EurasiaNet Eurasia Insight - A BICAMERAL PARLIAMENT FOR UZBEKISTAN?

EURASIA INSIGHT

A BICAMERAL PARLIAMENT FOR UZBEKISTAN?

Alisher Ilkhamov 6/22/00

At the May 25 session of the Olyi Majlis (parliament), President Islam Karimov unexpectedly proposed transforming the current parliament from a unicameral to a bicameral body. If adopted, the proposal could represent a step toward democracy or a legally palatable way to pacify regional parliamentary elites and consolidate his power.

President Karimov himself seems unsure of how the restructuring would be perceived. In a notable departure from usual practice, the state-controlled media did not publish his speech immediately, but withheld it for a full five days.

The main official newspaper, Khalq Sozi (Word of the People), described the new parliament as consisting of a lower chamber � the Olyi Majlis (Supreme Assembly) � and an upper chamber � the Olyi Kengash (Supreme Council). The lower chamber would comprise representatives of political parties and independent deputies, who are intended to become a "professional" part of the parliament, working year round, rather than convening only three to four times a year, as is currently the practice. The upper chamber would be elected from among deputies of local councils � regional, district, and town councils of people’s representatives � through elections and run-offs. Like the current parliament, the Olyi Majlis would continue to convene just three or four times a year.

Khalq Sozi represented Karimov’s plan as a step toward political reform and democratization. There is some merit to this position. The bicameral legislative system has served democracy well in the United States, Germany, and France, for example. Moreover, if the lower house were to work on a permanent basis, it could become more professional and thus, arguably, more independent from presidential influence.

But structural changes alone will not guarantee a more independent legislative process in Uzbekistan. Nor can they prevent central control from intensifying to the detriment of critics of the regime.

Indeed, the experience of bicameral systems in other CIS nations is ominous. Virtually all of the CIS governments that have adopted a bicameral system � Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, the Russian Federation, and Tajikistan � have arbitrarily disbanded parliament when they failed to comply sufficiently with presidential wishes. In all but Belarus, the central government had also been encountering serious separatist challenges on the regional level.

The proposal � and its timing � are harder to understand in Uzbekistan. Parliamentary and regional rebelliousness is minimal. Deputies and hokims (governors) still greet presidential speeches with ovations and can be appointed or deposed with equal ease. Uzbekistan’s vertical mode of government has worked ideally well for the executive branch. So why would the President propose changing it?

Part of the answer lies in the historical context of center-periphery relations in Uzbekistan. In 1989, Moscow brought Islam Karimov to power when it appointed him to spearhead the anti-corruption initiative in Uzbekistan that became known as the "Uzbek Matter." The Kremlin’s goal was to subvert the regional loyalties that had governed local politics.

Originally, he met the expectations of regional elites, who considered Karimov to be more palatable than the ousted, pro-Moscow party boss Rafik Nishanov. He rehabilitated those repressed by the Moscow brigade of prosecutor-investigators. Then, he yielded to oblast leaders some prerogatives to manage part of the cotton output. He brought provincial leaders closer to political inner circles and marginalized the cosmopolitan Tashkent elites.

But Karimov eventually caused some disruption in the established patronage network of republican and regional party and governmental bosses. As fixating his personal power he later realigned relations between the center and the periphery. Between 1993 and 1996, he deprived regional bosses of their share of cotton export revenue to consolidate the central government’s monopoly over all exports. Since then, the relationship between Karimov and Tashkent elite has improved. The Tashkent oligarchy represents the core of the ruling regime, and Karimov’s re-election through direct popular vote makes him less dependent on the parliament.

Nonetheless, President Karimov has reason to see the current parliament as a potential threat.

First, he has already survived one attempted ouster that emanated from the parliament. In the fall of 1991, Shukrullo Mirsaidov, the former mayor of Tashkent, unsuccessfully rallied support from disenfranchised parliamentarians to remove Karimov.

Second, regional elites are obviously discontent with their reduced share in the distribution of national resources. Third, the Fidokorlar Party, which Karimov founded, failed to become a main parliamentary faction following the last round of parliamentary elections. Its failure was widely attributed to hidden resistance from regional bosses.

Another plausible explanation for Karimov’s desire to divide parliament is the suspicion that a hidden "clan" existing inside government at the central and regional levels, which was disgruntled by the resource distribution policy, was behind the lethal bombings in Tashkent on February 16, 1999.

Finally, unicameral parliaments can theoretically impeach a sitting president with just one vote. Under the new proposal, the parliament will need to embark on a lengthy and complex procedural process, which allows the president time to undertake countermeasures to maintain power.

Implementation of President Karimov’s proposal merits intense scrutiny.

Editor�s Note: Alisher Ilkhamov is the former board chair and a current board member of the Open Society Institute’s Assistance Foundation in Uzbekistan. Dr. Ilkhamov just completed an IREX Fellowship, sponsored by the USIA, at Harvard University.

The Central Eurasia Project aims, through its website, meetings, papers, and grants, to foster a more informed debate about the social, political and economic developments of the Caucasus and Central Asia. It is a program of the Open Society Institute-New York. The Open Society Institute-New York is a private operating and grantmaking foundation that promotes the development of open societies around the world by supporting educational, social, and legal reform, and by encouraging alternative approaches to complex and controversial issues.

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