Eurasia Insight:
EARLY REVIEW OF GEORGIA'S LOCAL ELECTIONS
Irakly Areshidze: 6/06/02

Georgia’s chaotic local elections remain shrouded in uncertainty. The Central Election Commission, which earlier announced that it would recount ballots in Tbilisi, now appears to be reconsidering its decision. A recount has been sought by many major political parties that contested the Tbilisi election. Final results are expected within a few days, though analyzing regional races will be particularly challenging because Georgians were electing 60 different regional councils along with Mayors for a number of cities and towns.

There is no denying that elections had serious problems — according to the preliminary report of the International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy (ISFED), "these elections were so badly organized that it is difficult to tell whether or not the will of the people was expressed fairly." ISFED identifies two important problems with the vote. First, "disastrous state of voter registration lists," which were so inaccurate that one of the most prominent politicians in Georgia, beer magnate and leader of the Industrialists Party Gogi Topadze, could not find himself or the rest of his family on the voter list in his Vake precinct (Vake is the wealthiest part of Tbilisi). Second, violence, largely in the regions, particularly in Zugdidi — the power base of the now splintered "Zviadists" (supporters of former President Zviad Gamsakhurdia) — and Khashuri. In Zugdidi and Khashuri some precincts will have to revote. Two deputy Governors of Samegrelo region, of which Zugdidi is the capital, resigned because of the violence. Violations were also reported in the town of Rustavi, where elections were cancelled completely after armed men stole the ballots, which were, belatedly at 8:00 a.m. on Sunday, on their way to the city. Elections in Rustavi will be held on June 16, when the vote in the autonomous region of Adjaria is also scheduled.

While electoral violations were numerous, few, if any, observers suggested that President Eduard Shevardnadze’s government engaged in a conspiracy to engineer false results. ISFED, for example, writes that "parallel turnout tabulation conducted … revealed that there was not likely to have been massive and centrally organized fraud." This did not stop a number of political leaders, led by Mikhael Saakashvili of the National Movement (also known as "Nationalists") and former Parliamentary Speaker Zurab Zhvania (whose supporters competed on the former pro-Zviadist Christian Conservative Party list), from putting full blame on Shevardnadze during protests in front of the State Chancellery on June 3. Analysts and the Central Election Commission (CEC) explained many of the problems by the fact that the one-month timeframe was insufficient to prepare for the elections (the final decision to hold the vote was not made until late April due to Parliament’s inability to agree to changes to the Electoral Code). Anticipating problems before the vote, CEC’s Chairman Djumber Lominadze asked the President to delay the elections by at least a week. Explaining his refusal to do so, on June 4 Shevardnadze pointed out that the same individuals who were blaming him for the problems were planning on bringing up articles of impeachment against him in Parliament had he delayed the vote past June 2.

While administratively the elections were abysmal, the fact that an economically devastated nation was able to hold the elections for local government bodies at all is an achievement. As well, while not perfect, the vote was an excellent opportunity for people to engage in self-government. At 46 percent, the turnout in Tbilisi was over 10 percent higher than four years ago and 8-10 percent higher than anticipated by pollsters. According to ISFED estimates, regionally the turnout was over 60 percent, which suggests that citizens at large took seriously the opportunity to elect individuals who could impact their lives directly. The fact that the government did not actively engage in voter fraud is also encouraging. The present vote contrast sharply with the 1999 Parliamentary election, when fraud was widely acknowledged, with many Georgians accusing Zhvania of fraudulently engineering an overwhelming victory for then ruling Citizens Union of Georgia (CUG) through voter fraud, including reduction of the final total for the National Democratic and Laborist Parties to below the seven percent minimum necessary to enter the legislature (Zhvania has denied these allegations).

In Tbilisi, voters elected the city’s Sakrebulo (Council). The Tbilisi Mayor will continue to be appointed by the President, while the Sakrebulo will elect its Speaker, who will likely become the other dominant person in city’s politics. CEC reported that a total of 260,000 voters participated in the Tbilisi elections. Election was conducted using party lists, with 49 seats in the Sakrebulo divided proportionally among all parties that pass the four-percent minimum vote requirement. While polls predicted that five parties were likely to break this minimum, six managed to garner sufficient support.

