EurasiaNet Eurasia Insight - Ex-President, Caspian Confusion Cloud Russo-Azerbaijan Relations

EURASIA INSIGHT

EX-PRESIDENT, CASPIAN CONFUSION CLOUD RUSSO-AZERBAIJAN RELATIONS

Sergei Blagov 8/01/02

Azerbaijani soldiers joined the launch of Russia’s naval exercises in the Caspian Sea on August 1, appearing to support Russian President Vladimir Putin’s show of power. The exercises may coincide with a shift in Russia’s attitude toward Azerbaijan. With Azerbaijani President Heidar Aliyev aging and his opposition growing bolder, Russia may begin handling Azerbaijani relations with more care.

Former Azerbaijani President Ayaz Mutalibov, who has lived in exile in Moscow since 1992, has generated some bilateral anxiety since Aliyev’s government announced in late July it was investigating him for trying to start a 2001 coup. An Azerbaijani news agency, Olailar, reported in late July that Russia had expelled Mutalibov. The former president posted a July 25 press release on his web site claiming that he had merely left on vacation. Russian authorities have not confirmed either story. But the confusion over Mutalibov’s status indicates further confusion about Russia’s Azerbaijan policy. Until recently, observers speculated that the Kremlin considered Mutalibov as a potential Russia-friendly successor to Aliyev. But now, Russian officials seem ready to silence their already muted support for Aliyev’s opponents. A July 25 piece in Kommersant reported that some Kremlin figures worry that Mutalibov � whom Aliyev’s staff accuses of surrendering towns to Armenia during the 1992 Karabakh conflict and of neglecting 200,000 refugees � could poison Russia’s relationship with Aliyev and his chosen successor.

Azerbaijani authorities have sought the former president for at least seven years. Police detained Mutalibov in Moscow in May 1995 and in April 1996. However, in both cases the Russian Prosecutor General’s Office found no sufficient reasons to extradite him to Azerbaijan, and he went free. Mutalibov has predicted that some day he will return "in triumph" to Baku, provided that Azeri authorities pass legislation on the legal status of former presidents. Many say that his supporters organized opposition rallies in Baku in March. While the Azerbaijani opposition continues to rally around Mutalibov, Russia finds itself in a tough diplomatic position. Mutalibov has lashed out against what he deems Baku’s tilt toward the West, and has advocated closer ties with other former Soviet states. Mutalibov has also built considerable support among ethnic Azeris in Russia. On May 12, an inaugural congress of Azeri communities elected him chairman of a new association, "Azeri Community in Russia."

This is a difficult assignment, because xenophobic attacks on immigrants have hurt Azeris in Moscow and other Russian cities. Azerbaijani emigration to Russia is causing tension in both countries. On July 24, a Russian Federal Migration Service official told reporters that between 10 million and 12 million illegal immigrants live in Russia without paying taxes. The official did not affirm claims that 1.5 million illegal Azeri immigrants live in Moscow alone, compared with between 30,000 and 50,000 ethnic Russians in Azerbaijan. If Mutalibov gains support or official power in Baku, Russia may have to address its Azerbaijani constituency more aggressively.

More strategically, observers have suggested that Moscow has grown wary of Azerbaijan’s perceived intention to build closer ties with NATO, which some have predicted will include Azerbaijan by 2005. Russia has long treated Armenia, Azerbaijan’s rival, as a strategic ally. Since early 2002, signs of détente between Moscow and Baku have emerged. Notably, on July 20 Azerbaijan handed over to Russia Ramazan Ishkildin, a resident of the Russian region of Bashkortorstan, who Russian authorities wanted in connection to a 1999 explosion on the Perm-Nizhny Novgorod gas pipeline. Ishkildin was arrested in June trying to illegally cross the Russian-Azerbaijani border. And Azerbaijan’s participation in the August flotilla indicates some desire for harmony between the two governments.

But warm relations remain elusive. Moscow failed to strike a bilateral deal with Baku regarding Caspian ownership rights in June, as the ailing Aliyev cut short his June 9 visit to Russia. Though he told a news agency that he was "satisfied" with his visit, analysts say the frail Aliyev must have been insulted or angry to have his visit restricted to a monument dedication in St. Petersburg. And Russia is moving forward with its Caspian flotilla despite the lack of a bilateral deal between Azerbaijan and Russia. The exercises will showcase 10,000 soldiers, 60 ships and 30 planes over two weeks. In a closed sea like the Caspian, such a display can look like a warning to states that do not accede to Russia’s wishes.

Russia, seeing potential instability in Azerbaijan, cannot simply throw around its weight. Russian officials were keen to convince the media that the delay in clinching the Caspian deal did not indicate serious differences between the two nations, while only "several technical issues" remained. In retrospect, these official pronouncements leave analysts guessing whether Mutalibov was among these "technical issues."

Editor�s Note: Sergei Blagov is a Moscow-based specialist in CIS political affairs.

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