Eurasia Insight:
PUTIN'S RUSSIA DEFINES ITS FOREIGN POLICY AGENDA
Igor Torbakov: 7/28/00

The romantic era of Russian foreign policy is now officially over. Kremlin policy makers have embraced a pragmatic foreign policy agenda that could pose significant challenges to the nation-building aspirations of states in Central Asia and the Caucasus.

The Kremlin’s thinking is embodied in the new foreign policy doctrine of the Russian Federation, introduced by Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov on July 10. The 22-page strategic policy blueprint, which took over seven months to formulate, crowned the process of reshaping of Russia’s overall security concept. Previously adopted military and national security doctrines will also help shape Russian policy.

The argument for why it was necessary to elaborate a new foreign policy doctrine can be found in the text itself. It states, firstly, that changes in the international situation demand new approaches, and, secondly, that the previous "Kozyrev" doctrine (named after Former Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev), adopted in April 1993, simply doesn’t work.

"Certain hopes for the forming of the new equal, mutually beneficial and partner-like relations between Russia and outside world have proved unjustified," the new foreign policy doctrine states. As some Moscow analysts believe, this turn away from the "romantic approach" characteristic of Kozyrev-era Russian diplomacy provides the ideological foundation for the new doctrine.

In fact, already under Yevgeny Primakov (in his capacity of both foreign minister and then premier) Russian foreign policy had departed from the Kozyrev guidelines which rested, in the words of the leading Moscow commentator Aleksei Pushkov, "on illusions and wishful thinking."

The "Primakov doctrine" – although it was never formalized in a conceptual document – established three major priorities:

Integrating Russia into the world economy;

Establishing a multi-polar world;

Opposing U.S. initiatives on so-called "principled issues," including NATO enlargement, the Iraqi economic embargo, and military intervention in Kosovo. It turned out, however, that the Primakov policy principles contained substantial flaws. Rising anti-Western rhetoric, combined with Moscow’s diminished influence in world affairs, served to isolate Russia. Hence, the urgent need to introduce necessary correctives.

To be sure, "Putin doctrine" does inherit some important ideas from Primakov’s political thinking. The new foreign policy statement openly says that Moscow will resist "the strategy of unilateral actions" and "will encourage the formation of the multi-polar system of international relations." The document advocates the idea of the "strengthening of the consolidating role in world politics of the United Nations." And it sharply criticizes attempts to build security policies on "Western institutions …and weakening of the UN Security Council," (where Russia has veto power).

At the same time, the blueprint reveals a distinct lexicon, which, some observers argue, appeals not to the Great Power complex, but rather to the ethos of a managerial class. In his recent "State of the Nation" address, President Putin said the new foreign policy doctrine "establishes the superiority of internal objectives over external ones… It rests on pragmatism, economic effectiveness, and priority of national tasks." In a similar vein, Ivanov, while presenting the document to the public, stressed its "pragmatic approach," and said one of the main ideas is that Russian foreign policy "should effectively help solve domestic tasks"

"Today our foreign policy resources are limited…and we will concentrate them first and foremost in areas of vital importance to us," Ivanov said. These include, besides traditional security concerns:

The establishment of conditions favorable to Russia’s economic growth; The creation of a belt of friendly states along Russia’s perimeter; The comprehensive protection of the rights and interests of Russian citizens and co-nationals abroad; The promotion and support of Russian language and culture in foreign countries. One can easily perceive that Russia’s newly defined "areas of vital importance" are mostly focused on the territory of the former Soviet Union. Indeed, the foreign policy doctrine puts relations with the CIS member-states on top of the regional priorities’ list.

The last CIS summit, which took place in Moscow soon after the release of the doctrine, provides a good opportunity for analyzing how the new concept is being implemented. It would seem, argues Vitali Portnikov in the influential Kiev weekly Zerkalo nedeli, that currently within the CIS there are three groups of countries. The first one comprises the states that are almost fully dependent on Moscow, such as Belarus or Tajikistan. The second group comprises those states that vacillate between the Russian influence and a burning desire to break free of the Kremlin’s grip. States in this category include Uzbekistan and Ukraine. Finally, the third group consists of (relatively) independent countries -- like Turkmenistan or Azerbaijan -- which can agree or disagree with Russia depending on their own interests.

This complex reality is reflected in the doctrine’s "idea of multi-gear and multi-level integration within the CIS framework." At the same time, it would seem that political integration is not Moscow’s idee fixe any more. "Practical relations with each [member of the CIS] should be built mindful of the reciprocal openness and readiness to duly take into account the interests of the Russian Federation." Again, pragmatism appears to be the name of the game.

In Central Asia this can mean the continuation of the policy encapsulated in a formula "protection and arms in exchange for geopolitical alliance". Analysts in Moscow believe this formula works pretty well in Uzbekistan. With regard to countries in the Caucasus, specifically Azerbaijan, another strategy might be used, namely "favored relations in exchange for Russian business expansion." Ivanov said that when the doctrine speaks about defending economic interests, it means "first of all, the fuel and energy area".

The doctrine definitely reflects a somewhat downsized geopolitical outlook in Moscow. In the words of the popular Russian web-publication Russkii zhurnal, "today it becomes obvious that Russia’s top priority is the protection of its own state interests -- not the illusory ones, connected with the dreams about the USSR, but the very concrete, often immediate, interests". It does not exclude, of course, Russia’s clear desire to have its zone of influence, which it can dominate economically, thus commanding the support of reliable allies.

Editor’s Note: Igor Torbakov is a freelance journalist who specializes in CIS political affairs. He holds an MA in History from Moscow State University and a PhD from the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. He was a Regional Exchange Scholar at the Kennan Institute, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington DC, 1995; Research Scholar at the Institute of Russian History, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, 1988-1997; Kiev correspondent for the Paris-based weekly Russkaya mysl, 1998-2000; and is currently a Visiting Fulbright Scholar at the Harriman Institute, Columbia University, New York.