PEACE OVER NAGORNO-KARABAKH REMAINS ELUSIVE AS THE POPULACES DRIFT FURTHER APART
Seymur Selimov: 8/24/01
A EurasiaNet Partner Post from Transitions Online

BAKU, Azerbaijan--In spite of steps forward taken by Armenian President Robert Kocharian and his Azeri counterpart Heidar Aliev earlier this spring, the mood on the ground remains belligerent.

A new round of meetings to end the conflict--stalemated since a May 1994 cease-fire agreement stopped a war that claimed more than 20,000 lives--was originally scheduled for June, but was postponed, mainly because the populations were deemed unready for compromise. But spurred on by combative exchanges between leaders in both countries, the stance of both Azeri politicians and the general population has hardened. That has made it even more difficult to even broach the issue of concessions and ignore the increasing demands to act militarily if the situation remains deadlocked.

Attempts so far to prepare the Azeri population for possible compromises have met with failure and resistance from across society. Earlier this year, the Azeri parliament brought up the suggestions made by the "Minsk Group"--the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) initiative co-chaired by the United States, France, and Russia--and highlighted possible compromises to be proposed to the population. The reaction was overwhelmingly negative. The great majority of the population is clearly not ready to, as they see it, sacrifice their national interests in the name of peace. In addition, few believe that any economic benefits from a deal will ever trickle down to them.

"On the whole, the Azeri side has lost 20 percent of its territory. We have about 1 million refugees. And I don't think that the occupiers will so simply return our land, because there is not a similar case in history," says historian Zemfira Guliyeva, echoing many of her peers. "Maybe it will be possible only under advantageous conditions for the enemy--of course [they] didn't begin this war in vain. I hope that the authorities and our people will not accept unfavorable conditions."

Though most Azeris view Armenia as well-armed and ready for action, talk of a military solution has become more concrete and determined in recent months. If earlier calls to increase military spending and preparation came mainly from the opposition in both countries, now such statements emanate from official circles and even defense ministries. Both sides boast of their military superiority, with some on both sides of the front-line believing a "quick, victorious war" is the only solution.

Recently, for example, in a 3 July interview published in the Armenian newspaper Azg, a reporter asked Defense Minister Mikael Melkonyan if he agreed with the statement that Karabakh's army is the strongest in the Transcaucasus. "Armenia's army, yes," he replied. "Our people perceive the military forces of our country and Karabakh's army as a unified whole … Armenia is ready to defend Karabakh by force of arms." He also mentioned Armenia's interest in continuing to host Russian military bases. And on 6 July, the Mediamax news agency quoted Arkady Ghukasian, the president of the unrecognized Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh, as saying, "There in Baku they remember our army well and know that in the case of a resumption of war, Azerbaijan will lose new territories."

ALARM BELLS

Such remarks carry greater weight because they come amid reports--such as a 4 July article in Azg--that the authorities in Yerevan have prepared a preliminary draft of a new military doctrine that will be presented to the public in the near future. Based on Melkonyan's comments, Azeri analysts believe that the document envisions a larger army, ensures Karabakh's defense, and foresees wide-ranging military cooperation with Russia on the basis of the agreement on friendship, collaboration, and mutual aid signed between the two countries in Moscow in August 2000--all worrying thoughts. Rasim Musabekov, an independent analyst and advisor to Isa Qambar, chairman of the opposition Musavat party, calls the new doctrine "an overt confession of expansionism."

Eldar Namazov, an influential political scientist and former advisor to President Aliev, has similar thoughts. "Armenia's official policy includes plans to annex Nagorno-Karabakh and a number of districts on Azeri territory, so it's no wonder that such a policy is reflected in more concrete documents," he surmises. "That again points out that Armenia takes part in aggression against Azerbaijan and doesn't intend to release the occupied territories, and what's more, intends to defend them by war." Namazov is one of the authors of a recent "charter" that spells out ways of resolving the conflict, including starting a new war if Armenia refuses to withdraw its forces. Many politicians, as well as NGO representatives, have signed the document, and both President Aliev and Azeri Foreign Minister Vilayat Quliev have warned in recent days that the military option is increasing in likelihood if the peace process does not move forward. Quliev also accused Armenia of violating the cease-fire (in early July, the Defense Ministry and Azeri media reported that in recent incidents several Azeri soldiers had been killed and others taken prisoner at the border). As RFE/RL's Caucasus Report noted, those comments were made even after a Minsk Group statement in July that "bellicose rhetoric … only exacerbates tensions and increases the risk of renewed conflict."

