Eurasia Insight:
QANOONI'S REJECTION ENDS AFGHAN COUNCIL ON A BUMPY NOTE
Camelia Entekhabi-Fard: 6/20/02

The emergency Loya Jirga, a grand legislative council that assembled some 1,600 Afghans from around the country and the world, ended on June 20 in a mood of apparent calm. But while delegates raised their voices every day, they disbanded with some major problems unresolved. The government has not established a parliament, and it is not entirely clear how President Hamid Karzai plans to start developing one. Moreover, the cabinet Karzai announced one day earlier has not held. Karzai, an ethnic Pashtun like most of the deposed Taliban leadership, tried to balance the influence of northern Panjshiri Tajiks in the cabinet. Yunus Qanooni, a Tajik leader of the old anti-Taliban Northern Alliance, seemed to be playing along when he resigned as Interior Minister on June 14. But Karzai’s demotion of Qanooni from Interior to the relatively ill-defined Education Ministry took many people, including Qanooni himself, by surprise. As the Loya Jirga closed, Qanooni refused his new assignment, making Karzai’s real-life government look fragile.

Karzai faces the daunting task of uniting Afghanistan’s various ethnic and provincial leaders under a nationalist agenda. He will have to placate warlords like Mazar-i-Sharif chief Abdul Rashid Dostum and Tajik veterans like Qanooni, without ever appearing to defer to other interests. His handling of Qanooni’s assignment hints at how sensitive these tasks are. On June 19, after Karzai finished introducing key cabinet members, one delegate sent a note to Karzai asking about Qanooni’s future role. In response, Karzai said, "We haven’t forgotten about him. We have something for him, the Ministry of Education." There was a brief silence after that in the hall and many people look quite shocked by the announcement. A day later, a number of politicians threatened to boycott the government because of the perceived affront to Qanooni.

In part, Qanooni’s reputation precedes him. Some observers say the well-spoken Panjshiri played a decisive role in forcing hard-line former president Burhanuddin Rabbani to step aside for Karzai during United Nations-brokered talks in Bonn in December 2001, and for generally moving the Northern Alliance toward a more secular and pragmatic political model. In this context, some delegates may have felt that Karzai insulted Qanooni in the way he assigned him his new job.

How did the normally smooth Karzai slip? According to a delegate who asked for anonymity, Karzai had initially scheduled his inauguration speech for 5 p.m. on June 19, but had to delay for an hour because he remained in long discussions with US envoy Zalmay Khalilzad and influential advisor Ashraf Ghani until shortly before 6. Karzai and Qanooni had agreed earlier that day to discuss the Finance Ministry, this delegate says. But Karzai spontaneously went to the microphone naming Ghani as finance chief. Even if Karzai believed that he and Qanooni had an understanding, he evidently underestimated the degree to which the announcement would provoke the warlords and annoy Qanooni. According to some Kabul observers, many people around Karzai are plainly apprehensive and jealous of Qanooni’s popularity and political dexterity.

Yet Qanooni had voluntarily resigned the powerful Interior Ministry, so he must have expected a deal. An advisor to Qanooni told EurasiaNet that his boss had agreed to leave his job because of pressure to reduce the number of Panjshiris in the cabinet. By stepping aside, Qanooni seemed to protect Marshal Mohammed Fahim, another Panjshiri who has built a power base as Defense Minister. But Qanooni, his advisor said, expected to play a more prominent role, perhaps as prime minister or the head of the soon-to-be-formed National Security Directorate. Karzai showed little interest in appointing a prime minister, and the national security organization will not be operational for some time either. Yet the idea of being placed in the apolitical position of Education Minister apparently took Qanooni by surprise.

"I am not sure I am accepting this offer by Mr. Karzai," Qanooni told EurasiaNet. "I prefer to stay at home and improve on my English."

While the Loya Jirga was closing, activity buzzed around Qanooni’s house. Cars belonging to major Afghan political figures shuttled messages between Karzai and Qanooni, their owners sometimes offering to act as go-between. But at least one participant n the council accused Loya Jirga commission chairman Ismael Qasimyar of stifling popular will. "Qasimyar is a smooth operator," said a Kabul delegate bitterly. "He tricked us all day. He got the people busy with [discussing] things like water and electricity then when we asked to know the agenda he would call for lunch and prayer."

Qasimyar had a more discrete but equally sensitive task to Karzai’s. The Loya Jirga did select a president and cabinet, though it did not establish a parliament (or commonly understood procedures for electing one). Nor did the Loya Jirga provide clarity on how the country would develop a national army and police force, which constitutes one of Karzai’s most cherished priorities. Karzai said during his concluding speech that each province should leave five members "to stay about 20 to 30 days in Kabul and talk about the [legislature]." But the mechanics of such a discussion remain under dispute, leaving some delegates feeling cheated by the cutoff of debate.

As of June 20, Karzai has authority to make and enforce decisions about how to protect, tax and govern the ravaged country. But as the Qanooni mess shows, he remains subject to distractions from rival politicians and vulnerable to misunderstandings. Indeed, Rabbani briefly offered to pay for ongoing Loya Jirga expenses on June 19, ostensibly so that the council could choose a parliament. That was before Karzai’s speech closed the session.

But Qanooni’s hurt feelings, and a broader current of mistrust, will not cut off so easily. A Jalalabad delegate leaving the Loya Jirga spoke to EurasiaNet as if the previous week had established nothing firm. "Karzai cannot be a dictator," the delegate said.

Editor’s Note: Camelia Entekhabi-Fard is a journalist who specializes in Afghan and Iranian affairs. She is currently in Afghanistan reporting for EurasiaNet.