EurasiaNet Eurasia Insight - Georgian Base Dispute Helps Stoke NATO-Russian Tension

EURASIA INSIGHT

GEORGIAN BASE BECOMES A FACTOR IN NATO-RUSSIAN TENSION
Jean-Christophe Peuch 6/18/07

Editor's Note: Reposting to clarify details of the 1999 Adapted CFE Treaty.

Georgian-Russian tension is helping to fuel a deterioration of Moscow’s relationship with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

The two sides feuded over Russia’s continuing presence at a military facility at Gudauta, located in the separatist territory of Abkhazia, during an extraordinary conference involving the 30 state-parties to the 1990 Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty. The June 12-15 meeting in Vienna was convened ostensibly to discuss Russian grievances. The Kremlin in recent months has agitated to alter the treaty, which was modified in 1999, in order to enhance Russia’s strategic position the European theater.

NATO member states were steadfast and united during the meeting in rejecting Russia’s wish to renegotiate. In addition to the Gudauta controversy, the two sides jousted over the ongoing presence of Russian troops in Moldova’s separatist Transdniester region. Moscow reportedly is seeking a deal under which it would fulfill its commitment to withdraw troops from Georgia in return for the ability to maintain its military presence in Moldova. NATO, Georgia and Moldova rejected this.

In addition, Russia during the Vienna gathering insisted that NATO members ratify the 1999 modifications to the CFE pact. Those changes contain provisions for the accession of states that are currently not party to the pact, specifically the three Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, which regained independence in 1991. Once ratified by NATO states, Moscow would insist that the Baltic States join the CFE compact. NATO members have withheld ratification of the addendum, known as the 1999 Adapted CFE Treaty, due to Moscow’s refusal to comply with the so-called Istanbul Commitments, which mandate that Russian withdraw its forces from Georgia and Moldova.

The closed-door Vienna meeting ended with participants failing to endorse a Russian-drafted final statement, thus leaving open the question of whether Moscow would carry on with threats to freeze its commitments under the landmark Cold War-era arms reduction treaty.

In agreeing to the 1999 modifications to the CFE treaty, Moscow committed to withdrawing from four former Soviet bases on Georgian territory. Russia claims to have vacated one of the four bases, known as Gudauta, on October 26, 2001, 18 weeks behind schedule. Georgian officials dispute this, insisting that Moscow is maintains a military presence at the facility, which is located in the separatist territory of Abkhazia. Earlier in 2001, Russia handed over the Vaziani military airfield, outside Tbilisi, to the Georgian government of then-President Eduard Shevardnadze.

Negotiations on Russia’s two remaining bases -- located respectively in Akhalkalaki, in the predominantly Armenian region of Samtskhe-Javakheti, and in the Black Sea port of Batumi, the capital of the autonomous region of Ajara -- dragged on for nearly five years. On May 31, 2005, both sides signed in Sochi a couple of agreements under which Russia finally pledged to vacate the two military facilities by the end of 2008. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

In a June 14 address to the Permanent Council of the OSCE, made on the sidelines of the CFE Treaty Vienna conference, Georgian Foreign Minister Gela Bezhuashvili commended Russia for pulling out "according to the agreed schedule." But he added that concerns linger over Gudauta, which is the only former base located in territory not directly controlled by Tbilisi. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

Moscow initially insisted on assigning the facility to its Abkhaz-based peacekeeping forces, something the Georgians strongly opposed. Now, Russian officials claim Gudauta is mostly a sanatorium for retired army officers, and no longer hosts any combat military hardware.

Georgia dismisses Russia’s depiction, saying that, in violation of the CFE pact, the base is still operational and represents a potential security threat. In particular, officials in Tbilisi say they fear Gudauta could be used by Abkhaz armed forces. "We know precisely how many troops are there, what kind of ammunition is there. There are both transport and combat helicopters on the ground," Bezhuashvili told reporters following his address to the OSCE Permanent Council.

Moscow last year admitted that four helicopters and about 130 Russian peacekeepers were located at the base. But it denied accusations that it had installed a S-300 missile air defense system to protect its airfield, which Tbilisi insists should be blown up. Georgia is demanding that OSCE-led inspection teams be authorized to visit the base to make an independent determination. Tbilisi also wants Russian officials to hand over all base documentation to Georgian representatives.

Once Tbilisi makes sure Gudauta has been effectively dismantled, Bezhuashvili said, "the Georgian case will be removed from the list of issues that are preventing ratification of the Adapted CFE Treaty."

Russia argues that an OSCE inspection team already visited the base in July 2002 but could not officially document its closure because it had no mandate to do so. Georgia says that the OSCE mission in 2002 had a mandate only to determine a framework for future inspections. Georgia also insists that Russia is obliged to accept inspection teams at Gudauta under the CFE Treaty. Moscow counters that the Istanbul Commitments do not provide for international monitoring of its withdrawal from the base.

Anatoly Antonov, the chief Russian negotiator at the Vienna talks, said that "Moscow has met all those of the Istanbul commitments that are related to the CFE Treaty" and that all remaining issues should be negotiated through bilateral talks with Georgia, or Moldova. Tbilisi, meanwhile, points to a 1999 joint Russian-Georgian statement, saying it is an integral part of the Adapted CFE Treaty and is therefore creating a multilateral -- not bilateral -- international commitment.

In a bid to mollify the Russians, the United States suggested that Gudauta be visited not by a formal inspection team, but by a "neutral and objective" fact-finding mission. Addressing reporters at the start of the Vienna conference, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Daniel Fried described the offer as one of several "constructive ideas" that could help lift the Russian objections and "that do not compromise our principled position."

Asked by EurasiaNet to comment on the US proposal, Army Gen. Vladimir Nikishin -- who represented the Russian Defense Ministry at the Vienna talks, remained noncommittal. "We are not against such a mission provided it brings necessary, useful and -- most importantly -- fair results," Nikishin said.

Antonov in turn claimed no consensus exists among NATO countries on what exactly constitutes the Istanbul Commitments. Therefore, he said, prior to consenting to a Gudauta fact-finding mission, Russia wants all sides to agree on "terms of reference that clearly specify under which conditions the issue will be considered closed once and for all."

Neither side appears willing to compromise.

Reacting to Bezhuashvili’s address to the OSCE Permanent Council, US Charge d’Affaires Kyle Scott insisted on the necessity of a multinational observer visit to Gudauta. "We should stop talking about it, we should do it," Scott said.

Another problem is that Georgia insists on being part of the Gudauta observer mission. "We have a legitimate right to be part of the group," Bezhuashvili told reporters in Vienna. Sukhumi, which is still formally at war with Tbilisi, has vetoed such a possibility.

Editor�s Note: Jean-Christophe Peuch is a Vienna-based freelance correspondent, who specializes in Caucasus- and Central Asia-related developments.

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