Late in the evening on June 4, the CEC decided to recount the votes in the capital. Two days later, however, some CEC officials expressed reluctance to go through with a recount. Results are not expected to change much, though the most pro-Russian party in Georgia known as Unity, which is led by Djumber Patiashvili, is teetering on the verge of the four-percent mark and might break it in a recount.

According to the latest vote totals, the Laborist Party is expected to win between 15-16 seats; National Movement 14-15 seats; New Rights Party 7-8 seats; Zhvania’s Team and Industrialists Party 4 seats each; and the Revival Party 2-3 seats.

The level of support for Zhvania’s Team was higher than anticipated, and is attributed by some to the attacks that Zhvania suffered at the hands of the pro-Shevardnadze wing of CUG during the court battles about that Party’s future (a battle Zhvania eventually lost). The total vote for the Laborists and National Movement is also higher than originally anticipated. Analysts explained this by a higher than expected anti-Shevardnadze "protest voter" turnout. In other words, when a turnout is below 60 percent, the "protest vote" is necessarily a higher percentage of the total because many content citizens choose to stay at home. By contrast, in a high-turnout votes, such as Parliamentary elections where turnout can be expected at 60 or 70 percent based on past patterns, the share of the "protest vote" will be smaller.

Thus, it remains an open question whether National Movement and Laborist Party can do as well in forthcoming Parliamentary elections in 2003 as they did in the Tbilisi Sakrebulo race, even if only the Tbilisi electorate were considered (these two parties fared far worse in the regions than they did in the capital). The Laborist Party won the Tbilisi race during the last local elections, in 1998. By contrast, in the 1999 Parliamentary elections Laborists officially did not break the seven percent barrier, though some of its votes were clearly given to CUG and thus its real percentage was probably eight or nine. While the turnout helped Laborists and National Movement, it hurt the New Rights and Industrialists Parties, who have extremely loyal, but smaller, electorates. Had the turnout been in the mid-30s as anticipated, the share of the total would have been higher.

In Tbilisi the focus now is on the election of Sakbrebulo’s Speaker. Prior to the race, Saakashvili and one of the leaders of New Rights, Levan Gachechiladze, founder of Georgian Wine and Spirits Co., were regarded as the principal candidates for the position; both were first in their parties’ respective lists. Since the election, to the likely disappointment of many who voted for the Nationalists only because of his popularity, Saakashvili announced that he does not intend to leave Parliament to join the Sakrebulo, clearing the field for Gachechiladze to become Speaker. Gachechiladze’s only possible opponent is Laborists Party’s leader Shalva Natelasvhili, though Georgian newspapers reported on June 4 about a potential alliance between Laborists, Industrialists, and New Rights, which would give Gachechiladze the Speakership without the Nationalists’ support. According to news reports, this alliance would be aimed specifically against the Nationalists since for the three parties Saakashvili is unacceptable due to his populism.

Information about the regional races is coming in slowly, and many questions remain. In all, there are a total of 75 regional districts ("raioni" in Georgian and Russian). Elections for Sakrebulos were held in all these districts, with the exception of those located in Abkhazia, Adjaria (elections there will take place later in June), and Southern Ossetia. Each district has a Gamgebeli (Executive) who, according to the Election Code, will be appointed from the elected Sakrebulo by the President.

From the analysis of the regional results that are available at this time, it is clear that the hands-down winner was the New Rights Party. Of the less than 30 districts that have reported thus far where there was a competitive race for the Sakrebulo, New Rights gained a controlling majority in 15. It is of particular note that the Party won four districts in Samegrelo province, which boarders Abkhazia and some analysts suspect could be the next base for separatism if stability begins to disintegrate in Georgia in the post-Shevardnadze era. The so-called "Reformers Team" (i.e., alliance of Zhvania and Saakashvili) is reported by unofficial sources to have won a majority in five districts, while no party has a majority in a number of others.

Significant mayoral races took place in Kutaisi, Borjomi, Akhalkalaki, Poti, and Telavi; races in Rustavi, Zugdidi and Khasuri have not been decided because of voting irregularities, while in Batumi a free election is not expected to take place at all. Prime News reported on June 3 that a pro-Zhvania candidate was leading in Akhakalaki. Winners have been called in Kutuaisi, Georgia’s second largest city, where New Rights Party’s candidate Nugzar Puliani was declared the victor, and in Gori, where philosopher-turned-politician Paata Chkheidze also of the New Rights won, but his victory is being challenged in court by the National Movement.

