EurasiaNet Eurasia Insight - Tajikistan: Expect the Unexpected from the President

EURASIA INSIGHT

TAJIKISTAN: EXPECT THE UNEXPECTED FROM THE PRESIDENT
Clive Nigel 9/14/07

Locals cynically call him "papa," or praise him as their "king." Some expats, meanwhile, call him "big head." Whatever the moniker applied to him these days, Tajik President Imomali Rahmon is showing himself to be a man full of surprises.

This spring, the president unexpectedly launched a reform drive that aims to overhaul Tajik society, introducing new rules that extend into the farthest reaches of Tajiks’ private lives. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Decrees mandated austerity and sought to substantially strengthen the Tajik national identity, mandating, for example, that all newborns be registered without the Russian suffixes, "ov" or "ova," attached to their names. Rahmon led by example, dropping the "ov" from his own name. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

Rahmon’s latest surprise came on September 11, when he made a diplomatic u-turn by extending an olive branch to Tajikistan’s neighbor and long-time antagonist, Uzbekistan. At a ceremony marking the opening of an Uzbek language school in the western city of Tursunzoda, Rahmon attacked unspecified "internet" reports that he blamed for stirring up Tajik-Uzbek enmity.

"Every time their malicious shots were to no avail," Rahmon said in comments broadcast by state television. "Friendship between Tajiks and Uzbeks has stood the test of time for centuries. Furthermore, our friendship, neighborliness and kinship is God’s will."

It was perhaps no coincidence that Rahmon’s comments were made in Tursunzoda, which happens to be the home of the Tajik Aluminum Plant. The facility is at the center of an ongoing spat between the two nations. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Rahmon’s comments were possibly intended as a signal to Uzbek President Islam Karimov’s administration that he wants to set aside past differences, and establish a Modus Vivendi that would enable Tajikistan to undertake an ambitious economic development plan. [For additional information see the Eurasia Insight archive].

Given the attention being paid to name changes and social engineering, many outside observers worry that Rahmon is taking Tajikistan in the same direction as Turkmenistan, where the former dictator Saparmurat Niyazov built a far-reaching cult of personality. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Helping to buttress these fears is the fact that Rahmon, despite his insistence that others cut back on opulent displays, is building a massive official residence for himself.

Some Tajiks also express reservations about the president’s recent steps, although they do so anonymously out of fear of government retribution. One Dushanbe resident suggested Rahmon is "losing his sense of reality." The resident added that after more than a decade of cut-throat political infighting, in which Rahmon succeeded in outmaneuvering rivals for power, the president is succumbing to a common political pitfall � isolation. "He [Rahmon] is too far away from normal people and is becoming blind. Since his reelection last year he has become even more insolent towards any sign of opposition," the resident said.

Many Tajiks are supportive of the president, crediting him with restoring a sense of stability to the country following the 1992-1997 civil war. That alone is enough for most Dushanbe residents to forgive some of the shortcomings of Rahmon’s administration, in particular rampant official corruption. As for Rahmon’s social overhaul, his initiatives are generally backed by a large number of Tajiks.

A western anthropologist working in the Pamir Mountains notes that many of her Tajik contacts believe Rahmon’s social initiatives are good for Tajikistan. "They see Rahmon as protecting their interests," she said. "Wedding traditions have become huge economic burdens for poor families, who are already sending many of their sons to Russia just to make ends meet. �. These villagers readily agree that money [spent on elaborate wedding rituals] could be saved for things like a car or sending their kids to university, and are glad to have an �excuse’ to not go into serious debt without loosing face."

Tajiks tend not interpret the wedding limitations, along with other measures designed to enforce austerity, as government meddling in private affairs. "They see the ban as a �boost’ for individual families, like a tax break," the anthropologist said.

A waiter in Dushanbe also applauded Rahmon’s restrictions on lavish weddings. "The situation here is really hard to earn money and prices are increasing," the waiter said. "Why make a party for people you haven’t seen in years?"

For the few who can easily afford to throw a big bash, there is always a way to circumvent the rules, the waiter added. "If someone wants to have a really big party they will just pay off the police responsible" for enforcing wedding party limits.

Supporters of the president tend to attribute government misdeeds to incompetent or ill-intentioned aides. "He has made really big, really good changes here," the waiter said. "No one else wanted to make peace like him here. Maybe he could do more, but maybe he is unable to because other people have power."

The effect of deleting the Russian suffix from Tajiks’ names is yet to be seen. Asked whether Rahmon will insist all future Tajiks drop the suffix, or institute a change in the official alphabet from Cyrillic to Latin � as in neighboring Uzbekistan � or Arabic, the Western anthropologist balked.

"He needs Russia," the anthropologist said. "With over a million migrant workers in Russia, Tajikistan is dependent on that country for much of its GDP. He can’t afford to push Russia too much."

Editor�s Note: Clive Nigel is a pseudonym for a reporter based in Tajikistan.

The Central Eurasia Project aims, through its website, meetings, papers, and grants, to foster a more informed debate about the social, political and economic developments of the Caucasus and Central Asia. It is a program of the Open Society Institute-New York. The Open Society Institute-New York is a private operating and grantmaking foundation that promotes the development of open societies around the world by supporting educational, social, and legal reform, and by encouraging alternative approaches to complex and controversial issues.

The views expressed in this publication do not necessarily represent the position of the Open Society Institute and are the sole responsibility of the author or authors.