EURASIA INSIGHT
Ardeshir Moaveni
7/17/02
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Ayatollah Jalaledin Taheri is among the few clerics who has retained popular support. As a member of the powerful Assembly of the Experts, he frequently denounced extremism and corruption, and, unlike many of his peers, he refrained from involvement in lucrative financial dealings. Taheri also happens to be a staunch supporter of Irans embattled President Mohammad Khatami. Thus, many political observers view his shocking resignation as a harbinger of political struggle in the Islamic Republic.
Taheri resigned July 10 as Friday prayers speaker in the city of Isfahan, a post he had held for three decades. The move appears to have opened a spirited campaign to break the conservatives hold on power. Reform advocates have become increasingly exasperated by the ability of un-elected conservative bodies to control Irans political and economic agenda. The conservatives are using their power to deny the popular majoritys desire for political and economic liberalization, reformers assert.
Addressing the "people of Iran" in the form of an open letter, and lacking the customary difference to the Supreme Leader, Taheris resignation letter attacked the countrys religious hierarchy. "I shudder to think how you [the conservative clerics] and your family have plundered this country as if it has been your personal fief," Taheri said in his resignation letter, the text of which was published by the reform-minded Norouz newspaper. "How long more can we tolerate this corruption, this duplicity and this utter ineptitude? … You dont have the Shah or the US to blame for things anymore since they are no longer here."
Taheri blamed conservative clerics for Irans "moribund economy," which featured a "hellish gap between the rich and the poor, repression and illegal detentions." He went on to warn that conservatives who have thwarted reform will soon face "a frightening flood [that] is now swelling behind the dam."
The day after the resignation, a number of prominent individuals and groups, including MPs, clerics and political parties, came out in support of Taheri. There were also reports of clashes in Isfahan between his supporters and hardline vigilantes.
In recent days, reformers have maintained the rhetorical pressure on conservatives. On July 17, for example, Mohammed Rez Khatami, a leader of the reformist Participation Front, warned of a possible conservative dictatorship.
Conservative authorities took swift action to control the political damage caused by Taheris resignation. The Secretariat of Supreme National Security Council issued an edict that effectively prohibited mass media from covering Teheris resignation. One paper, the reform-oriented Azad, went ahead with its coverage and was subsequently closed down.
Meanwhile, Norouz, which is affiliated with the Participation Front, published a facsimile of the Security Council edict on its front page. It also published large blank spaces in the newspaper, showing where articles about Taheris resignation would have appeared. In the past, authorities have punished such action by closing the newspaper and/or imprisoning staff. But in a sign of the effectiveness of the reformers campaign, Norouz was continuing to publish.
"[Norouz editor] Mir Damadi would have never done this if he were not aware of some behind-the-scenes development," said a journalist who has been in and out of jail several times. "As you know, he is member of the National Security Commission of the Parliament," the journalist told EurasiaNet. "As such, he has access to a lot of classified information and is also privy to high-level developments."
In response to Taheris charges, a group conservative clerics issued a joint letter defending their activities. At the same time, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said he too was pained by corruption, but expressed the belief that those who sew division were only abetting Islams enemies.
According to those familiar with Taheri‘s thinking, the popular cleric was distraught about the "the erosion of the appeal of religion" among Iranian citizens. In resigning from the clerical hierarchy, the cleric "wants to dissociate himself from what is done in this country in the name of Islam," a clerical friend of Taheri told EurasiaNet.
Many political observers view Taheris resignation as a calculated political move designed reinvigorate the reformers political fortunes. Despite receiving an overwhelming popular support in presidential and parliamentary elections since in 1997, reformers have made little headway in the face of concerted conservative opposition.
Taheris departure may mark an important shift in the political strategy of reformers, who have been divided for months over how to overcome hard-line opposition. Some had advocated resignation as the best way to call popular attention to the conservatives mismanagement of government and the economy. Supporters of the resignation strategy also have favored civil disobedience and a popular referendum that would settle the fate of reforms.
A majority of reformers until now had opposed resignations, saying such a strategy was too risky. They also held that elected officials were morally and legally obligated to fulfill their popular mandates. Likewise, they felt that conservatives would never sanction the holding of a referendum.
Some observers say they would now not be surprised if Taheris move sparked a string of resignations by reform supporters. It could also prompt new internal theological and doctrinal disputes among the clergy. While the eventual outcome of the reformer-conservative political struggle remains uncertain, what is clear is that Taheris resignation raised the stakes for both sides considerably. Many in Tehran believe that the conservatives will be hard-pressed to utilize existing levers of power to retain their controlling influence over the countrys political and economic policies.
Editor’s Note: Ardeshir Moaveni is a free-lance journalist in Tehran
Posted July 17, 2002 © Eurasianet
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