EurasiaNet Eurasia Insight - Pro-Russian Georgian Officers Impede US Military Training Program

EURASIA INSIGHT

PRO-RUSSIAN GEORGIAN OFFICERS IMPEDE US MILITARY TRAINING PROGRAM
Irakly Areshidze 7/29/02

Opposition from pro-Russian elements within Georgia’s officer corps is impeding a US program that would boost the army’s fighting capabilities. The influential bloc of Soviet-trained officers has so far managed to frustrate government structural reforms of the Georgian military.

Top Georgian political leaders, including Parliament Speaker Nino Burjanadze, have portrayed the US training program � the Georgian Train and Equip Program (GTEP), as vital to the country’s national security and as a key to the long-term prospects of US-Georgian relations. However, two recent developments � a July 10 parliamentary hearing and a July 19 protest by Georgian officers � have raised questions about Georgia’s ability to fulfill commitments connected with GTEP.

At the parliament hearing, Irakli Batiashvili, the newly appointed Chairman of the Parliament’s Committee on Defense and Security, suggested that the Defense Ministry was mishandling GTEP and warned that the program would fail if existing problems were not addressed. Specifically, Batiashvili complained that the government had not fully funded the Defense Ministry’s budget. While most Parliamentarians did not attend the hearing, a number of Batiashvili’s colleagues from the New Rights Party joined the meeting and supported his claims, with some charging the Ministry with incompetence. New Rights leader David Gamkrelidze also claimed that Russian intelligence agents inside the military establishment were trying to sabotage the GTEP program.

Lt. Gen. Djoni Pirtskhalaishvili defended the military’s handling of GTEP at the hearing. However, he was evasive when pressed about problems connected with GTEP. Critics, for example, have accused the Defense Ministry of a lack of effort in recruiting candidates for a rapid-reaction battalion that is slated to undergo training with US military advisers later this year. There are 600 slots available in the battalion. Pirtskhalaishvili offered no explanation as to why less than 100 applications had been received by the July 19 deadline.

An event with more ominous implications for GTEP’s success occurred July 19, when over 100 officers and NCOs, led by Col. Nika Djandjgava, submitted letters of resignation. Djandjgava, regarded by many military analysts as a leading pro-American advocate of military modernization, had recently been appointed as acting land forces commander. He was also the commander of the elite Kodjori Battalion, and was responsible for coordinating Georgian activities under GTEP.

Publicly, Djandjgava and his fellow officers submitted their resignations to protest inadequate financing, ill-advised personnel policies and deficient leadership within the Defense Ministry. However, sources tell EurasiaNet another major factor behind the action is a feud between Djandjgava and Maj. Gen. Koba Kobaladze, the commander of the National Guard.

Kobaladze is widely known to have strong pro-Russian sympathies and was working to force the merger of the Kodjori Battalion into the National Guard. Djandjgava, in organizing the protest, wanted to highlight the threat posed to progressive elements inside the army by pro-Russian forces, and the dangers that these elements pose to GTEP.

All but three of the officers who submitted their resignations have since returned to the army, but Djandjgava’s future remains uncertain. Defense Minister David Tevzadze dismissed Djandjgava as land forces commander, but a number of Georgian newspapers have published unconfirmed reports that American officials have lobbied for Djandjgava’s reinstatement. President Eduard Shevardnadze indicated that a final decision will be made after the National Security Council reviews the incident, Georgian television reported July 22.

The Kodjori Battalion resignation incident focused attention on the divisions within the military. Many senior officers, who began their military careers during the Soviet era, tend to be wary of US-supported reforms. Meanwhile, junior officers, especially those who have participated in NATO training programs, generally welcome military reform efforts. The size and influence of the pro-Russia constituency within the military is such that Defense Minister David Tevzadze influence is limited, some observers say. Others contend that the Tevzadze lacks the will to take on senior officers opposed to reforms.

A highly placed source within the Defense Ministry told EurasiaNet that the United States was aware of the deep divisions within the Georgian military when Washington was planning the GTEP in late 2001. US officials additionally recognized that the Georgian military establishment had made almost no progress in following up on recommendations made by an American assessment team in February 2000, the Georgian source said.

The United States had urged Georgia to streamline the Defense Ministry staff structure and to develop cohesive plans for tactical combat operations. Washington also wanted the Georgian government to carry out a drastic reduction in the size of the armed forces. Such cuts, it was hoped, would force many older, pro-Russian officers into retirement, and encourage the rapid promotion of NATO-trained military leaders.

Editor�s Note: Irakly Areshidze is a Visiting Fellow at the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute of the Johns Hopkins University School for Advanced International Studies in Washington. Views expressed in this analysis are those of the author and not of the institutions with which the author is affiliated.

The Central Eurasia Project aims, through its website, meetings, papers, and grants, to foster a more informed debate about the social, political and economic developments of the Caucasus and Central Asia. It is a program of the Open Society Institute-New York. The Open Society Institute-New York is a private operating and grantmaking foundation that promotes the development of open societies around the world by supporting educational, social, and legal reform, and by encouraging alternative approaches to complex and controversial issues.

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