Eurasia Insight:
"FRIENDLY" NUCLEAR TALKS MASK STRATEGIC DILEMMA IN TEHRAN
Ardeshir Moaveni: 7/10/03

Amid domestic turmoil, Iran continues to project a courteous but cryptic tone to the International Atomic Energy Agency. The worldwide nuclear watchdog has urged Iran to accept tougher inspections standards regarding the development of its nuclear capacity. On July 9, Foreign Minister Khamal Kharrazi reached an agreement with the IAEA's chief to receive weapons inspectors in Tehran "in the near future." But Kharrazi's calm bearing covers a strategic dilemma for Iran.

Iran has insisted that its nuclear reprocessing facilities exist to develop cheap sources of energy for its rapidly growing population. American diplomats have vigorously disputed Tehran's claim. Meanwhile, the G8 group of industrialized nations, of which the United States is a member, warned Iran in June against any clandestine attempt to develop nuclear arms. [For background, see the Eurasia Insight archives.]

The IAEA's 35-member Board of Governors concluded its meeting on June 19 by reprimanding Iran for failing to report nuclear "material, facilities and activities." A report issued on that meeting said Iran had bought 1.8 tons of uranium in 1991 and had started building uranium enrichment facilities without informing the agency, although it also said Tehran was taking steps to correct the situation. The board urged Iranian leaders to accept extensive, unscheduled inspection of atomic sites and to refrain from enriching uranium at a pilot facility.

The IAEA report, though relatively harsh in tone, may have brought waves of relief to Tehran's political establishment. Before the IAEA met, Iranian leaders had worried that intense pressure would be brought to bear on Tehran to sign a supplement to the United Nations' Nonproliferation Treaty , called the Additional Protocol . The protocol would allow inspectors complete access to all nuclear sites, without prior warning, as a condition of Iran's freedom to import advanced nuclear technology.

Ultimately, while the IAEA Board called on Iran to "promptly and unconditionally" accept the Additional Protocol, it also accepted Iran's promises to maintain a fully transparent nuclear program.

A July 9 meeting between Iranian leaders and IAEA Secretary General Mohammad ElBaradei confirmed the IAEA's decision not to take a hard-line approach on the Iranian nuclear issue. At the same time, ElBaradei continued to press for Iran's acceptance of the Additional Protocol. During talks with the IAEA leader, Iranian President Mohammed Khatami expressed "Iran's positive attitude with respect to the conclusion of an Additional Protocol," according to a statement posted on the IAEA's web site. The Iranian leader also said he was seeking clarification of several points in the Additional Protocol's language. The IAEA statement said that a team of agency experts would remain in Iran for "technical discussions" on "outstanding issues."

According to a diplomat who attended the two-day closed IAEA meeting in June, the United States lobbied hard for a strongly worded resolution condemning Iran for breaching the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom backed this effort, the source said. Such a resolution might well have led to debate in the United Nations Security Council on the imposition of economic sanctions and other punitive measures. Instead, the IAEA board limited itself to issuing a relatively mild Chairman's Summary.

This stance, which led Kharrazi to term ElBaradei's July 9 visit "friendly," derived from several factors. Among them is the fact that 15 IAEA governors belong to a coalition called the Non-Aligned Movement, which moved to block the American-led initiative to condemn Iran. Malaysia, which currently chairs the group, led this effort; Iran's delegate professed "deep gratitude to the members of the Non-Aligned Movement for their solidarity, constructive and fruitful deliberations and for rendering support to my country" at the meeting.

Malaysian envoy Dato Hussein Haniff told EurasiaNet that he views any effort to condemn a country that has volunteered to cooperate with IAEA as unreasonable. "The Iranians had even made some positive efforts not stipulated under their current IAEA obligations," he added.

In defending its position, Iran reportedly pointed to Pakistan, which has not signed an additional protocol and nonetheless benefits from nuclear cooperation agreements with various countries. Iran also repeatedly protested that Israel faces no pressure regarding spot inspections.

Some observers have also suggested that the United States, after clashing with other nations before the Iraq invasion in March, now seeks to avoid the development of new rifts in the international community, especially those that could divide the United States and the European Union, which maintains extensive trade contacts with Iran. In addition, some political analysts say that the absence of concrete evidence concerning the development of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq have undermined American claims about the potential nuclear danger arising in Iran.

In the United States, some policy experts, including George Perkovich of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, have argued that Washington's belligerent stance towards Iran serves only to fortify conservative elements in Tehran.

Despite the fact that the American officials failed to secure the condemnation that they sought, ElBaradei's underlying pressure for more openness hints at a strategic dilemma in Tehran. Sources say that Iranian leaders were surprised over how firmly the EU, Japan and even Russia, a long-time regional partner, are willing to press for full transparency concerning Iran's nuclear program.

Until recently, many Iranian leaders believed that the development of an advanced nuclear program could serve as a bargaining chip to win concessions, including the removal of American economic sanctions. But the IAEA's continued pressure for an Additional Protocol indicates that such a bargain may not find a match. If the IAEA declares that Iran is dawdling or obstructing monitoring efforts, the international community might give in to US pressure for retaliatory measures, including the possible reduction of trade, a halt in joint energy projects, and even possibly moves by the US military to destroy Iranian nuclear facilities in Natanz and Arak.

At the same time, Iranian policy experts see disadvantages in agreeing quickly to an Additional Protocol. According to Hassan Ghashghavi, a member of the parliament's security and foreign affairs subcommittee, three positions have emerged within Iran's policy-making elite.

One group opposes signing on principle, noting that industrialized nations have failed to honor obligations in the original treaty to "contribute to the development of the applications of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes [as stipulated in the nonproliferation treaty]."

A second, more radical group sees the Additional Protocol as a pretext through which the United States can secretly work to undermine Iran's regime. This group argues that such a risk makes nuclear weapons technology vital as a deterrent.

A third group, says Ghashghavi, believes that Iran would serve its interests best by signing the protocol and holding other nations to the protocol's provisions.

Iran has until next September, when the IAEA Board convenes again, to demonstrate its good faith. It is unclear how this debate will turn. After ElBaradei's inspectors return, Iranian leaders may find themselves adjusting principles and tactics in all sorts of ways as they seek to keep their options open while not appearing uncooperative or intransigent.

Editor’s Note: Ardeshir Moaveni is the pseudonym for a writer specializing in Iranian politics.