The treaty faces two closely related dilemmas. Many still associate it with the former Soviet Union, and the 1999 withdrawal of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Uzbekistan made the organization seem more like a vehicle for Russian interests. This perception becomes dangerous when the CST needs to respond to Islamic extremism and regional terrorism, which exploded within Central Asia in 1999. After the United States struck alliances with Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Uzbekistan to prosecute the international war on terrorism, the CST needed a fresh identity. Today, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan are accordingly trying to credibly protect the stability of Central Asia. Their first challenge is to create a unique identity for the CST.
In May, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that the CST members had agreed in Moscow to call themselves the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). [For more information, see the Eurasia Insight archive]. A new charter and other documents regulating the CSTO and related bodies should be in place by November. With the new name, the group aims to focus on preserving the territorial integrity of member states and seek close cooperation with the UN, OSCE, SCO and NATO. Putin has stressed that there will be no attempt to "counterbalance" NATO, but Russia will remain the group's dominant player.
This change will emerge first in military settings. An interstate command body, including representatives from each member state, will form in 2002 to coordinate military decisions. Russia will play the leading role in the new body, in exchange for which Putin will sell Russian arms and equipment to member nations at substantial discounts. Central Asian leaders, such as the Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev, have long pushed for such preferential prices on Russian hardware, which the Russian arms industry has resisted. But regional strategic challenges may make the idea of a dominant arms vendor more compelling. Valery Nikolayenko, General Secretary of the Collective Security Council, is convinced that three distinct regional collective security systems are now operating in the Caucasus, western CIS and in Central Asia. An efficient centralized command can improve across-the-board security, but only if the Russians can persuade member states to avoid the Uzbek model of relying on the United States for their national security needs.
The campaign to establish this model will feature frequent joint exercises, like the "South Antiterror 2002" procedures that occurred in Tajikistan in April. Kyrgyzstan and Russia have also hosted joint exercises in 2002. Russia primarily finances the military exercises of the Collective Rapid Deployment Forces (CRDF), a unit of the treaty organization, and will probably finance the overall military integration of the CSTO. It is not surprising, then, that these exercises' scenarios show the Central Asian Republics that Russia can be a viable alternative to the United States in resolving regional security problems. Nikolayenko points to Central Asian states' willingness to participate in these military exercises to show that, despite a new US military presence, Russia has not lost influence in the region.
In theory, the CRDF could become a significant regional force, crossing members' borders without customs control or bureaucratic obstacles. But its solidarity implies certain weaknesses. For one thing, in the event of a crisis within Central Asia requiring the assistance of the CRDF, the notoriously bad road system would substantially delay speedy intervention. The CRDF also needs a stronger aviation plan, which will make the unit harder and more expensive to establish. An existing plan for the development of the CRDF until 2005 proposes joint funding by member states, but this may prove to be another
Editor's note:
Roger N. McDermott is a Political Consultant at the Scottish Center for International Security of the University of Aberdeen.
