On July 15, after receiving a death sentence in a Hyderabad court for murdering American reporter Daniel Pearl, a defiant Omar Sheikh made a threat against the life of Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan's president. The threat comes at a moment when the military government's campaign to give the army a permanent political role enjoys critically low public support. The standoff between Musharraf's generals and Omar Sheikh's radical Islamists could inflict violence on ordinary Pakistanis. It could also disrupt reconstruction efforts in neighboring Afghanistan and intensify fears of insurgence elsewhere in Central Asia.
Three months before Pakistani elections, many expect the US to effectively support military rule no matter how elections go. In light of this public suspicion, Pakistan could be vulnerable to new terrorist attacks. In Karachi and Islamabad, where four terrorist attacks against Westerners have taken place in the past four months, security has become especially tight. Police in all major cities are watching for reprisals from Sheikh, whom police officials now believe runs a terrorist group called Lashkar-e-Omar (the Army of Omar) and maintains close links to al-Qaida. Unlike Uzbekistan or Kyrgyzstan, where dissenters accuse the government of repression and torture, Pakistan maintains a strong free press. Through this press, Sheikh issued a blunt warning to Musharraf: ''I will see whether who wants to kill me will first kill me or get himself killed,'' said Omar's message through his lawyer Rai Bashir.
The army, meanwhile, is trying to dilute Pakistan's parliament by introducing major amendments to the 1973 constitution, which would give the army a permanent political role. These efforts, coupled with a April referendum endorsing Musharraf, have complicated Pakistan's international role. After strong prodding from the US and India, Musharraf has begun to crack down on extremist groups. Much of his credibility depends on his effectiveness at preventing extremist violence. But Sheikh poses a tough threat. ''I have no doubt that Sheikh's comments are aimed at the President but they will not succeed,'' said a senior Pakistani diplomat in Islamabad. Despite this tough talk, the Sheikh case could stoke growing public resentment- and extremist violence.
Amid news reports that Sheikh's prosecutors withheld evidence and arrested suspects during the trial, senior officials face a dilemma regarding how to treat Sheikh. Top judiciary officials have cooperated closely with the military regime over the past three years, and enormous pressure from the US to restrain Sheikh's followers makes the case a matter of national security. The military has refused American demands to extradite Sheikh and has barred US federal agents from interrogating him, even though he is believed to be a close friend of Osama bin Laden. ''If another court orders a new trial or overturns the judgment of the Hyderabad court, then US demands for his extradition would increase and the military know that,'' says a senior bureaucrat in Islamabad.
But weaknesses in the prosecution's case could undermine Musharraf in a different way. ''The way the case has been conducted, the lack of evidence and the pressure on the court to convict Sheikh could, purely on legal grounds, lead to a new trial,'' says Hina Jilani, a leading lawyer and Secretary-General of the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan. Western diplomats connect the case's complexity to Sheikh's former ties to the military and its intelligence services. In the 1990s, Islamic groups hailed Sheikh as a ''freedom fighter'' in the disputed Kashmir region; he spent five years in an Indian jail, before being released in 1999 as part of deal to end the hijacking of an Indian Airlines plane that was forced to land in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan. ''There are wheels within wheels," said a Western diplomat in Islamabad. "We still don't know what the relationship between Sheikh and the intelligence is today.''
Musharraf's dilemma involves the past and the future. Many now attribute the 1999 hijacking to Pakistani militants trained and funded by al-Qaida. Some say it is possible that such operatives may again attempt to rescue Sheikh, this time from a Pakistani jail. ''I have a nagging suspicion that the government does not want to hang Sheikh, nor do they want to hand him over to the Americans,'' says Jilani. The longer Mr Sheikh remains in jail as the appeal process continues, the greater the chances that his supporters may mount major terrorist acts or kidnappings of Western diplomats in a bid to free him. But terrorists could also take revenge if authorities execute their prisoner; the Dawn newspaper reported on July 17 that Hyderabad jailers had received death threats regarding Sheikh's treatment. Although only a small circle of radicals publicly support Sheikh, growing public anger at the military regime and the US' indulgence of it could trigger more violence before October 10 elections.
Musharraf has few defenders outside the army and the US. Every major Pakistani political party in the country has virulently opposed the political proposals, and the minor parties that once supported Musharraf are now distancing themselves from him. Musharraf has said he is trying to introduce ''sustainable democracy'' in a nationwide television address on July 12. ''I am not power hungry and I want to give power to the people and not take it away ....but we need checks and balances,'' he added. Many suspect that Musharraf wants most of all to ensure that former Prime Ministers Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif and their followers do not stand for elections. The two largest parties are Sharif's faction of the Pakistan Muslim League (PML) and Bhutto's Pakistan People Party (PPP), even though their leaders are in exile in the Arab Gulf states.
The opposition, meanwhile, has begun demonizing Musharraf. Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan, head of the 16-party Alliance for the Restoration of Democracy (ARD), told reporters on July 11. ''The majority of the people now hate Musharraf and he should step aside." This intense opposition puts Musharraf in a bind. American support for his moves depends on his army's ability to track down al-Qaida loyalists. The US State Department has refused to comment on the constitutional amendments the army wants to introduce. Thus just when US intelligence agencies will need to step up their cooperation with Pakistani agencies to prevent terrorist attacks from Sheikh's supporters, public disenchantment is growing. Pakistanis who despise the terrorists nonetheless worry that the US is supporting the continuation of quasi-military rule after October.
Secretary of State Colin Powell is due to visit Islamabad on July 27 to monitor tensions between Pakistan and India. Some politicians are privately urging the US to rein in the army's ambitions- before terrorists seize Musharraf's political weakness for violent ends.
Editor's note:
Ahmed Rashid is a journalist and the author of two books, "Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia" and "Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia."
