EurasiaNet Eurasia Insight - Can US-Russian Missile Defense Cooperation in Azerbaijan Work?

EURASIA INSIGHT

CAN US-RUSSIAN MISSILE DEFENSE COOPERATION IN AZERBAIJAN WORK?
6/14/07
A EurasiaNet Commentary by Richard Weitz

Exploratory talks on the joint US-Russian operation of the Gabala radar station in Azerbaijan are expected to begin in July, following Russian President Vladimir Putin’s planned visit to the United States. Whether the discussions make any actual progress toward an agreement remains highly uncertain, but the very proposal places Washington in an uncomfortable position.

Putin appeared to surprise US officials with a formal offer, extended at the recent G-8 summit in Germany, for Washington and Moscow to share the Gabala facility. Many observers see Putin’s proposal as an attempt to head off US plans to establish a new ballistic missile defense (BMD) radar facility in the Czech Republic.

Washington disclosed its intention in early 2007 to build a BMD radar in the Czech Republic and to deploy associated anti-missile systems in Poland. Immediately after the announcement, Putin’s Kremlin shifted into overdrive, launching a rhetorical offensive designed to thwart Washington’s BMD plans. Russian officials alternately claimed that no missile threat existed in Europe, then proceeded to very publicly test new arms systems that could evade the envisioned BMD network. Moscow also threatened to withdraw from European arms control agreements, as well as target any US-operated BMD complexes in Eastern Europe with Russia’s own missiles and warplanes.

Such bluster failed to deter the Bush administration, or bully the Czech and Polish governments for that matter. So Putin apparently changed course � opting to employ charm instead of resorting to intimidation. Playing to the Bush administration’s current obsession with Iran, Putin emphasized the fact that Gabala is far better suited to track a potential Iranian missile launch than would a Central European-based BMD system. From Moscow’s perspective, pushing Gabala over a Czech-Polish option makes perfect sense, as a joint operational framework would ensure that the BMD system couldn’t be used to monitor Moscow’s behavior.

Despite Russian hype, chances are slim that the United States will bite on a Gabala deal as envisioned by Putin. US defense analysts are quick to point out flaws in Putin’s reasoning. Gabala, as currently configured, couldn’t meet all of Washington’s strategic requirements. Among the technical problems, Gabala’s proximity to Iran could make the complex less useful for guiding interceptor missiles, since Iranian ICBMs would quickly overfly the radar. Also, experts in Moscow readily admit that the Russian-built Gabala station isn’t set up to operate US anti-missile systems.

But the point of Russia’s offer wasn’t necessarily to get the United States to agree to a joint-operating scheme, but to place Washington on the diplomatic defensive. "Moscow has seized the initiative and pushed Washington into a corner," Russian expert Alexander Khramchikhin wrote in a commentary published by the official RIA-Novosti news agency on June 14.

The Gabala offer has already succeeded in softening Putin’s image in Europe, and some NATO members are supposedly interested in exploring the feasibility of Gabala cooperation, according to a June 13 report distributed by the Interfax news agency. The United States, then, could take a serious public relations hit, if it is seen as dismissing the Gabala plan out of hand.

Though skeptical of Russian intentions, US officials see a certain utility to gaining access to Gabala. The chief benefit would be the strengthening of US-Azerbaijani ties. [For background see the Eurasia insight archive]. US defense official have long sought to make better strategic use of Azerbaijan, Iran’s northern neighbor, and Gabala could be a wedge that opens the door to other avenues of US-Azerbaijani security cooperation. Prior to Putin’s Gabala offer, the American and Azerbaijani dialogue on the BMD issue had, in the words of Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov, been "rudimentary."

For several years, the US government has been helping construct two radar stations in Azerbaijan. The first radar site is slightly north of Baku; the second is near Azerbaijan’s southern border with Iran. Unlike the Gabala BMD complex, however, the American-sponsored radars are designed to monitor the potential movement of weapons of mass destruction

Many political observers believe the United States will seek to strike a deal with Russia on Gabala while still proceeding with its Central European BMD plans. This, of course, is a scenario that Moscow steadfastly opposes. For Russian negotiators, Gabala is a substitute for, not a compliment to the Czech-Polish option. Some experts believe that Moscow may try to drag out Gabala discussions in the hopes that a change in US administrations in late 2008 will result in the shelving of US BMD plans.

Editor�s Note: Richard Weitz is a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute in Washington, DC.

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