One of the most striking post-election developments has been a very public feud between Saakashvili’s National Movement and the Laborists Party. The Nationalists, joined by Zhvania’s Team, Traditionalists, and others, demanded a recount of the vote in Tbilisi; the CEC agreed to this demand. The Laborists Party opposed the recount, arguing that the recount’s goal was to declare many of the votes cast fraudulent in order to reduce the total number of valid votes to below 33.3 percent, which is the minimum to make the election legitimate. In making his argument, Laborists leader Natelashvili pointed to Saakashvili’s demands on June 3 that the vote be cancelled and a revote be called.

Things got further complicated when Natelashvili was asked about reports by the Armenian News Agency "Armen Press" that leaders of the National Movement (Saakashvili) and Christian Conservatives (Zhvania) were "ethnically Armenian." Natelashvili, appearing on Rustavi 2 Television on June 5, responded by saying that "if they are indeed Armenian, let God keep these sort of Armenians away from Georgia and Armenia." This statement, understandably, drew sharp rebuke from the supporters of Saakashvili, who generally denies these rumors about his ethnicity. (Saakashvili himself is away from Tbilisi in the United States.) Some of Saakashvili’s supporters have accused Natelashvili of working on President’s command in order to discredit the reformers.

What role the Laborists Party will play in Georgian politics in the future remains an open question. Their ideas are clearly neo-Communist; Natelashvili has argued that Georgian property owners do not need protection and that it is not at all strange to expect the rich to support the poor. Some analysts believe that Natelashvili makes these statements only to appeal to the vulnerable pensioners and has few, if any, real ideological convictions. Some believe that Laborists Party’s prospects on the national scale are very limited, because the so-called "protest vote," which is the basis of the Party’s support, has far less influence in national races.

The question of Laborists Party’s future notwithstanding, the elections helped clarify Georgia’s very confusing and complicated political landscape. With the formerly governing CUG unable to win any of the major races, this election was the first test for two new political forces—Saakashvili’s Nationalists and the pro-business New Rights Party, which the "reformist" camp claims is Shevardnadze’s new power base. Some have argued that CUG’s loss is also a defeat for Shevardnadze, but in reality, the President had given up on the Party he used to chair a long time ago and now finds far more support among the business community. The two new parties followed very different political strategies, with the Nationalists focusing almost entirely on Tbilisi, and the New Rights spreading its resources across the country. Results were mixed for both. While the Nationalists came in second in Tbilisi, behind the Laborists Party, the New Rights came in third. While reformers called this a loss, the pro-New Rights analysts in Tbilisi point out that in April it remained an open question if the Party could surpass the four-percent barrier at all. What the Tbilisi vote will look like in a future Parliamentary election, however, is an open question, as discussed above. Meanwhile, the New Rights strength in the regions, where the turnout was 15 percent higher than in Tbilisi, indicates a strong base of support for the Parliamentary election, especially because one-third of the legislature is elected through majoritarian districts (like those in the US House of Representatives) most of which are outside of the capital.

Analysts are also interested in the future of the so-called "reformist team," and whether Zhvania and Saakashvili will be able to cooperate, since both wish to be President. Zhvania has expressed interest in forming a united front; he shares with Saakashvili a center-left, pro-government ideology. If a formal alliance were established, Zhvania would probably wish to take the leading role as a more senior politician. However, with Saakashvili far more popular than Zhvania, the former has little need for the latter, who, in turn, is unlikely to feel comfortable being second-in-command having played that role to Shevardnadze for a decade.

Talk of an alliance has also reached the center-right, pro-business political wing where the New Rights and Industrialists Parties dominate. Much like the Zhvania-Saakashvili union, the New Rights-Industrialists alliance is logical philosophically, but whether Industrialists’ leader Topadze would be willing to give up a party he dominates single-handedly to join with an organization which has from the start chosen to stay away from personality-based party building is an open question.

Editor’s Note: This report, which has had prior limited circulation by email, is posted with the permission of the author. Irakly Areshidze is a Visiting Fellow at the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute of the Johns Hopkins University School for Advanced International Studies (SAIS). Comments are welcome at irakly@psigeorgia.org. Opinions expressed in this analysis are those of the author and not of the institutions with which the author is affiliated.