EurasiaNet Eurasia Insight - Divisive Debate Mutes Karzai's Anti-Warlord Agenda

EURASIA INSIGHT

DIVISIVE DEBATE MUTES KARZAI’S ANTI-WARLORD AGENDA
Camelia Entekhabi-Fard 6/14/02

June 14 marked the first day of Hamid Karzai’s two-year term as Afghanistan’s transitional president. It may also mark the end of warlords’ rule in this troubled country, as Karzai has immediately compared the provinces’ martial law to terrorism. But a dispute over the country’s religious identity diluted Karzai’s call for civic reform.

Less than 24 hours into his presidency, Karzai tried to nullify provincial warlords’ claims to power. In a June 13 speech accepting his election by the emergency Loya Jirga, or grand legislative council, Karzai unambiguously warned the armed commanders who control Afghan provinces to unify under national laws. "The Afghan people want to get rid of warlordism," Karzai said. "They want to get rid of the gun once and for all. And once again we have a strong mandate." Warlords like Mazar-e-Sharif’s Abdul Rashid Dostum and Herat’s Ismail Khan have, like Karzai, enjoyed the United States’ military support since the antiterrorism coalition formed in October 2001. Nonetheless, Karzai used his election as an opportunity to distance himself from these strongmen. "The war against warlordism will go on and the war against terrorism will go on," he told a Kabul press conference on June 14. "We need a country which will have institutions that are trusted by people." Warlords like Khan have seized tax and customs revenue, and many maintain their own armies.

Karzai’s challenge to the regional strongmen seemed to portend a showdown on the Loya Jirga’s fourth day, as nearly 1,600 delegates began choosing a cabinet and parliament for the new government. In one corner of the Loya Jirga tent, most of the powerful warlords were sitting together. Former president Burhanuddin Rabbani, Wahabbi leader Abdul Rasul Sayaf, Hazara leader Karim Khalili and others sat near Khan, Dostum, Kandahar governor Gul Agha Shirzai, and other provincial chiefs. In another corner, facing them, Karzai sat with the men who had formed his six-month interim cabinet. Jalalabad governor Haji Qadir, rumored to be a strong contender for Interior Minister, joined Karzai’s group.

The symbolism was not lost on the Loya Jirga delegates. "The new stage of Karzai’s government would be to start ending warlordism," said Haliem, a delegate in the tent. "This is the beginning of the end to them."

But another issue distracted the delegates: what to call the new country. Sayaf, known for his hard-line religious beliefs, spoke about Islam. When he raised the idea of segregating men from women, many women raised their hands to speak. As the women kept murmuring, a group of Sayaf supporters tried to quiet them by chanting "Allah-hu Akbar (God is great)!" After a Kandahar sheik talked about forming an Islamic transitional administration, to shouts of "right!," Shirzai played the role of moderate. The Kandahar governor, whose region served as the Taliban’s base, prompted many delegates who had been ready to attack one another to jump from their seats and approach the microphone in unified disagreement.

"I think we’ve had enough war since 25 years ago in the name of Islam," Shirzai said. "This government has enough of a basis in Islam and everybody knows this is an Islamic government. We admire Islam and�don’t need to put its name on the transitional government." Chaos followed this statement, prompting Abdullah Abdullah - the interim government’s Foreign Minister and a leader of the former Northern Alliance - to approach the mob. Qadir, who has been friendly to Panjshiri Tajiks like Abdullah, found himself blocking attacks against Shirzai. "We don’t need to talk about this issue," said Qadir. "Why are you worried?"

In a sudden show of hands, the Loya Jirga did decide to name Karzai’s team the Islamic Transitional Government of Afghanistan. Whatever the consequences of this debate may be, it did drown out Karzai’s call to end warlordism. It also deferred for another day the matter of what role regional strongmen could play in the new government. The agenda had called for delegates to discuss the shape of the government. But the name issue changed the subject and completely overshadowed the situation.

One minister who asked for anonymity suspected foul play. "Seems very strange to me. Who said that without voting, just with that kind of stupid showing of hands, the chairman could announce a majority vote?" he said. "Who counted that? It was a collusion."

Shirzai, meanwhile, discredited Karzai’s office. "I don’t like the presidency," he told EurasiaNet. "It’s not good for our society. Our constitution talked about the President and Prime Minister." Shirzai complained that previous governments based around a president had failed, then called on Karzai to work with a "little change from his old cabinet."

The showdown between Karzai and the warlords may merely have been delayed. A source close to Karzai says, "some warlords may be getting ready to show their hand for the Interior ministry position." Yunus Qanooni, a Northern Alliance leader, resigned as Interior Minister on June 11, speaking of the need for "sacrifice."

If the Loya Jirga appoints someone like Dostum to a government job, Karzai will have a hard time reconciling his cabinet to his June 14 speeches. American envoy Zalmay Khalilzad, who held a press conference stressing the sustained danger that al Qaeda poses to Afghanistan and the world, works for a country that has long endorsed governmental reform while giving warlords wide latitude. It remains to be seen whether Afghanistan can follow this model.

Editor�s Note: Camelia Entekhabi-Fard is a journalist who specializes in Afghan and Iranian affairs. She is currently in Afghanistan reporting for EurasiaNet.

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