EurasiaNet Eurasia Insight - Election Landslide in Iran May Moderate President-Elect’s Domestic Policies

EURASIA INSIGHT

ELECTION LANDSLIDE IN IRAN MAY MODERATE PRESIDENT-ELECT’S DOMESTIC POLICIES
Kamal Nazer Yasin 6/29/05

Following his landslide presidential election win, Iranian political analysts are scrambling to explain the phenomenon behind Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s sudden rise from political obscurity, and what it means for Iran’s political, economic and social future. Ahmadinejad tended to be closely associated with hard-line policies during the presidential campaign. But the surge of electoral support that swept Ahmadinejad into power may end up moderating his conservative political agenda, some experts believe.

The president-elect’s policy preferences remain largely a source of conjecture. What is known for certain, however, is that he managed to tap into widespread discontent over Iran’s widening income gap.

A social conservative who espouses populist economic remedies, Ahmadinejad could not have succeeded without massive support from hardliner-controlled entities, namely the Revolutionary Guards and the Basij militia. Both helped propel him to a surprising second-place finish in the first round of Iran’s presidential election. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. In the June 24 run-off against Ali Akhbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, it was a far different story: Ahmadinejad trounced his opponent, gaining over 17 million votes to Rafsanjani’s roughly 10 million. In doing so, he needed little or no assistance from the Revolutionary Guards and Basij militia.

Ahmadinejad’s landslide margin of victory is now being interpreted by some analysts as a thorough rejection of deeply entrenched economic policies, which are seen as responsible for creating the wide disparity in living standards in Iran today. Ahmadinejad’s unpretentious political style enabled him to been viewed as a political outsider, even though the president-elect was considered the preferred candidate of conservative interest groups that now dominate the Iranian government. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. During the campaign, Rafsanjani, a wily politician who served as president from 1989-97, attempted to portray himself as a reformer. Yet on election day, most Iranians evidently considered Rafsanjani to be the representative of the status quo, while Ahmadinejad was viewed as an anti-establishment folk hero.

After election results were announced, euphoric scenes could be observed in Tehran’s poor and working-class neighborhoods. People handed out sweets and congratulated each other. A few even wept for joy. Late on election night, a crowd gathered at Ahmadinejad’s modest house in the middle-class Narmak District in Tehran and chanted; "Ahmadinejad we support you; stop the people’s exploiters." The chant offered insight to the president-elect’s skyrocketing popularity: many Iranians feel that the 1979 Islamic revolution has so far failed to deliver on a key promise – socio-economic justice.

Years of mismanagement, corruption, discrimination and nepotism have created a small class of super-rich in Iran, their ostentatious habits contrasting sharply with those of the millions of citizens living near or below the poverty line. The income gap has become so stark that Iranian leaders now shun the egalitarian rhetoric that was common during the early years of the Islamic revolution. Few if any references are made these days to the Mostaz’afin, or the dispossessed, who were championed by Iranian leaders during the early years of the Islamic republic.

Many Iranians are now experiencing severe economic stress. Aziz Ghadiri considers himself lucky because he owns a home and he and his wife are managing to pay for university tuition for their eldest child. "Everybody I know has two or three jobs and they feel they are barely making ends meet," Ghadiri told EurasiaNet.

"I am from a martyr’s family and all of us, my family, have done so much for this revolution. Yet I see some people from my own neighborhood become millionaires in less than one generation," Ghadiri said. "I know these people. They have nothing but good connections to those in power. That’s wrong."

Ghadiri, like millions of other Iranians, believes Ahmadinejad is the politician most capable of implementing substantive changes. At the same time, Ahmadinejad has no political experience on a national stage, and political experts are unsure of the president-elect’s abilities and intentions to implement change.

During the election campaign, Ahmadinejad’s platform seemed to be socially and economically retrograde, relying heavily on ultra-conservative interpretations of religious doctrine. For example, Ahmadinejad advocated the re-segregation of males and females. Some experts now believe that that the magnitude of his electoral support, coupled with voters’ high expectations for social justice, could force Ahmadinejad to alter his policy-making calculus.

Prior to June 24, hard-line forces, allied with Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and the Revolutionary Guard, seemed intent on exerting pressure on the new president to run the country as if it was in permanent crisis-mode, in which the government would maintain tight control over all aspects of the political, economic and social spheres.

Ahmadinejad’s large margin of victory perhaps gives him both the incentive and the power to reorient his political direction, some analysts say. Thus, he could move from a radical-conservative agenda -- restrictive in nature and aiming to reinforce the state’s control over society -- to a more inclusive course that pays greater attention to the needs of a modern society, and is more responsive to the complaints of those who voted for him.

Early indicators show Ahmadinejad is moving away from the radical-conservative position. The president-elect sounded like a pragmatist during his first post-vote news conference, emphasizing that his administration would espouse policies of "peace and moderation."

"There will be no room for radicalism in my government," Ahmadinejad stressed. "The pursuit of radicalism will be confronted."

At this point, there is no way of telling whether Ahmadinejad can fulfill his pledge to oppose radicalism. Given the election experience, political analysts will be paying close attention to the way Ahmadinejad interacts in the coming weeks with hardliner-dominated institutions, in particular the Revolutionary Guards and the Basij militia. These centers of neo-conservative thinking are expected to fight hard to prevent Ahmadinejad from straying from the radical-conservative agenda. It may prove difficult for Ahmadinejad to resist their pressure, given their pivotal role in making him president.

In addition, Ahmadinejad’s ability to pursue a pragmatic course would require the Ayatollah Khamenei’s approval. The Supreme Leader became closely allied with the Revolutionary Guards in recent years, as conservatives sought to overcome the political system’s profound crisis of legitimacy. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Some political analysts say that the June 24 election results could enable Ayatollah Khamenei to distance himself from the Revolutionary Guards -- the institution most closely associated with the radical-conservative political position -- and align himself with other interest groups. If the Supreme Leader indeed enters into new political alliances, Ahmadinejad’s administration may make policy choices that surprise both the president-elect’s present-day supporters and detractors.

Editor’s Note: Kamal Nazer Yasin is a pseudonym for a freelance journalist specializing in Iranian affairs.

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