EurasiaNet Eurasia Insight - Armenia, Turkey Takes Steps Towards Rapprochement

EURASIA INSIGHT

ARMENIA, TURKEY TAKES STEPS TOWARDS RAPPROCHEMENT
Jon Gorvett 5/29/02

After decades of hostility, there are now signs that two of the Caucasus’ staunchest foes � Armenia and Turkey � are seriously exploring a rapprochement. Improved Armenian-Turkish ties could have a broad stabilizing effect across the Caucasus, improving the potential for a Nagorno-Karabakh settlement and enhancing the prospects for regional energy development projects.

A May 15 meeting involving the foreign ministers of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Turkey, taking place on the fringes of the NATO summit in Reykjavik, Iceland, served as the catalyst for the new dialogue between Yerevan and Ankara. While the three parties have kept quiet about the particulars of the Reykjavik meeting, a number of surprise developments since then have provided strong clues that Armenia and Turkey are prepared to engage in a normalization process.

"I don’t think we’re witnessing any imminent restoration of diplomatic relations between Turkey and Armenia," commented a spokesman for the Turkish foreign ministry, "but there are some positive moves being made."

The first of these indicators came on May 25, when news broke in Turkey that Armenian President Robert Kocharian would visit Istanbul on June 25 for a meeting of the Black Sea Economic Co-operation (BSEC). This is a regional body consisting of all the Black Sea littoral states, plus other interested parties such as Greece and Armenia. Azerbaijani President Heidar Aliyev is also expected to attend.

Kocharian’s visit represents a significant shift in the largely hostile relationship between Armenia on the one hand and Turkey and Azerbaijan on the other. The reasons for this hostility from Ankara run deep, having become intertwined with history, especially the events surrounding the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Armenians living under Ottoman rule during World War I.

A top foreign policy priority for Armenia is to win global recognition of the Armenian Genocide in 1915.Yerevan maintains that modern Turkey’s predecessor, the Ottoman Empire, carried out a deliberate policy of ethnic cleansing against Armenians during the war.

Turkish officials and scholars steadfastly refuse to characterize the events of 1915 as genocide. Ankara argues that at the time, Ottoman forces were trying to repel a Russian invasion of what is now eastern Turkey � an area then largely inhabited by Armenians. Hundreds of thousands of Armenians died during the struggle. Much of the suffering occurred because of an Ottoman decision to deport the entire Armenian population, which was perceived by Ottoman leaders as being pro-Russian, away from the front lines to the southeast.

In recent years, the Armenian communities in the United States and France have mobilized to advocate for international recognition of the Genocide. Turkey has strongly objected to genocide recognition attempts. Every April, when the Armenians commemorate the slaughter, there is usually a noticable deterioration in bilateral relations.

Another second source of Armenian-Turkish tension has been the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Starting in 1988, neighbors Azerbaijan and Armenia fought a war in which some 30,000 people died over the enclave, which lies within Azerbaijan but which is inhabited mostly by ethnic Armenians. Armenian forces emerged victorious, and ended up occupying a large chunk of Azerbaijani territory adjoining Karabakh. Since 1994, the enclave has been under the control of an unrecognized ethnic Armenian government.

As Azerbaijan’s strongest ally in the region, Turkey imposed a blockade on Armenia, essentially shutting off Yerevan’s road and rail links to the West. Until now, Turkey has maintained that a normalization of relations with Yerevan can happen only if Armenian forces withdraw from occupied Azerbaijani territory.

Turkey also alleges that Armenia still holds territorial claims on Turkish soil, and given such weighty problems, Turkish-Armenian relations have long been written off by many observers. Armenia’s closeness to Russia, with Turkey a strong US ally, and Ankara and Moscow long term rivals for influence in the Caucasus, seemed to mean the old Cold War division was set to continue. However, a variety of geopolitical developments, in particular the post-September 11 campaign against terrorism, have exerted pressure on Armenia and Turkey to resolve their differences.

Prior to the launch of the anti-terrorism offensive, tentative attempts to explore reconciliation had stalled, the most visible effort being the formation of the now inactive Turkish-Armenian Reconciliation Commission. [For additional information see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Armenian Foreign Minister Vardan Oskanyan said the Reykjavik meeting provided important momentum to the normalization process.

"All three of us [Reykjavik participants] behaved as equal partners, each country committing itself to contribute to the improvement of the situation in the region," Oskanyan was quoted as saying by the Armenian newspaper Azg on May 21.

Larger geopolitical developments are helping foster a favorable diplomatic atmosphere. At their recent summit, US President George W. Bush and Russian leader Vladimir Putin pledged to work together to promote settlements to Caucasus conflicts, including Karabakh and Abkhazia. Oskanyan also noted that improved NATO-Russian ties could have important stabilization ramifications for Armenia. "The closer Russia-NATO ties get, the more effective Armenia’s complimentary policy will be," he said.

Meanwhile, Putin is due to visit Turkey this summer for the opening of the Blue Stream pipeline, a natural gas conduit lain along the floor of the Black Sea that will bring Russian energy to the Turkish market. Turkey’s relations with Russia are now better than they have been for many years, as growing economic ties have pulled the two countries closer together. This too may influence the Armenian issue.

Editor�s Note: Jon Gorvett is a freelance journalist based in Istanbul.

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