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EURASIA INSIGHT

THE CHECHEN WAR ECHOES IN AZERBAIJAN
Hikmet Hadjy-zadeh 8/24/00

The Chechen war has placed Azerbaijan in an uncomfortable geopolitical position. Russia has repeatedly accused Azerbaijan of supporting Chechen separatists, and the Kremlin has pressured Baku, seeking Azerbaijani approval for Russian military policies. Though sympathetic to the Chechen cause, Azerbaijani leaders have denied the allegations, and have sought to defend the state’s sovereignty and protect its oil export options.

In the latest diplomatic incident, Azerbaijani officials rejected a report that Chechen leader Aslan Maskhadov and other separatist fighters were using Azerbaijan as a safe haven, the Interfax news agency reported on August 21. "There is not a single Chechen rebel on the territory of Azerbaijan," said a statement issued by Azerbaijan’s National Security Ministry. Such claims made by Russian military officials were the result of either "the fruit of a sickly imagination or poor professionalism," the ministry statement added.

In mid July, Russia and Azerbaijan sparred over the broadcast of an interview with Chechen rebel commander Shamil Basayev by a private television station in Baku. Azerbaijani officials, seeking to allay Russian concerns, initially tried to prevent the broadcast, but relented after a public outcry. The decision predictably produced outrage in the Kremlin.

In the interview, the rebel leader assailed Russian political and military leaders. "We, to be honest, entered this war weaker than we were in the previous [Chechen war that ended in 1996]. Because the Russians managed to split us badly or well, they managed to disperse our forces, and if this war hadn’t started, we would have had civil war," Basayev said in the interview. "Now they [the Russian government] are practically staking everything they have. But they bomb villages and exterminate civilians. � At every opportunity, they use all kinds of force."

Russian-Azerbaijani antagonism is nothing new. Moscow started alleging Azerbaijani complicity with Chechen rebels shortly after Russian military units moved into the renegade province for a second time in October 1999. In Russia itself, authorities engaged in the systematic persecution of Azerbaijanis who had found temporary jobs in Russia. According to Azerbaijani media, police in many Russian cities arbitrarily detained and harassed Azerbaijanis. Numerous cases of beatings and arrests were reported. Hundreds of Azerbaijani migrant workers ended up fleeing Russia and returned to Azerbaijan.

At the same time, Russian President Vladimir Putin instructed the Ministry of Finance to exert strict control over the cash remittances sent by Azerbaijani migrant workers in Russia to friends and relatives in Azerbaijan. An estimated 1 million Azerbaijanis were earning wages in Russia, sending a share of their wages each month back to their loved ones in Azerbaijan. This attempt to interrupt remittances did not yield the desired results for Russia, and the effort was soon abandoned.

Russia, however, continued to exert pressure on Azerbaijan. For example, Russian troops in April participated in military maneuvers with Armenian forces along Armenia’s border with Azerbaijan. In May, Russian government announced withdrawal from the CIS treaty on visa-free regulations and toughened its border-control regime with Azerbaijan.

More ominously for the Azerbaijani government of President Heidar Aliev, Putin in recent months has embraced pro-Russian, Azerbaijani opposition figures. Newspapers reported that Putin had appointed the former chairman of the Azerbaijani KGB, Vagif Husseinov, as Deputy Head of the FSB Caucasus Department. It was also reported that Putin had met with the ex-president of Azerbaijan, Ayaz Mutalibov, who lives in Moscow. According to one published account, Putin offered Mutalibov a position in the Russian Government. Mutalibov reportedly refused, but Putin granted him a state pension and other perquisites. Encouraged by Putin’s support, Mutalibov has told Azerbaijani newspapers that he intends to establish a political party within Azerbaijan, and to return to Baku.

Russia’s aim in pressuring Azerbaijan is not limited to securing Baku’s support for Russian policies vis a vis Chechnya. In a broader sense, the Kremlin seeks to keep Azerbaijan within Russia’s sphere of influence. Doing so would permit Moscow to retain a dominant role in the Great Caspian Oil game now playing out in the region. [For background see EurasiaNet’s Economics department]. The success or failure of Moscow’s attempt to coerce Azerbaijan could help determine whether new pipelines are built in the Caspian region. These planned pipelines, the construction of which is supported by Western governments and oil conglomerates, would circumvent existing Russian export routes.

To a certain extent, Azerbaijan’s leadership has acquiesced to Russian pressure. As the Basayev interview demonstrated, officials in Baku have sought to avoid any overt displays of support for the Chechen cause. In addition, Azerbaijan in October 1999 agreed not to permit Chechen refugees to settle in the country. Baku also has consented to an arrangement with Russian frontier guards on increasing security along the Azerbaijani-Russian border.

Azerbaijan wants to keep its options open. In the years immediately following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Azerbaijan sought to increase its ties with Western governments in an effort to bolster its economy and secure its independent identity. In recent months, however, Western governments have been critical of Azerbaijan’s human rights record, and have expressed support for opposition parties that will compete in parliamentary elections this fall. The criticism has caused consternation in Azerbaijani government circles.

Despite the government’s stance, up to 4,000 Chechen refugees currently reside in Azerbaijan, according to local news sources. Some are immediate family members of Chechen fighters. A few are wounded rebels who are recuperating. Azerbaijan also has been utilised as a supply point to help maintain the Chechen war effort, according to an April anti-terrorism report released by the US State Department.

Sympathy for the Chechen cause is widespread among Azerbaijanis. The bond between the two peoples strengthened during the early 1990s, when small groups of Chechens fought with Azerbaijani troops during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. So far, Russian attempts to pressure Azerbaijan have had no tangible impact on Azerbaijani popular feelings for Chechens.

In evaluating current policies towards Azerbaijan, Moscow would do well to examine the lessons of the first Chechen war. In 1995, during the first Chechen conflict, the Russian Government, acting under the pretext of fighting terrorism, completely sealed off the overland and maritime border with Azerbaijan. This policy produced a profound economic crisis in Azerbaijan since its industrial and agricultural sectors depended on Russian markets for 70 percent of its exports. The Russian economic blockade lasted more than a year, but it brought about an unexpected result: during that time, the Azerbaijani economy reoriented itself. Today, Azerbaijan depends on Russia for only about 30 percent of its exports. At the same time, the blockade did nothing to decrease unofficial support in Azerbaijan for Chechen fighters.

Editor�s Note: Hikmet Hadjy-zadeh is the Vice President of the FAR CENTER in Baku.

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