These are not happy times for Russian foreign policy, or for the country's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In both words and actions, President Vladimir Putin has expressed displeasure recently with the ministry's performance, carrying out a personnel reshuffle and warning that Russia's dominant role in the Commonwealth of Independent States is endangered. Not only is the West encroaching on Russia's traditional sphere of influence, China is also making substantial economic inroads, especially in Central Asia.
Securing Russia's leadership position in the former Soviet zone remains Putin's top foreign policy priority. Since the September 11 terrorist tragedy, Russia has struggled to contain the rise of US/NATO influence in the Caucasus and Central Asia. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. The same may be said of the European Union, which has expressed increasing interest in the Caucasus, along with a long-standing interest in boosting ties with Ukraine.
Much of the West's cooperation with CIS states these days is security-related. Yet, in the economic sphere too, Russia's strangle-hold on regional commerce appears to be slipping. Indeed, despite Putin's persistent efforts to build a Russian-controlled free trade sphere, the bulk of CIS members' trade occurs with governments outside the Eurasian Economic Zone. Kazakhstan, in particular, is becoming an ever more independent economic player in the global oil and gas industry. Astana in recent months has implemented major oil and gas deals with foreign states, most notably China.
China's success in acquiring stakes in both Kazakhstani and Azerbaijani energy projects constitutes a major blow to Russian policy. The Chinese successes merely add to Putin's pain over the construction of the US-backed Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline an export route that will circumvent Russia. [For additional information see the Eurasia Insight archive].
Given Russia's precarious position in the Caucasus, it was not a surprise that a high-profile target of Putin's wrath was Viktor Kalyuzhny Russia's special envoy on energy issues, and the point man in Russia's efforts to negotiate a Caspian Sea treaty with the four other littoral states. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Kalyuzhny often found himself out of sync with other players inside the Russian foreign policy establishment, and his penchant for overbearing statements did not endear him to his Caspian Basin interlocutors. Kalyuzhny's new assignment is the ambassadorship to Latvia clearly a form of diplomatic exile.
Another notable personnel change concerns Vyacheslav Trubnikov, a former intelligence official and protégé of Yevgeny Primakov. Trubnikov, who served as first deputy foreign minister, is moving on to be ambassador to India. On the surface, the change seems like a demotion. But, considering Trubnikov's background, that may not actually be the case. Indeed, Trubnikov may be going to India to serve as a trouble-shooter. He has lengthy experience in India, which was and remains an important outpost of Moscow's intelligence apparatus. His presence in India may signify the start of a new effort by Russia to check China's entry into Central Asia.
Trubnikov is on record as being wary of China's rising profile in Central Asia. In May, 2004 he gave an interview in which he stated that Moscow opposed any outside strategic presence in Central Asia, either Western or Chinese. His comments caught some observers by surprise, given that China under bilateral treaties, as well as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization pact enjoys the right to maintain such a strategic presence.
Russian and Indian diplomats routinely discuss the dangers facing their respective governments, including terrorist threats and rapidly growing Chinese power. It may be that Russia now seeks to enlist India, which also enjoys a growing economic and security profile in Central Asia, as a counterbalance to Chinese influence in the region. If so, then Trubnikov would be the best man to represent Moscow in New Delhi. Whatever the motivation behind the appointment, there seems to be a strong possibility that Russian policy toward CIS states will take interesting turns in the coming months.
Editor's note:
Stephen Blank is a professor at the US Army War College. The views expressed this article do not in any way represent the views of the US Army, Defense Department or the US Government.
