EurasiaNet Eurasia Insight - Nuclear Negotiations with Iran May Continue Amid Caution

EURASIA INSIGHT

NUCLEAR NEGOTIATIONS WITH IRAN MAY CONTINUE AMID CAUTION
Kamal Nazer Yasin 8/06/08

Iran is refusing to compromise, but it wants to keep on negotiating with the international community over the fate of the country’s nuclear program. Iranian officials continue to hope that they can revamp a deal, but some experts caution that Tehran may err in pushing too far.

Iran responded on August 5 to an ultimatum delivered by the so-called 5+1 group -- comprising the five UN Security Council permanent members, along with Germany -- which demanded in July that Tehran immediately suspend uranium enrichment activity in exchange for an international guarantee that new economic sanctions would not be imposed. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

According to several representatives of 5+1 governments, Tehran’s answer had failed to impress them. "It just doesn’t look like it’s anything worth writing home about," White House spokeswoman Dana Perino said in describing the Iranian letter’s contents. Iranian officials did not directly respond to the 5+1 demand that uranium enrichment be suspended. Instead, the letter mentioned a need for clarity on several issues, and expressed hope that a more substantive round of talks concerning the future of Iran’s nuclear program could commence "as early as possible."

Perino said that Iran’s equivocation meant that the 5+1 group would "have no choice but to take further measures that would be punitive." The next step would be to raise a plan for new sanctions against Iran when the United Nations reconvenes next month.

Some experts suggest that Iran, by declining to conform to the 5+1’s blueprint for negotiations is testing the group’s unity and resolve. The more Tehran can play out the current talks, the harder it may be for 5+1 states to remain focused on the nuclear issue and follow through on their threats, including sanctions, and even the use of force.

Experts in Tehran say that Iranian leaders remain interested in striking a bargain on the nuclear issue -- just not the deal that the 5+1 currently has in mind. Hints as to what Tehran may be looking for were contained in a July 27 announcement by current parliament speaker and the country’s former top nuclear negotiator, Ali Larijani. "The two sides should find out a third model which will be of benefit to both sides," Larijani said. This "nuclear third-way," as some Iranian newspapers have taken to describing Iran’s evolving position, revolves around a compromise on the uranium enrichment issue. Iran wants to find a way to proceed with all its nuclear-related activities, but perhaps at a slower pace, and with closer international supervision.

Although the looming US presidential election -- along with other issues, especially the ongoing global energy crunch -- may provide distractions, international determination to punish Iran for its nuclear recalcitrance now seems greater than ever. Even so, Iranian leaders appear to feel that the 5+1’s resolve cannot be maintained for long, given that the group’s members have widely varying geopolitical agendas. In an effort to reinforce a hard-line negotiating position, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei claimed in a July 30 speech that 5+1 states would not change their policies towards Iran, even if Tehran made concessions on the nuclear front. "Taking one step back against the arrogant powers will lead them to take one step forward," Ayatollah Khamenei said.

A major assumption the Iranians appear to be making is that US President George W. Bush is eager to strike a deal on the nuclear issue in order to bolster his diplomatic legacy. In addition, if Bush does not exhibit a desired level of flexibility, Iranian leaders believe his successor may be easier to deal with. A July 29 article in Tabnak, a publication closely associated with Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, suggested that Bush wanted to achieve a "lighting diplomatic success," not only to enhance his personal image, but also to improve his party’s chances of retaining the presidency in November. The article went on to hint that it would be a "mistake" to strike a deal with Bush, unless Iran could come away with a substantially better bargain that what is currently on the table.

Gary Sick -- a New York-based Iran expert and a US National Security Council member during the Carter administration -- believes that both sides are indeed committed to keeping the existing process alive. "This may be the beginning of a long process," he said, adding that some "posturing and bluster" had to be expected during the early stages.

But he cautioned that Iran "should be very careful" about how far it pushed things. "Bush is paying a very high price by its moves on Iran and North Korea. Many in the neo-conservative camp are already calling him a pro-Obama supporter," he told EurasiaNet. "Iran can easily overplay its hand."

Such a sentiment was echoed by Sharon Squassoni, a non-proliferation expert at the Carenegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, DC. According to Squassoni, Bush may be genuinely interested in reaching a deal with Iran today, but there are limits to how far he can go.

While hoping to strike a better deal, Iranian leaders also appear to be planning for a more undesirable contingency. The Turkish press recently revealed that Iranian diplomats recently discussed the possibility in Ankara of Turkish mediations between Iran and the 5+1 should the current dialogue reach a crisis point. And on August 4, the Iranian reformist newspaper Etemad revealed that Syrian president Bashar al Assad, during an early August visit to Tehran, volunteered to act as mediator in the nuclear dispute. Iranian leaders reportedly welcomed the gesture. The paper went on to report that French president Nicolas Sarkozy sounded out Assad on his desire to be an intermediary during the Syrian leader’s trip to Paris in mid July.

Editor�s Note: Kamal Nazer Yasin is a pseudonym for a freelance journalist specializing in Iranian affairs.

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