EurasiaNet Eurasia Insight - Tajik Leader Takes Aim at His Islamic Political Opponents

EURASIA INSIGHT

TAJIK LEADER TAKES AIM AT HIS ISLAMIC POLITICAL OPPONENTS

8/29/02

There are indications that President Imomali Rahmonov wants to utilize the US-led campaign against terrorism in Central Asia to neutralize his mainstream Islamic political opponents in Tajikistan. Leaders of the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP) have vigorously denied Rahmonov’s claim that the Islamic movement promotes extremism.

Rahmonov lashed out at the IRP in a July 13 speech during a gathering of the pro-presidential Movement for National Unity. He accused some IRP members of "indoctrinating people in the spirit of extremism, which may lead to a split of society." The president specifically cited the actions of IRP members in Isfara District near the confluence of the borders of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. He also hinted that the IRP was engaging in activity similar to that of Islamic radical organizations, such as the Hizb-ut-Tahrir and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). In addition, Rahmonov implied that several Tajik nationals now detained by the US military at its Guantanamo Bay naval base in Cuba had ties to the IRP.

Rahmonov’s comments served as the harshest criticism that he has leveled at the Islamic political opposition since the 1997 signing of a power-sharing agreement that ended five years of civil warfare. Under that agreement, IRP leaders were promised a 30 percent share of representation in government structures. Some local Tajik political analysts believe Rahmonov’s comments could be the harbinger of an attempt to ban the IRP.

IRP leaders initially did not respond to Rahmonov’s attack. But at an August 1 news conference, IRP Chairman Said Abdullo Nuri struck back at Rahmonov, insisting that the IRP should not be equated with Hizb-ut-Tahrir and the IMU, both of which are banned in Tajikistan. "We [the IRP] have always acted and will always act only within the framework of laws of the country," Nuri said. He likewise dismissed any suggestion that the IRP had a connections to Tajik detainees, who are among the hundreds of suspected Taliban and al Qaeda fighters being confined at Guantanamo.

Nuri acknowledged that recent public comments by 11 IRP-affiliated imams in Isfara could be interpreted as controversial, but stressed that the opinions expressed by the clerics did not represent the official position of the party. Nuri suggested that Rahmonov was blowing the instances of incendiary rhetoric out of proportion in order to serve his own political ends. "It would be wrong to accuse the party of it [extremism]. It is the fault of its concrete members," he said.

That Rahmonov would want to make a move to weaken the IRP is understandable given the steady rise of popular support the party has experienced since the end of the Tajik civil war. The IRP remains the lone example in Central Asia of an Islamic movement attempting to advance its agenda within the established political framework. Although nominally a religious party, some local Tajik political observers say the IRP’s popularity gain is connected largely with Tajikistan’s continuing economic difficulties. An estimated 80 percent of Tajiks live at or below the poverty line, and the party’s power base rests among the impoverished.

As the IRP’s strength has expanded, party leaders have agitated for a greater share of authority. Of late, Nuri and other IRP leaders have called for changes in legislation concerning presidential and parliamentary elections. According to international organizations, including Human Rights Watch, the Tajik parliamentary elections were marked by widespread fraud, which assisted Rahmonov’s government and denied the IRP its rightful share of representation. The IRP also has sought to introduce the direct election of regional and local leaders. Under the current practice Rahmonov appoints regional and local political leaders.

On July 10, three days before Rahmonov denounced the IRP, leaders of the Islamic party met with OSCE representatives in Dushanbe. During those talks, OSCE representatives concurred with the IRP view that Tajik electoral legislation required revision.

Local observers say Rahmonov is concerned that the continuing deterioration of socio-economic conditions in Tajikistan � including the damage wrought by recent flooding, along with a typhoid outbreak [for additional information see the Eurasia Insight archive] � could dangerously erode the government’s authority. At the same time, analysts caution that an attempt by Rahmonov to crack down on his main political opponents would not be guaranteed success, given the IRP’s substantial popular backing in many regions.

The Central Eurasia Project aims, through its website, meetings, papers, and grants, to foster a more informed debate about the social, political and economic developments of the Caucasus and Central Asia. It is a program of the Open Society Institute-New York. The Open Society Institute-New York is a private operating and grantmaking foundation that promotes the development of open societies around the world by supporting educational, social, and legal reform, and by encouraging alternative approaches to complex and controversial issues.

The views expressed in this publication do not necessarily represent the position of the Open Society Institute and are the sole responsibility of the author or authors.