EurasiaNet Civil Society - Central Asia: Western Democracies Enable "Petro-Authoritarianism"

CIVIL SOCIETY

CENTRAL ASIA: WESTERN DEMOCRACIES ENABLE "PETRO-AUTHORITARIANISM" - REPORT
Deirdre Tynan 6/27/08

Driven by "petro-authoritarianism," the countries of Central Asia are thoroughly throttling democratization, according to an annual survey conducted by the watchdog group Freedom House.

Unlike other regions -- such as Central Europe, the Baltics and the Balkans -- which for the most part are steadily shedding their Communist legacies, former Soviet States are generally reverting to their totalitarian pasts. And energy-rich Central Asian nations are leading the way. "In distinct contrast to the trajectories of the other regions, the former Soviet Union has moved toward a more deeply anchored authoritarian," the Freedom House annual report, Nations in Transit 2008, said. "Democratic accountability is an ever-scarcer commodity."

The report identified a disturbing trend: Western democracies, states that should be encouraging civil society development, are instead enabling authoritarianism and coddling dictators. "Energy needs are increasingly distorting relationships between democracies that consume hydrocarbons and the authoritarian states that produce them," the report asserts.

Russia has led the way in exploiting the lack of a Western "common strategy that advances both energy-security needs and basic democratic values." Over the last few years, under Vladimir Putin’s stewardship, Russia has come to be ruled by an "Iron Triangle" of interest groups � in which the political class, security services and powerful conglomerates, such as Gazprom � dictate state policy. "The new elite ushered in by the Putin era has swiftly arrogated power to itself and jealously guards its political and economic prerogatives," the report states.

As far as Central Asia is concerned, extraordinary levels of corruption and the threat of violence in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan have helped keep political elites in office. In Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, vast energy wealth is allowing authoritarianism to flourish, according to Nations in Transit 2008.

The report rates democratic and market reforms across the formerly socialist countries of Eastern Europe and Central Asia. The scores are based on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 representing the highest level of democratic progress and 7 the lowest.

Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, with overall democracy scores of 6.93 and 6.86 respectively, are among the most repressive countries to have emerged out of the Soviet bloc. Only Kyrgyzstan, with a democracy score of 5.93 escapes being classed as "consolidated autocracy" under the report’s criteria.

Following Uzbek President Islam Karimov’s unchallenged and unconstitutional run for a third presidential term, Uzbekistan’s rating for electoral process worsens from 6.75 to 7.

The sudden death of Turkmenistan’s president for life, Saparumat Niyazov in December 2006 and the subsequent election of Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov in 2007 offered an opportunity for a loosening of the totalitarian system. But Freedom House said the election constituted a missed opportunity. While the presidential vote in 2007 was contested, it was by no means free and fair. "The February presidential election could not be deemed free and fair, given that media coverage was state-controlled, all six candidates were from the same political party and the opposition-in-exile was barred from participation," the report said. As a result, Turkmenistan’s rating for electoral process stays at a rock bottom 7.00.

Turkmenistan’s rating for local democratic governance rose from 7 to 6.75 due to improvements in state education system and the reintroduction of an additional year at secondary school. However, the report warned that corruption remains the biggest threat to public services and rule of law. "The existence of patronage networks as the basis of power has inevitably given rise to a political culture of bribery, nepotism, and embezzlement," it says.

Graft remains an issue in Kazakhstan, despite efforts to improve the energy-rich country’s reputation ahead of taking the rotating leadership to the OSCE in 2010. "While improved governance, salary increases, and more effective monitoring of corruption by government bodies may have helped at lower and middle levels of [the] bureaucracy, the continuing absence of an independent media and judicial system makes it impossible to launch an impartial inquiry into cases of corruption at top levels and deters ordinary citizens or independent public bodies from filing corruption charges against high-ranking state officials," the report says. Kazakhstan’s democracy score was 6.39.

The report asserted that "justice is bought and sold" in Tajikistan. The country is also dealing with the fallout of a fraud scandal, in which the national bank fudged numbers in order to secure loans from an international financial institution. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

"I think the sort of goals that these countries have to combat corruption or establish rule of law are set back when judicial independence doesn’t make the sort of strides one would hope it would so it’s a critical dimension of the larger ambitions of these countries to consolidate their reforms," said Christopher Walker, Director of Studies at Freedom house.

"The judiciary is a central piece of that. And certainly in those countries where judicial reforms have lagged there’s often been spill over in holding back greater reforms in other areas," he added.

In Freedom House’s view, backsliding in Kyrgyzstan is the greatest source of concern for democratization advocates. "In some ways the Kyrgyz case was one of lost promise. The [revolutionary] events of 2005 held the promise of greater reform and that hasn’t come to pass over the last three years," said Walker. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

"In the last year, Kyrgyzstan has regressed in several areas. We found this to be one the more worrying signs in the region precisely because the country had this unique opportunity to advance reforms in the aftermath in the events of spring 2005," he added.

Kyrgyzstan’s rating for both corruption and judicial framework both fell to 6.25 and 6 respectively. Kyrgyz President Kurmanbek Bakiyev is target of particular criticism in the report for his efforts to manipulate the judiciary and to reshape the Constitution, tilting the country’s political system heavily in favor of executive authority. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

With the exception of Tajikistan, the environment for independent media suffered or stagnated throughout Central Asia. "Given an apparent loosening of controls by the government, the rating for independent media improves from 6.25 to 6.00," the Tajik report states.

Kazakhstan’s independent media score is 6.75. "Privately owned media are in fact almost entirely under the control of major financial groups affiliated with key members of the ruling elite." Turkmenistan’s score stays at 7. "Turkmenistan’s media organizations continued to uphold the ideological line of the state, which maintains its control over all forms of mass media."

Journalists in Kyrgyzstan fear attack from both the government and the criminal underworld, the country’s rating for independent media rating declined from 5.75 to 6.00. News from Tashkent is no better. "Continued harassment of independent journalists, blocked opposition Web sites, and the government’s suspected involvement in the killing of an independent journalist in neighboring Kyrgyzstan have assured that Uzbekistan’s rating for independent media remains at 7.00," the report adds.

Editor�s Note: Deirdre Tynan is a freelance journalist who specializes in Central Asian affairs.

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