Many Azeris--both analysts and common citizens--even cite Croatia's 1995 cleansing of the Krajina region as a precedent for a country regaining its territorial integrity. In mid-August of that year, the Croatian Army quickly overran the self-proclaimed and internationally unrecognized Republic of Serbian Krajina, expelling the ethnic Serb population who had rebelled when Croatia declared its independence in 1991. And then, as Azeris point out, Croatia without great difficulty entered the Council of Europe and has been developing closer partnerships ever since with NATO and the European Union.

TOO COZY FOR COMFORT

Armenia's special relationship with Russia also continues to alarm Azeris. They believe that, instead of playing a constructive role during recent negotiations in Paris and Key West, the Russians held back and then afterwards "interfered" in the process, fearing that a settlement would deprive them of a lynchpin for pressure in the region. Pointing to the repeated visits of Russian First Deputy Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Trubnikov to Armenia, the Azeri political elite say Moscow has pressured Yerevan to harden its stance toward a compromise while continuing to funnel arms to Armenia. Those arms, they say, go in a straight line to the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh, purportedly economically weak but with an already strong army. Namazov, for one, believes that Ghukasian's tough talk is backed up by a belief that Russia would supply even more weaponry should a conflict break out. On 9 August, Ashot Shakhnazaryan, Armenian first deputy industry and trade minister, predicted that Russian President Vladimir Putin's visit in September would result in weapons orders from Armenia's military industry.

Azeris are also disenchanted by the attempts--publicized first by Carey Cavanaugh, the U.S. special negotiator to Nagorno-Karabakh--to involve Iran in a solution for the conflict. They remember well Tehran's mediation in 1992, which, they say, did not stop the occupation of the Shusha district despite a meeting at the time between Azeri and Armenian heads of state in Iran. And many Azeris believe that Iran intentionally wants to keep their country weak because a stronger, post-conflict Azerbaijan would be in a position to more forcefully defend the millions of ethnic Azeris living in Iran. Conspiracy theories also abound that Tehran, like Moscow, prefers to cause trouble and provoke Armenia into re-igniting the conflict because a volatile Caucasus would scare off Western investors and thus Western governments (whose interest in the region is seen as being largely economic). Hostility has only intensified after the latest dispute with Iran over Caspian Sea exploration rights--a confrontation that included gunboats and military aircraft--and Baku now views it inadmissible to include Tehran at all.

"I'm surprised that Armenia for now has military help from Russia, financial assistance from the U.S. and others European countries, and now doesn't [have to] discuss the 1992 resolutions of the UN Security Council, but instead thinks about the [future] status of Karabakh's Armenians," says Ilgar Mamedov, an officer in the reserves, referring to past UN calls to release the occupied territories. "It is an unjust relation to the two disputing sides," he adds. Those feelings of inequity weren't helped much by the 26 July announcement that the U.S. Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations had approved $90 million in 2002 aid for Armenia, while reaffirming the Section 907 restrictions on U.S. aid to Azerbaijan.

Not surprisingly, those who fled their homes are among the most defiant. "I cannot imagine that my native town of Lachin and others districts will stay under the foot of the enemy. It's not permissible to think about an exchange of territories," says Ali, a young refugee. "In my opinion, we need to operate on the principle of fighting fire with fire. The occupiers must unconditionally release our lands."

Editor's Note: Seymur Selimov is a freelance writer based in Baku and a regular contributor to TOL.

The above story is reposted with permission from Transitions Online (TOL). TOL (http://www.tol.cz) is an Internet magazine covering Central and Eastern Europe, the Balkans, and the former Soviet Union. If you aren't already a member, you can fill out the registration form at <http://www.tol.cz/trialsubscr.html> to receive a free two-month trial membership. If you're a citizen of a post-communist country, FREE annual memberships are available at <http://www.tol.cz/trialsubscr2.html>.

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Posted Augugst 24, 2001 © Eurasianet
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