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EURASIA INSIGHT

RUSSIA HAS MISGIVINGS ABOUT SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANIZATION

6/20/01

A Russian diplomatic source reports that Moscow’s foreign policy establishment has misgivings about the newly minted Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). In particular, Uzbekistan’s inclusion in the organization is viewed by many Russian policy makers with ambivalence. They see a risk that Tashkent’s mercurial leadership can do more to complicate, rather than clarify Central Asia’s security picture.

Leaders from the six member states � China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan -- met June 14-15 in China to formally transform the so-called Shanghai Five into the SCO. At the same meeting, Uzbekistan became a full-fledged member of the group, which aims to promote greater regional economic and security cooperation. At the summit, leaders spoke of the need to jointly address the threat posed by radical Islam, especially the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan’s (IMU) insurgency. [For additional information see the Eurasia Insight archives].

Uzbekistan has long posed a dilemma for Russian geopolitical designs in Central Asia. Tashkent has steered an independent course, resisting pressure from Moscow to adhere to Kremlin policy, and even withdrawing from the Collective Security Treaty in 1998. Since the IMU’s first incursions two summers ago, Russia has sought to get Uzbekistan more involved in multilateral security initiatives, both to provide a more effective response to Islamic radicalism and to bolster Moscow’s regional influence.

When the Shanghai Five began to take shape in 1996-97, Russia viewed it as a potentially effective method to manage Central Asian geopolitical developments, the diplomatic source says. Russian policy makers, in effect, hoped the organization would help them retain a traditional level of influence over Central Asian events. From the start, however, Central Asian member states � Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan � were reluctant to rely on Russia’s guidance. The three Central Asian states, for example, reached border delimitation agreements with China during the late 1990s, without ever consulting with Moscow.

Despite their frustrations, Russian officials decided to proceed with the formal transformation into the SCO. However, the aspirations of the Russian establishment now appear more limited � with some policy-makers viewing the SCO as largely an alliance of convenience with the limited aim of containing Islamic radicalism. Even in this sphere, Russia is concerned that Uzbekistan’s inclusion in the organization has the potential to create headaches.

Comments made by Uzbek President Islam Karimov seemed to underscore Russian worries. In a report broadcast on Uzbek television on June 16, Karimov stated clearly that he would not take orders from Moscow, expressing concerns of his own that Russia might try to manipulate the SCO to mount a campaign against US strategic initiatives, such as NATO expansion and a missile defense shield.

"I have put my signature under ideas expressed in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization declaration. � It says: cooperation, cooperation, cooperation," Karimov said. "This organization must never turn into a military political bloc. � It should not be against any country, should not join certain trends, should not organize subversive activities against third countries."

In another sign of defiance, Karimov stressed a desire for improved Chinese-Uzbek ties. "The sympathies of Chinese leaders and the Chinese people, as a whole, lie with the Uzbek people," Karimov said. "We should be interested in creating long-standing relations with China."

Other Central Asian SCO member states are not enthused about Uzbek participation, according to the Russian source. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in particular are disenchanted with Uzbekistan’s bullying behavior, including Tashkent’s mining of border zones and its periodic cutoffs of natural gas deliveries. They are worried that the SCO will offer Tashkent a forum to stir up further trouble. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archives]. The Russian source quoted a Tajik official as complaining: "None of us is apt to welcome the Uzbek imperialists, interested in nothing but their own status and ambitions."

Ignoring the complaints of its neighbors, Uzbekistan is continuing to plant mines in mountainous areas along the country’s borders with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, indicating that it intends to pursue unilateral responses to the IMU danger.

The irony that it was Moscow which initially brought Uzbekistan into the Shanghai Five process is not lost on Russian policy makers. Apparently concerns about the IMU threat outweigh Russia’s apprehensions in other areas, as well as the opposition of Central Asian states, to Uzbek membership in the SCO. Uzbekistan’s maverick status aside, the country is the largest and most powerful in Central Asia. Thus, Tashkent’s participation would significantly enhance any effort to build a successful regional security architecture.

Likewise, Russian officials have low expectations that the SCO can emerge as a successful vehicle for trade. Only 10.7 percent, or almost $15 billion, of Russia’s overall trade turnover involved SCO countries. For China, the figure was a mere 2.5 percent, or $12 billion.

A growing concern for Russia is China’s expanding influence, and some in Moscow are worried that the SCO could end up abetting Beijing’s efforts to expand its influence in Central Asia, the Russian source says. At the June 14-15 summit, not only Karimov, but also Tajik President Imomali Rahmonov called for improved relations with China.

Beijing’s growing relationship with Central Asian states has already created difficulties for Russia. The source pointed out that the Chinese stance in bilateral discussion with Russia over the use of water resources has hardened. China is considering diverting waters from up to 30 rivers originating in northwestern Xinjiang Province that flow into Kazakhstan and Russia. Russian officials oppose the plans.

It is somewhat ironic, the Russian source notes, that China, which now seems poised to benefit most from the organization, at first opposed the transformation of the Shanghai Five into the SCO. Beijing’s position changed only after the election of US President George W. Bush.

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