A New Vision for Armenia?

As the United States and the European Union step up their engagement with the South Caucasus in the wake of Georgia's "Rose Revolution," Armenia is taking steps not to be left behind.

During a recent visit to Washington, Foreign Minister Vartan Oskanian outlined a bold vision for political reform, regional security, and cooperation with neighbors Azerbaijan and Turkey. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. His June 14 speech at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) provided a welcome change to the disheartening news that has come out of Armenia of late.

The Armenian government's brutal crackdown against opposition protests this April, its attacks on journalists, the ransacking of opposition headquarters, and political arrests were a blatant contradiction of democratic standards. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Two subsequent court decisions provided further evidence of Armenia's ambiguous commitment to rule of law—a demonstrator who struck a police officer with a plastic bottle received an 18-month prison sentence, while gang members who intimidated and assaulted protestors and journalists at an April demonstration were fined less than $200.

In his public address, Oskanian acknowledged the need for Armenia's political climate to improve and expressed a barely concealed hope that the US government's Millennium Challenge Account (MCA), an initiative that will provide $1 billion in aid to up to 16 developing countries in 2004, would be a mechanism for doing so. Oskanian asserted that Armenia's inclusion in the program has made the country "more focused" on matters of governance, democracy, rule of law, and human rights. He conceded that progress in democracy building "require[s] further political will" on the part of the government and the opposition.

Armenia's inclusion in the MCA had initially raised eyebrows. But Oskanian's remarks appeared to be more than mere PR pitches. The minister also laid out means for allowing Armenia's opposition to reconcile its differences with the government -- and for Yerevan to meet the criteria to maintain MCA funding.

While chiding Armenia's political opposition for "its aggressive attitude" towards the authorities, Oskanian revealed a standing government offer to give opposition deputies—who hold some 20 percent of the National Assembly's 131 seats—veto rights on three issues: amendments to the election code, constitutional reform, and anti-corruption legislation. These veto rights, Oskanian declared, would "force" the majority to work with the opposition to make "the necessary changes that will benefit Armenia."

Whether the government in Yerevan will seize the opportunity to implement this plan for political dialogue remains in doubt, however.

At remarks before the Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly (PACE) on June 24, President Robert Kocharian rebuffed that body's earlier criticism of his government's heavy-handed crackdown on opposition protests in March and April of this year, saying that the Council of Europe is "not the best place" to settle arguments with political opponents. Unlike Georgia, a neighbor whose November 2003 "Rose Revolution" serves as a model for the Armenian opposition, Armenia, Kocharian argued, " is developing dynamically, its government is quite efficient and its democratic achievements are propped up by institutional structures, including police, which are able to maintain public order."

Such a stance promises to reinforce doubts in Washington about Armenia's entry into the MCA. Two of the key criteria for the MCA selection process are countries' commitment to political freedom and good governance.

Commenting on Armenia's entry into the MCA, Carlos Pascual, the State Department's Coordinator for Assistance to Europe and Eurasia, has noted that the awarding of funding to Armenia would take into consideration the quality of the proposals submitted by the government as well as its record on defense of civil liberties. "The expectation, in order to be able to move forward with the program, is that there would be progress on these issues and not movement backwards," Pascual told a May 18 news conference in Yerevan.

That message was further underlined by Paul Applegarth, the chief executive officer of the Millennium Challenge Corporation, the body charged by Congress with administering MCA funds. During a visit to Armenia and Georgia earlier this month, Applegarth stated that the proposal review process would consider not only whether proposals would promote economic growth – the MCA's main objective – but also whether governments rely on an "inclusive" decision-making process to draw up their proposals and outline steps for improving the political, economic, and social indicators used to determine their eligibility for MCA funding.

Opposition leaders have declared the "first stage" of their efforts to unseat the incumbent government finished after failing to galvanize large numbers of supporters. Returning to parliament with concessions akin to the ones Oskanian described would be a face-saving maneuver for Armenia's opposition, whose popularity has sagged since the failure of this spring's protests. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

It could also help Armenia stay on track for receiving MCA funds, a key mechanism for the United States to continue prodding the Armenian government to adopt valuable reform. While the opposition's failure to mount a serious challenge might give Armenian authorities confidence to further inhibit official respect for rule of law, the government's newfound security could, combined with the influence of Millennium Challenge conditionality, also encourage it to move in a positive direction.

Other incentives exist as well. Armenia has recently modified its approach to national security, seeking to complement a longstanding alliance with Russia with military engagement with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the United States. Yet though such a dialogue could provide an opening for additional democratic reform, the U.S. and its NATO allies lack pressing strategic imperatives for providing what Oskanian termed "a better [security] shield for Armenia." To justify a more intensive engagement with Armenia, the US and NATO are more likely to look for advances in democracy building and rule of law than in military policy.

Another stumbling block to the establishment of a healthy NATO-Armenia relationship is Armenia's lack of diplomatic relations with its NATO neighbor, Turkey. But, here, too, Oskanian suggested an opportunity for change. In his speech, Oskanian exhorted Turkey to "take the lead" in furthering Euro-Atlantic engagement with the South Caucasus by normalizing relations with Armenia and opening its lengthy border.

Oskanian disputed claims that normalization would require Turkish concessions, specifically the recognition of the 1915 Armenian genocide and border adjustments. The foreign minister declared that while it is Armenia's "moral obligation" to raise the genocide issue, "recognition is not a precondition" for diplomatic relations. When asked about potential Armenian irredentist claims, Oskanian noted that all such issues could be adequately addressed in the protocols that accompany the establishment of diplomatic relations.

Turkey, however, insists that Armenia make progress in resolving its conflict with Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabagh before any normalization of its relations with Yerevan occurs. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

On this, the long-standing bug-bear of Armenian foreign policy, Oskanian offered cautious cooperation at best. Oblique references were made to existing efforts with Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov, with whom Oskanian met in Prague on June 22, to devise a two-track conflict resolution plan that would simultaneously define Nagorno-Karabagh's political status and set out a clear timetable for Armenia to withdraw from occupied Azerbaijani territories and for the resettlement of Azerbaijani internally displaced persons.

Without specifying the exact political status Armenia seeks for Nagorno-Karabagh, Oskanian instead referred to the "principles" established in negotiations between Armenian President Robert Kocharian and the late Azerbaijani President Haidar Aliev in Key West, Florida in 2001. Armenia insists these involve Azerbaijan's surrender of sovereignty over Nagorno-Karabagh in exchange for Armenia's withdrawal from most of the occupied territories and the establishment of a road link across Armenia connecting the Azerbaijani exclave of Nakhichevan to the rest of Azerbaijan. Oskanian attributed Azerbaijani denials that any such principles had been established to Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliev's fragile hold on power.

For Oskanian's vision to come to pass, however, a tremendous amount of effort from Armenia's friends, and, even, adversaries and political opponents, must be made. Most importantly, his vision of dialogue, development, and peace must be promoted, not only by the Foreign Ministry, but by the powers that rule Armenia today.