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Political Consensus in Iran is Firmly Behind a Continuation of Nuclear Research
There is widespread political consensus inside Iran that the country's nuclear program must continue. Growing international pressure on Iran only serves to strengthen Tehran's resolve, a high-ranking official responsible for the country's nuclear program insists.
Iran resumed work on its nuclear program at its Isfahan facility in early August after rejecting an proposal made by three European Union states Britain, France and Germany under which Tehran would abandon work on a nuclear fuel cycle in exchange for unspecified economic benefits. Iran voluntarily suspended its nuclear program in November, under heavy outside pressure. Efforts to enrich uranium at Iran's Natanz facility remain suspended.
On August 17, an EU statement voiced "deep concern" over Iran's recent actions and urged the country's leaders to reconsider its decision to resume nuclear work. "Iran faces an important choice," the statement said. "The door remains open for Iran to continue negotiations ... by urgently halting all uranium conversion work and recommitting itself to a full suspension."
The conservative-dominated Iranian leadership is focusing mainly on domestic political issues, working to consolidate its authority following the triumph of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in the June presidential election. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Thus, some Tehran political analysts say, Ahmadinejad's hardliner-filled administration is likely to be open to further negotiations over the near-term.
At present, the Iranian leadership is debating whether to restart operations at the Natanz facility in advance of a meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency board of governors in September. Restarting operations at Natanz, some Iranian officials believe, would strengthen Tehran's negotiating position. In addition, Iranian experts say the skyrocketing price of oil precludes tough international action against Iran, as such action would threaten to send energy costs still higher.
The United States has been the most vocal opponent of Iran's nuclear research efforts, with President George W. Bush recently suggesting that military force could be used in an effort to frustrate Tehran's ambitions. The EU-3 states have also hinted that they might join the United States in seeking United Nations sanctions against Iran if Tehran does not adopt a more cooperative stance on the nuclear issue. On August 17, the deputy director of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization, Mohammad Saidi, said that such international threats were counterproductive. "The rougher and faster these countries make the game, the more decisive we become to operate the rest of our nuclear facilities," the Iranian Student News Agency quoted Saidi as saying.
Iranian officials insist their nuclear program is designed solely for peaceful applications, namely to produce nuclear energy. The United States and other nations suspect that the Iranian program aims to develop nuclear weapons. Iranian officials are convinced that they have a legal right to continue the country's nuclear program, citing Article IV of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which allows countries to pursue research aimed at developing "the peaceful uses of nuclear energy."
The domestic consensus spanning the political spectrum and the general population -- is solidly behind the development of an indigenous nuclear fuel cycle. To underscore this point, Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, recently convened a meeting of top executive-branch leaders, past and present, to secure their consent for the country's existing policy.
Iranian experts say the existing EU-3 offer is inadequate as an enticement to get Iran to submit its nuclear program to strict international supervision. In particular, the EU proposal is vague on two key areas the extension of concrete security guarantees to Tehran; and an explicit promise that US-impose economic sanctions would be lifted.
Yet, even if the international community were to move closer to Iran's position, it is unclear whether the nuclear program could ever be brought to a complete stop. Some experts in Tehran believe the chances are slim that negotiations could produce a settlement satisfactory to all sides.
At least three distinct schools of thought have formed in Iran over the nuclear issue. Each has a differing view of what Iran's relationship to nuclear power should be, and it is not certain at this time which view will prevail.
One school -- including the former president Mohammad Khatami and many pragmatic conservatives -- believe that Iran has expended too many resources already on its nuclear program to unilaterally abandon it. This faction, however, is open to a "grand bargain," in which Iran receives substantial economic and political concessions in exchange to jettisoning its nuclear ambitions. For this group, the development of nuclear weapons by Tehran could become a source of regional instability, and thus could do more to endanger than enhance Iranian national security. A non-aggression pact and an end to the sanctions are what this group is aiming for.
A second school -- incorporating hardliner elements within the Revolutionary Guards, the Iranian parliament, the press and the clerical establishment -- abhor the idea of the nuclear program serving as a bargaining chip. This group considers the nuclear program as an integral part of their overall military and security strategy. For this group, the "weaponization" of the nuclear program is seen as indispensable in achieving the twin goals of deterrence and projection of power. A recent editorial in the newspaper "Sobh" published by the Revolutionary Guards exclusively for its officer corps said: "The (nuclear) program is more than a source of pride and prestige for our Islamic country. It will effectively repulse the hand of the arrogant aggressors, put an end to their evil designs, and provide vital support for our strategists and planners
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