Eurasia Insight:
GEORGIA: OSCE ENVOY PUSHES FOR MOVEMENT IN SOUTH OSSETIA PEACE PROCESS
Jean-Christophe Peuch: 7/18/08

As saber-rattling continues in the South Caucasus, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) remains committed to finding a negotiated solution to the sovereignty dispute involving Georgia’s separatist territory of South Ossetia.

Heikki Talvitie, the special envoy of the OSCE chairman-in-office, on July 14 expounded on the Ossetia situation during a special session of the organization’s Permanent Council, called by the Finnish chairmanship to discuss the recent incursion of Russian military aircraft in South Ossetia. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

Comments made by Talvitie during an interview with EurasiaNet following the closed-door meeting indicate that his conflict-resolution approach hinges on three elements: crisis management, reinforcement of confidence-building measures, and a search for a suitable format to discuss the future status of South Ossetia.

The Finnish diplomat says the most urgent task facing the OSCE is “to convince all sides of the need to de-escalate the tension.” Otherwise, he adds, “you can forget about [the rest].” In an effort to intensify contacts with the parties involved, Talvitie went earlier this month on a diplomatic mission to Russia, Georgia, and South Ossetia. Shortly after Talvitie met with South Ossetia’s chief negotiator Boris Chochiyev in Tskhinvali, Russia admitted that an unspecified number of its aircraft had, two days earlier, “briefly flown over the territory of South Ossetia.” A Russian Foreign Ministry statement said the flights were designed to pre-empt a Georgian military operation to rescue four servicemen in South Ossetian custody.

Wrong, objects the Georgian envoy to the OSCE. Viktor Dolidze, who was in Tskhinvali on the day the incident took place with other OSCE ambassadors, says he had personally negotiated the release of the servicemen with South Ossetia’s separatist leader Eduard Kokoity hours before the Russian incursion took place. “It was clear that no one would resort to force,” he told EurasiaNet following the special PC session.

The unsanctioned Russian flights followed an extensive exchange of light arms and mortar fire in Tskhinvali and its outskirts on the night of July 3-4. Georgia and South Ossetia have blamed each other for the incident. Kokoity’s administration claims that, in anticipation of an offensive, Georgia has been fortifying checkpoints around Tskhinvali in violation of demilitarization agreements.

“There are reinforcements in the military sense of the term,” Talvitie confirmed. “But I don’t think we should accuse only one party in this respect.”

In a move that is unlikely to help ease tensions, Georgia has opted not to attend a planned session of the Joint Control Commission (JCC), the four-party body in charge of monitoring and implementing the 1992 Georgian-South Ossetian ceasefire agreement, coordinating confidence-building measures, and overseeing economic rehabilitation projects in the zone of conflict.

The JCC comprises Georgian, Russian, South Ossetian and North Ossetian representatives. The OSCE has an observer seat.

Russia’s JCC co-chair Yuri Popov on July 11 said the session -- tentatively scheduled for the end of this month -- was due to discuss the possible deployment of a radar station to be used jointly by the Russian, Georgian, and South Ossetian peacekeepers deployed in the conflict zone.

Claiming the JCC is Russian-dominated and inefficient, Tbilisi is seeking to replace it with a new mechanism that would include additional stakeholders, including the European Union and the pro-Georgian Provisional Administration of South Ossetia. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Dolidze said his country is also seeking to swap the JCC-administered peacekeeping force for joint Georgian-South Ossetian police patrols. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

Yet, Talvitie believes the JCC has an important role to play “in monitoring and administering the zone of conflict.” In addition, he argues that the commission could serve as a model for building confidence and implementing economic rehabilitation programs in Georgia’s other conflict zone -- Abkhazia.

“Those two conflicts actually affect each other and we can no longer speak very differently [about them],” Talvitie said, adding that he believed that, should Georgia agree to meet Moscow’s demand and seal a non-aggression pact with Abkhazia, that would “automatically” lift existing obstacles to the signing of a similar agreement in South Ossetia.

The Finnish envoy said he had started consulting with all parties in the conflict and “interested powers” on a possible format for future negotiations on the political status of South Ossetia. “This is an open question and there is currently no format. I don’t think we will be ready very soon and I hope that, some time around September -- most probably when the UN holds its General Assembly and everybody is around -- we might produce some ideas on how to proceed,” Talvitie said.

“The main idea here is that confidence-building measures cannot really work unless there is a prospect for negotiations on the status of South Ossetia,” an OSCE official familiar with the peace process told EurasiaNet.

Regional experts believe any negotiation on the future status of the separatist region would inevitably be linked to Georgia’s NATO membership bid.

Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov on July 10 warned that even a decision to extend NATO’s Membership Action Plan (MAP) to Georgia in December would “write off” all prospects of diplomatically solving the South Ossetian and Abkhaz conflicts. Lavrov was reacting to comments made that same day in Tbilisi by U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. Although participation in the MAP does not prejudge any decision by the alliance on future membership, Rice reiterated her conviction that “Georgia’s future is in NATO.”

Some voices in Georgia have been suggesting that Tbilisi relinquish plans to join NATO and declare its neutrality. “If we join NATO without Abkhazia and South Ossetia, we will never be able to recover those territories,” Azerbaijan’s Day.az news website quoted Georgian political expert Jumber Kirvalidze as saying on July 14. “Therefore, we should be given back those territories and declare that our state will remain out of any [military] alliance,” Kirvalidze was quoted as saying.

Proponents of this option point to the precedent of Moldova, arguing that Chisinau’s stated neutrality has been instrumental in obtaining Russia’s backing to a tentative plan to settle the Transdniester separatist conflict. Moldovan President Vladimir Voronin wants all parties involved in the peace talks -- including the OSCE -- to formally acknowledge his country’s neutrality.

However, Kirvalidze believes that, unlike Moldova, Georgia should obtain firm Russian guarantees “that its territorial integrity will be restored.” “This is why I believe we must come to an agreement in a quadripartite format [that would involve] Georgia, Russia, the United States and the EU,” he told Day.az.

Editor’s Note: Jean-Christophe Peuch is a Vienna-based freelance correspondent, who specializes in Caucasus- and Central Asia-related developments.