EurasiaNet Civil Society - Turkey: Court Ruling Represents "The End of the Beginning" of Secular-Islamist Tension

CIVIL SOCIETY

TURKEY: COURT RULING REPRESENTS "THE END OF THE BEGINNING" OF SECULAR-ISLAMIST TENSION
Nicholas Birch 7/31/08

The refusal of Turkey’s constitutional court to ban the governing Justice and Development Party pulled the country back from the brink of political upheaval. Nevertheless, the country’s political foundation remains unsound, and the court ruling could easily prove to be merely a temporary reprieve from turmoil.

In a case that had preoccupied Turks for months, six judges voted in favor of banning the Justice and Development Party, known by its Turkish acronym AKP, four voted for financial penalties and one rejected the case, the Constitutional Court spokesman Hasim Kilic announced July 30.

Seven judges would have had to vote in favor of the ban for it to be implemented. Instead of that nuclear option, the court contented itself with a sharp slap on the wrist for AKP, with all but one judge voting to remove half the party’s state funding. Calls for five-year political bans against 71 AKP politicians, including Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and President Abdullah Gul, were dismissed. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

"There’s only one word to describe my reaction to the decision", said Koksal Toptan, AKP’s speaker in parliament. "’Phew.’"
Many observers had long expected the court to endorse a ban. If the court had fulfilled those expectations, political analysts believe the result could have been calamitous for Turkey. "[The] verdict is a great relief for Turkey and its allies and neighbors," wrote Yavuz Baydar, a commentator for the Today’s Zaman news web site. "The pressure, fed on daily basis with wild speculation and severe verbal warfare domestically, had become unbearable. And a verdict on closure would most certainly push the country down into an abyss of chaos."
The court, in defusing the immediate crisis, let it be known that the AKP had to make profound policy changes if Turkey was to regain a sense of social and political equilibrium. The court ruling should not be interpreted as a victory for the governing party, many analysts concluded. If anything, it was more like a suspended sentence. "The AKP has been convicted of committing a crime against secularism by the constitutional court. So the AKP was not acquitted," Murat Yetkin, a commentator for the Radikal newspaper, said July 31.

The closure case was sparked by AKP’s clumsy efforts to end a ban on headscarves in universities this February. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Since a senior prosecutor brought the indictment mid-March, domestic politics had become paralyzed, blocking the country’s struggling European Union bid and pushing decades-long tensions between pious and secular-minded Turks to the boiling point. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

While it is less powerful than in the past, Turkey’s secularist establishment, headed by the military, shows few signs of accepting the model of "democratic secularism" that the AKP proposed in defense of its policies amid the Constitutional Court’s deliberations. In response to the ruling, the military’s chief of staff, Gen. Yasar Buyukanit, bluntly stated that "there has been no change in the view of the Turkish Armed Forces regarding secularism."

Thus, the return of political tranquility in Turkey would seem to depend on how the AKP responds to the ruling. "The AKP has a lot of lessons to learn from the ruling", said Atilla Kart, a senior member of the staunchly secularist chief opposition party. "I hope [senior party members] remember the content of the speeches that were made after last year’s electoral victory", he added, referring to Erdogan’s promise that the AKP would represent the interests of all Turks. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

The headscarf debacle was not the only mistake AKP has made. Many centrist voters who backed the party for its sound economic management have been alienated by Erdogan’s increasingly authoritarian rhetoric. "The government has not passed a single reform worth its salt in two years", says Emma Sinclair-Webb, Turkey analyst for Human Rights Watch. "Its first step must be to revive the long stalled human rights reform agenda."

Erdogan recently admitted his party had made mistakes, and some AKP deputies have expressed private concerns about the path their party’s leader has taken.

"The AK Party leadership should, after taking time for reflection, proceed with the reform process that was interrupted by its own and its adversaries’ mistakes," said Baydar, the Today’s Zaman commentator. "Perhaps, at the end of summer, a Cabinet reshuffle is necessary. This government is worn out and needs to be refreshed with elements of liberals, who would help a lot with the EU process that is waiting to be revived." [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

It could prove hazardous for Turkey’s political health if the AKP interpreted the court’s ruling as a victory, Baydar added. "The greatest mistake that the AKP could make would be to take this [the decision] as a new pretext for euphoria and adventure," he said.

Yet, some top AKP leaders clearly do not feel chastened by the Constitutional Court’s ruling. Asked whether AKP would move more carefully, Edibe Sozen, a member of the party’s Central Executive Committee, responded by paraphrasing the party’s electoral slogan: "There will be no change. We will carry on as we have been going."

Erdogan struck a slightly more ambiguous note, bemoaning the time and energy Turkey had lost due to the case. He also talked about importance of "social peace" and of the need for politicians of all stripes to act "responsibly."

At the same time, his statement that the AKP "has never been a center for anti-secular activities" does not appear to bode well for the immediate future. "Saying this implies either that he has misunderstood the court’s message, or is ignoring it", says Oktay Eksi, chief columnist for Hurriyet, Turkey’s most influential secularist daily.

For Bulent Aliriza, Turkish expert at the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies, the speech made mockery of widespread talk about the decision spelling the end of Turkey’s political chaos. "How did Churchill put it; ’this is the end of the beginning,’" he said.

Tension again could escalate rapidly in August over appointments of a new generation of university rectors and senior military officers, both of which have to be given the nod by President Abdullah Gul, the AKP’s erstwhile foreign minister. "Turkey’s old political model has been shown to be out of date", Aliriza says. "But there is still no consensus on what might replace it. In the long-term Turkey is in for more trouble."

"Potential sparks for a new row are legion", added Hakan Yilmaz, a political scientist at Istanbul’s Bogazici University who shares Aliriza’s belief in the need for what he calls "a new political
concordat."

He is in two minds as to whether the government will show the political maturity to seek the social compromise Turkey needs. "Nobody can deny the AKP’s capacity to learn from its mistakes -- it has all the pragmatism of a small shopkeeper", he says. "But small shopkeepers are opportunists too: when they finally see a customer, they jump on them. That is what AKP did with the headscarf ban, and look where that got us."

Editor�s Note: Nicolas Birch specializes in Turkey, Iran and the Middle East.

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