Iran is making a diplomatic push to engage its northwestern neighbors, aiming to reduce the perceived threat of geopolitical encirclement. A key component of Iran's strategy concerns Turkey. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's recent visit to Tehran failed to resolve several substantial bilateral disputes. From the perspective of some Iranian political leaders, however, the visit established a foundation for better relations.
Top Iranian officials sent clear signals during Erdogan's late July trip to Tehran that they are eager to promote better bilateral relations. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Iranian First Vice President Mohammad Reza Aref said Iran accorded Turkey "special status" as Tehran strives to improve its global diplomatic position. Meanwhile, President Mohammad Khatami said during a meeting with Erdogan that strong bilateral relations could "safeguard the interests of the two nations and the Islamic world," the official IRNA news agency reported July 29.
"The two states should make strides in promoting [bilateral] ties due to the sensitive situation in the region, and they should continue on this path," Khatami added.
The regional situation for Iran is indeed sensitive, with Iranian leaders feeling geopolitical pressure coming from the United States. US troops are stationed near Iran's eastern and western borders in Afghanistan and Iraq. In addition, the United States has established a high-profile strategic and economic presence in the Caucasus nations of Azerbaijan and Georgia. At the same time, Iran faces considerable international criticism over the country's nuclear research program. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].
In the face of persistent US pressure, Iran is working to keep economic outlets to the outside world open. On top of trying to bolster relations with Turkey, a NATO member state and a traditionally close US ally, Iran has also sought to strengthen ties with Azerbaijan. [See related story].
During their talks with the visiting Erdogan, Iranian officials repeatedly emphasized a desire to rapidly expand trade aiming for a total volume of $5 billion in 2004. Discussions focused on several contentious issues including Turkey's desire to revise a $30-billion gas export agreement and a dispute over a construction contract that has kept Tehran's new airport closed. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. The two sides also focused on a $3 billion mobile phone deal, in which a Turkish company would build Iran's first privately owned system. Agreement on all three issues proved elusive, in part due to opposition from vested interests in Iran.
Iranian ultraconservatives attacked the potential mobile phone deal and airport deals as unpatriotic in the Iranian media. They also cited security concerns. But behind such protestations lay personal economic interest, political observers in Tehran say. For example, Iran's Revolutionary Guards Corps, which acts as the Islamic republic's enforcer of Islamic orthodoxy, has kept Imam Khomeini airport closed, reportedly because guard commanders want a company in which they have an interest to operate the facility, rather than the Turkish concern that won the tender.
The Iranian press, rather than explore domestically rooted obstacles to agreement, suggested that Erdogan's insistence on a price reduction for Iranian gas exports to Turkey blocked any resolution of the economic issues. Iranian negotiators felt that Tehran was already sending energy exports to Turkey at a discounted rate, and thus refused to revise the existing price structure. Conversely, Turkish officials felt a strong need to obtain an Iranian price reduction, given the country's extended commitment to purchase Iranian energy combined with slackening gas demand in Turkey.
Beyond the impasse on the trade deals, Turkey and Iran signed two memos of understanding that left Iranian officials optimistic about the future. One memo expressed a mutual desire to improve trade relations. More significant was a memo in which the two countries committed themselves to improved security cooperation. Specifically, Ankara and Tehran pledged to help each other in the fight against domestic terrorist groups the radical Kurdish nationalist PKK, now called Kongre-Gel, which is agitating in Turkey for a Kurdish homeland; and the Mujaheddin-e-Khalq (MEK), which for more than two decades has waged an insurgent campaign against the Islamic republic of Iran.
While Iranian leaders may see anti-terrorist cooperation as an opening for better ties between Tehran and Ankara, Turkish officials and experts are taking a more cautious approach. Many in Ankara are not yet willing to take Tehran at its word, and are waiting for Iran to take concrete steps towards fulfilling the commitment outlined in the security memo. Sources in Tehran insist that Iranian authorities are already taking steps to hamper PKK activities, especially in areas along the Iran-Iraq border. A major incentive for Iran to cooperate on joint anti-terrorism action is the widespread concern in Tehran that the MEK leaders, who are finding it increasingly difficult to maintain camps in Iraq, may attempt to move its operational base to Turkey.
Another encouraging sign from Iran's perspective was Erdogan's lack of criticism on Tehran's nuclear research efforts. IRNA reported that Erdogan supported the "absolute right of every country to use nuclear energy in a peaceful way." Iranian officials insist that the country's nuclear program is designed solely to meet civilian energy needs. International critics, led by the United States, suspect that Iran is striving to build nuclear weapons.
Iranian political leaders continue to send positive signals to their Turkish counterparts. On August 9, for instance, the head of the Iranian parliament's Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Technology, Ramezanali Sadeghzadeh, hinted that the mobile phone pact will soon be sealed. "[Iran's] present mobile network does not meet the current demand. That's why signing the agreement ... is essential," Sadeghzadeh said. "The Parliament will not object to it and the agreement will soon be signed."
Khatami suggested the "complementary role" of the two nations' economies would help encourage closer ties. Whether the hopes of Iranian political leaders are fulfilled, though, appears to depend not only on Turkish reciprocity in forging stronger bonds, but also on powerful domestic interests inside Iran. Those interested parties, including the Revolutionary Guards, have so far acted more as impediments than facilitators of bilateral commerce.
