. The beetles are capable of devastating wheat and other grain crops.

Although the beetle story may be genuine, the Agriculture Ministry’s inspectorate has a reputation for being used for political purposes. In the most prominent recent instance of the inspectorate’s use as a foreign policy lever, the agency banned Georgian and Moldovan wines from the Russian market in apparent retaliation for Tbilisi and Kishinev’s Western leanings. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

Agricultural products comprise a significant portion of the Russian-Uzbek trade, which amounted to $4.2 billion in 2007. Uzbekistan exports most of its fruits and vegetables, and about 10 percent of its cotton to Russia, so the ban can hit Tashkent where it hurts. Some Russian media outlets claimed that Uzbekistan sends as much as 40 percent of its cotton exports to Russia.

"Given that direct trade turnover with the United States and the European Union make less than a fifth of Uzbekistan’s total trade, and Russia accounts for about a third of it, Tashkent is very unlikely to turn away from Russia completely," says a Tashkent-based analyst on conditions of anonymity. "Also, Russia is still an important geopolitical ally."

"However, Uzbekistan’s reviving ties with the West and increasing competition for Central Asian resources will probably give Tashkent more independence and space for maneuver," the expert continued. "Tashkent is probably stirring up trouble to renegotiate its position and find a new balance."

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