EURASIA INSIGHT
7/13/05
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Despite the woeful rights record of President Islam Karimov’s administration, Uzbekistan has been one of the top recipients of US security assistance in Central Asia in recent years. US aid policies are now coming under review in the wake of the Andijan events, in which hundreds of civilian protesters are estimated to have been killed by Uzbek security forces that may have benefited from US security assistance.
According to a report compiled by Human Rights Watch (HRW), based on dozens of interviews with eyewitnesses, Uzbek security forces opened fire without warning on demonstrators gathered in Andijan’s central Babur Square on May 13. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Later, security forces engaged in a well-coordinated operation to secure the city center, with troop columns moving toward Babur Square from several directions. Once secured, Uzbek officials reportedly executed wounded civilians and then engaged in a cover-up designed to conceal the extent of the violence. HRW indicated that establishing a definitive death-toll was virtually impossible, and placed the number of killed in the "hundreds." On July 13, Uzbek authorities raised the official death count to 187, while continuing to blame Islamic radicals for instigating the violence. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].
In the days following the crackdown, several of the participating units were identified, including special Interior Ministry crisis-response teams known as Bars and Skorpion. According to a report published by the New York Times, several officers from both the Bars and Skorpion units participated in a US-sponsored training course in 2004 in Louisiana. The Times said it was unable to confirm whether or not the US-trained officers were actually present in Andijan on the day of the crackdown.
One of the factors behind US calls for an independent investigation in to the Andijan events is to determine whether US-trained Uzbek military personnel participated in the crackdown. Washington also wants to know whether non-lethal assistance, such as night-vision goggles, were used by Uzbek forces in Andijan. Karimov’s government has resisted all calls for an outside probe, and has generally not disclosed information concerning the crackdown. The bilateral row over the Andijan investigation has the potential to cause the collapse of the US-Uzbek strategic partnership, some experts believe. [For additional information see the Eurasia Insight archive].
The bulk of US aid to Uzbekistan has been in the form of development assistance principally aimed at promoting political and economic reforms. Since 1995, Uzbekistan’s military and security establishments have also benefited from cooperation with Washington.
Strategic cooperation accelerated in the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist tragedy. As the United States planned its anti-terrorism campaign in Afghanistan in late 2001, Uzbekistan assumed a strategic importance for the Pentagon due to its proximity to Afghanistan and relatively developed infrastructure that could meet US military requirements. The strategic partnership was cemented by Tashkent’s decision to give American forces access to the Karshi-Khanabad (K2) air base in southern Uzbekistan, roughly 100 miles from the Afghan border. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].
From the Uzbek perspective in late 2001, military cooperation with United States seemed to offer the best chance of accomplishing a variety of strategic objectives. The Uzbek government at the time wanted to keep the influence of its largest regional neighbors – Russia and China -- to a minimum, thus maintaining room for autonomous political and economic action. At the same time, Karimov was eager to find a strategic partner that could help him contain Islamic militancy in the region. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Uzbek officials hoped that Washington, along with NATO, would, in effect, serve as a guarantor of Karimov administration’s authority. [For additional information see the Eurasia Insight archive].
Arms and equipment transfers have been a major part of US-Uzbek security cooperation. Through its Excess Defense Articles (EDA) program, the US Department of Defense (DoD) has donated surplus combat gear, equipment and military transport to Uzbek defense and security agencies. Uzbekistan has also been able to procure command and control equipment and crew-served weapons for special forces (including sniper rifles and machine guns for urban warfare) using funds from the DoD Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program. So far, over $60 million have been pledged for this program in Uzbekistan, with over $50 million already spent on weapons and equipment.
The FMF funding has also been used to pay for Uzbek troops, including special forces, to participate in NATO-led exercises, some of which were focused on enhancing counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency capabilities. In 1996, Uzbekistan, along with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, contributed troops to a joint peace-keeping battalion, dubbed Centrasbat. A number of annual exercises have taken place since then, and the US military has actively cooperated with Centrasbat in such areas as crowd-control and counter-narcotics techniques.
Another DoD-funded program, known as International Military Education and Training (IMET), has provided defense management and training support to the Uzbek Defense Ministry, including money to train senior staff officers and government officials on defense reform priorities. Tashkent has received over $5 million in IMET funds. Over 200 Uzbek staff officers have studied at US military colleges since 1995.
Meanwhile, Uzbek security and intelligence agencies have received over $40 million worth of anti-terrorist and border-control training and equipment through programs funded by the US government. This includes an assistance program focusing on counter-insurgency techniques and urban warfare administered by the US CENTCOM Special Operations Command. Reports indicate that dozens of Uzbek special forces officers were flown to the US for short-term courses, and as many as several hundred soldiers and NCOs serving with elite commando units have received training on Uzbek territory.
As for NATO’s involvement with Uzbekistan, the Atlantic alliance does not sell or supply arms to Tashkent, nor does it have a dedicated bilateral training assistance program with the Uzbek military. However, NATO has played an important part in efforts to build the capacity of Uzbek defense and security forces.
Uzbekistan works with NATO through the multi-lateral Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, which offers the Uzbek military access to some NATO training facilities, defense training courses, as well as an opportunity to engage in maneuvers alongside NATO units. Uzbekistan joined PfP in 1994. Tashkent’s top priority has always been the development of special forces capabilities.
Uzbekistan benefits from NATO’s Planning and Review Process (PARP), a mechanism used by the alliance to transfer strategic and operational planning expertise to its partners. NATO PARP experts have assisted Tashkent in the reform of the Defense Ministry’s top command structure. Uzbek military officers are trained at the NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) center in Ankara, Turkey, where they receive advice on developing counter-insurgency doctrine, crisis management procedures and modernization of military logistics and medical services.
Uzbek officers also have received command training at the NATO Junior Staff Officers Course (JSOC) based in Slovakia and administered by the British Army. In addition, NATO had been considering opening an alliance-funded PfP training centre under auspices of the Uzbek Armed Forces Academy.
Uzbek military units have participated in dozens of NATO-led exercises since 1996. These included an emergency response exercise, Ferghana-2003, hosted by Uzbekistan; a large multi-lateral, Strong Resolve-2002, military exercise in Poland; and annual Centrasbat exercises, where Uzbek forces trained alongside such elite US units as the 82nd Airborne Division and the 10th Mountain Division.
Within the framework of NATO’s Individual Action Plan on Terrorism, assorted special forces units belonging to the defense and interior ministries, as well as the National Security Service (SNB), have received training from US, British and Turkish military advisers.
Turkey has provided special forces training and equipment to the Uzbek army and SNB security service units. Ankara has also provided direct grants to Uzbek forces to purchase weapons, equipment and transport vehicles. Other NATO member states have extended bilateral military assistance -- the bulk of it consisting of training in counter-insurgency and mountain warfare tactics. Uzbek special forces, for example, are known to have received training in Germany and Norway.
NATO members have expressed dismay over the Andijan violence and have joined in calls for an independent international inquiry. Yet, prior to May 2005, the Atlantic Alliance voiced strong support for Karimov’s administration. In mid-March, for example, Robert Simmons, NATO Special Representative for the Caucasus and Central Asia, visited Uzbekistan, where he praised the results of Tashkent’s engagement in NATO-led PfP, and pledged NATO support for Uzbek efforts to develop robust counter-terrorism capabilities.
Posted July 13, 2005 © Eurasianet
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