The G8 nations, in a statement, declared that they "will not ignore the proliferation implications of Iran's advanced nuclear program." They also implied that they would all consider an Iranian refusal to agree to an Additional Protocol a more stringent menu of inspections under the existing United Nations Nonproliferation Treaty an affront.
The Additional Protocol would give International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors broader access to Iran's nuclear sites, including unannounced visits. "We urge Iran to sign and implement an IAEA Additional Protocol without delay or conditions," the statement said. "We offer our strongest support to comprehensive IAEA examination of this country's nuclear program."
Iranian President Mohammed Khatami responded by warning other nations against using nuclear suspicions as a pretext for pressuring Iran. Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hamid-Reza Asefi, via the Islamic Republic News Agency, said June 3 that the country was developing nuclear facilities as energy sources and is already "under careful and comprehensive supervision by the IAEA." [For additional information see the Eurasia Insight archive].
While Iran insists its program is peaceful and geared to meet the country's growing energy needs, many in Washington believe Tehran's main aim is the development of nuclear weapons. An Additional Protocol could stall any nuclear weapons development by letting IAEA inspectors visit wherever they wish and analyze whatever they find. While Iran's program does seem to be at a more advanced stage than many analysts previously believed, experts are nevertheless divided as to its extent and its intentions. It remains an open question as to whether Iran can swiftly begin producing weapons, use its nuclear potential as a bargaining chip in possible future negotiations, or simply produce more energy for domestic consumption.
Concern over Iran's nuclear program heightened following IAEA chief Mohammed el-Baradei's February tour of previously undisclosed nuclear sites in Iran. In Natanz, he found 160 centrifuges ready to turn spent fuel into highly enriched uranium, along with equipment to build 5,000 more such devices. In Arak, he saw a heavy water facility intrinsic to the production of plutonium.
International attention is focusing on Iran's centrifuges. The mere possession of this type of centrifuges does not necessarily violate IAEA rules. In addition, such centrifuges can be used in the production of nuclear energy. Some international experts say Iranian claims that the country requires new energy sources are credible. While Iran's population has more than doubled since the 1979 revolution, oil production has contracted, they point out.
Gary Sick, an Iran expert at Columbia University's School of International and Public Affairs and former member of the US National Security Council, says Iran's pressing energy needs may explain its pursuit of nuclear technology. According to a report by the National Iranian American Council, Sick told a meeting of Congressional aides on May 9 that Iran began pursuing nuclear technology before 1979 without "a bit" of opposition from the United States. Sick also said that American sanctions, imposed after 1979, prevented large-scale projects that could upgrade the country's oil sector.
For now, Iranian leaders seem unconcerned about stern words from abroad, and in little hurry to dispel misgivings, let alone sign additional protocols with the IAEA. Gholamreza Aghazadeh, Iran's atomic chief, recently told the French daily Le Monde that Iran would predicate signing an Additional Protocol on an end to American sanctions.
Meanwhile, there are questions surrounding the G8's resolve to follow up on its statement concerning Iran's nuclear activities. While the Bush administration is steadfastly opposed to Iran's nuclear development, Russia has built extensive commercial relationships on its foundations. [For background, see the Eurasia Insight archives]. Iran has been trying for more than a decade to complete a nuclear power reactor in Bushehr near the Persian Gulf, and Russia has played an important role in this project. According to officials at Russia's atomic energy ministry, Moscow could reap hundreds of millions of dollars in profit from the completion of the Bushehr plant. There is also talk of constructing five additional reactors in the future.
On June 3, Russian President Vladimir Putin told reporters in France that his commitment to the Additional Protocol did not cancel his desire to see the Bushehr project completed. "We are categorically opposed to bringing in any problems which could be used for unfair competition, including on the Iranian market," he said, according to the Islamic Republic News Agency. Iran's nuclear program also ranked high on the agenda of the summit between Bush and Putin in St Petersburg on May 31. Bush administration officials consider the issue a major irritant in its relations with the Russians, and have pressured the Kremlin to restrict its nuclear cooperation with Iran. Putin and Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov appear not to have made major concessions on Bushehr, insisting that its development can proceed without compromising nonproliferation efforts. "We have no agreement with Iran that Bushehr can only be built if Iran signs an Additional Protocol," Ivanov said on May 31.
Tension between Tehran and Washington may intensify on June 16, when the IAEA's Board of Governors is scheduled to meet in Vienna. El-Baradei is expected to report on Iran's nuclear capabilities during the meeting. Washington is reportedly pressuring the 35-member board which includes Iranian and American delegates to declare Iran in breach of the Nonproliferation Treaty. The Bush administration could use a declared violation to press the United Nations Security Council for sanctions on Iran.
The Americans' chief nonproliferation official, Assistant Secretary of State John Wolf, said in Geneva on April 28 that Iran's nuclear agenda constitutes "perhaps the most fundamental challenge ever faced by the Nonproliferation Treaty." A report in the Saudi newspaper Al-Watan claimed that the Bush administration might lobby for el-Baradei's removal if he does not make a suitably stern report at the Board of Governors meeting.
Editor's note:
Ardeshir Moaveni is the pseudonym for a freelance journalist specializing in Iranian political affairs.
