The current U.S. intervention in Iraq is a great example of this simplification. Before the toppling of Saddam Hussein's Ba'ath Party in Iraq, the country was a secular state that was a major opponent of Islamic radical groups such as al-Qaeda. Indeed, al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden frequently denounced Saddam's regime, castigating the fascist leader as an "infidel." However, despite animosity between the two, the Bush administration's main focus before the invasion of Iraq was to paint these two ideological rivals as allies in a crusade against the United States and the West. Once Saddam Hussein was toppled, the Bush administration failed to show evidence tying his regime to al-Qaeda simply because that evidence most likely does not exist or, if it did, would be highly anecdotal.
Presently, after the fall of Saddam Hussein, the U.S. occupation of Iraq has been challenged by constant attacks. The Bush administration has continuously attempted to link al-Qaeda to any individuals or groups attacking U.S. interests in the war-torn country. The majority of the time the evidence used to make this connection is based on assertion, rather than evidence. For example, recently the top U.S. administrator for Iraq, Paul Bremer, argued that al-Qaeda is alive and well in Iraq because U.S. forces have "seen foreign fighters who sort of fit the al-Qaeda profile -- people traveling on documents from Syria, Yemen, Sudan, in some cases Saudi Arabia."
In addition to Bremer, President Bush himself has tried to tie attacks against the U.S.' main ally in the Middle East, Israel, to al-Qaeda. He recently claimed in his weekly radio address that the devastating suicide blast in Jerusalem was part of a terrorist campaign to establish Taliban-style governments across the Middle East.
Given these examples, one would believe that al-Qaeda was a powerful force that could send militants to countries all over the globe, from Central Asia, to the Middle East, to Southeast Asia in a highly orchestrated and efficient manner. However, it is extremely dubious that al-Qaeda is indeed this powerful. For instance in Iraq, the chief of U.S. Central Command, General John Abizaid, did not claim that U.S. occupational troops were under attack on a daily basis by al-Qaeda, but instead said that they were victims of a "classical guerrilla-type campaign." These guerrilla tactics are being followed by individuals who know the terrain and who are able to gain support from the Iraqi populace; while there may be foreign fighters operating in Iraq, it would be an exaggeration to claim that many such fighters are connected to al-Qaeda.
In Israel, the attacks by Palestinian militant groups have a long history, dating well before the formation of al-Qaeda. Furthermore, Palestinian militant groups call for a Palestinian state or, in extreme cases, the dissolution of the state of Israel, not the Taliban-style government that the Bush administration claims is their intention.
In the Philippines and Southeast Asia, the U.S. has contended that al-Qaeda may have been involved in multiple bombings throughout the area through its alleged link with the Indonesian group Jemaah Islamiah. However, most of the militant activity in the area is completely independent of al-Qaeda and is ensconced in its own political and social contexts. Abu Sayyaf and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front are examples of such groups.
Therefore, the argument that the main opponent of U.S. interests is al-Qaeda is based more on assertion rather than actual evidence. Instead, what the U.S. is facing is a series of internal revolts and movements targeted at U.S. friendly governments and, when possible, the United States itself. The aim of each disparate group is different according to its location -- sometimes the goal is establishing an Islamic government, other times it merely happens to be Muslims fighting for a certain cause but willing to target and kill civilians to reach their end goal.
The fact that there are multiple, diverse groups threatening U.S. interests highlights the extreme weaknesses found in the U.S.' "war on terrorism." Without a clear enemy, there can be no clear strategy to achieve victory. Dismantling one militant group, such as al-Qaeda, will do nothing to stop attacks from other militant groups. If the Bush administration continues its current policies, they may find themselves getting involved in a plethora of internal movements and revolutions in which intervention and interference by the United States will merely make it a target for local armies. Indeed, members of the Defense Science Board, who report directly to the U.S. Secretary of Defense, released a 1997 report warning, "historical data show a strong correlation between U.S. involvement in international situations and an increase in terrorist attacks against the United States." Therefore, such an interventionist foreign policy will amplify the threats to U.S. interests and make the "war on terrorism" a war with far too many fronts to fight on and too many enemies to defeat.
