EurasiaNet Eurasia Insight - Polished Commission Chairman Prepares for Historic Afghan Vote

EURASIA INSIGHT

POLISHED COMMISSION CHAIRMAN PREPARES FOR HISTORIC AFGHAN VOTE

Camelia Entekhabi-Fard 6/03/02

On one of side of the table, Ismael Qasimyar sat erect in a conservative Western-style business suit. Facing him, a group of roughly six visitors from Northern Afghanistan, all ethnic Tajiks, sat wearing traditional clothes. Qasimyar, a professor of law, heads the Special Independent Commission for Convening Afghanistan’s Emergency Loya Jirga. The Loya Jirga, or grand council, will open on June 10 to select a two-year transitional government. The visitors, who ranged in age from 45 to 65, had trekked to the Afghan capital, Kabul, to learn how their district would select delegates to the council. All were village elders and leaders of their communities. But the cordial briefing raised the possibility that the council may not be as smooth as Qasimyar’s manner.

As is customary in Afghanistan, the guests received bowls of fruit and nuts. They all busied themselves with peeling and munching without making eye contact with the venerable Chairman. Speaking in a slow and deliberate tone, Qasimyar talked about the process of electing representatives to the 1500-member chamber. But his explanation was curt. "Don’t worry about anything, United Nations is supervising this election," Qasimyar assured the men. With these words, he stood up. This was a cue to the visitors that the meeting was over. When the men rose, I noticed that they had all taken their shoes off. For a moment, I thought I had made a mistake in keeping my shoes on. But a quick glance at Qasimyar’s varnished shoes put my worries at ease. In conversation, attire and concern, Qasimyar and the officials coordinating Afghanistan’s next step toward democracy are trying to impress the West.

"My biggest worry right now is vote-rigging and bribery," Qasimyar told me after his guests had left. "If we feel there are any irregularities in an area, we would immediately cancel the election and appoint the delegates ourselves."

The process of indirectly selecting Loya Jirga delegates began in May. According to rules that Afghanistan’s interim government submitted to the United Nations on April 4, delegates should represent localities, refugees, women, ethnic minorities and several other categories. The Commission will select representatives of secular groups, while local and religious groups will select their own delegates. Anyone 18 years old or older, born in Afghanistan and legally capable of acting as a citizen, may vote for a delegate. Candidates must be at least 22, must be literate, and must pass cautiously worded tests designed to weed out sympathizers with the fallen Taliban militia. Candidates must "have no links with terrorist organizations," must "not have been involved in spreading and smuggling narcotics, abuse of human rights, war crimes, looting of public property and smuggling of cultural and archeological heritage," and must be innocent of murder "in the eyes of the people."

Qasimyar brings an uncommon perspective to many of these criteria. The commission’s sole ethnic Qizilbash, he lived and worked in Tehran before the Taliban fell. He speaks several languages fluently, including English, and enjoys the sponsorship of Lakhdar Brahimi, Afghanistan’s special ambassador to the UN who nominated him to his post in December. His snow-white hair and charismatic posture may help him manage a sensitive position.

Brahimi and Qasimyar have been sending warning signals about election fraud. At a Kabul press conference in late May, Brahimi told reporters that some powerful local individuals he did not name were trying through bribery and threat to change the outcome of local delegate elections in their favor. While Brahimi said these efforts had failed, vote rigging remains a concern. "We had just a few complaints during Loya Jirga elections so far," Interim Interior Minister Yunus Qanooni told EurasiaNet in Washington on May 20. "In one case, we had a complaint because a few local commanders tried to force their own candidates for Loya Jirga. We had to intervene."

Organizers worry about broader patterns of influence as well. Former king Mohammed Zahir Shah, who returned from exile in April, will open the session. Zahir Shah’s supporters have started publicly calling for him to play a larger role, in no small part because many of his fellow ethnic Pashtuns hope for patronage jobs in the new government. As of this writing, the king has discounted the idea of serving as a monarch although he has indicated that he is open to being the nominal head of state. This possibility could prompt some mischief during the Loya Jirga proceedings.

If the Loya Jirga builds a system around a president and Prime Minister, current interim authority chairman Hamid Karzai is likely to take the presidential post. However, it is unlikely that the prime minister would also be an ethnic Pashtun like Karzai. The prime minister could be an ethnic Tajik veteran of the Northern Alliance like Qanooni or Foreign Minister Abdullah Abdullah. According to sources in the Karzai government, the new government would make disabling warlords its top priority. With lawlessness looming as a problem in Paktia and other provinces, the government that emerges from the Loya Jirga will have reason to worry about its popular legitimacy. That means Qasimyar may have to explain the commission’s methods - and its conclusions - more energetically after the Loya Jirga ends.

Editor�s Note: Camelia Entekhabi-Fard is a journalist who specializes in Afghan and Iranian affairs.

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