Civil Society:
UZBEKISTAN EMPLOYING DIVIDE-AND-RULE TACTICS TO KEEP RADICAL ISLAM IN CHECK
9/17/07

With Uzbek President Islam Karimov expected to submit to a presidential election by the end of this year, the Uzbek government is promoting policies designed to divide moderate, practicing Muslims from radical activists. The divide-and-rule tactics are seen as a means to help stabilize the country ahead of a potentially disruptive vote.

Uzbekistan has found itself in constitutional limbo in 2007, with Karimov’s supporters and critics offering differing interpretations of provisions on presidential tenure. Critics insist that Karimov’s mandate expired in January of this year. Administration officials, meanwhile, believe the president’s term runs through the end of 2007.

Accepting the government’s view, a presidential election constitutionally must be held in the latter part of December this year. Yet, the government has yet to confirm that the vote will actually take place, and the Uzbek press has been conspicuously silent on the topic.

The clock is now ticking, as, according to Uzbek legislation, a vote must be formally announced at least three months before election day. In this particular case, the election would be held on December 23, meaning that an official announcement must come no later than September 23.

The Karimov administration’s hesitancy is understandable given the restive state of society. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Uzbek authorities have been able to maintain a surface calm only through the use of relentless repression.

A recent report issued by the International Crisis Group (ICG) cautioned that a political transition in Uzbekistan has the potential to turn violent. "The international community must brace for civil conflict in Uzbekistan when the dictatorial president, Islam Karimov, leaves office," the report stated. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

Karimov has given no indication that, election or not, he is willing to step down. At the same time, in perhaps tacit recognition of the validity of ICG’s assessment, the Uzbek government has, since the start of 2007, diversified its approach toward practicing Muslims. While the administration remains as tough as ever toward radicals, both real and perceived, it has implemented a few measures designed to prevent moderate elements from moving into the radical camp.

The government’s far-reaching crackdown on freedom of conscience has become a source of widespread discontent among Muslims in Uzbekistan. With an election looming, Karimov has been trying to soften his image. “More than 90 percent of the country’s population identifies itself with Islam,” explained a Tashkent political analyst, who spoke on condition of anonymity. With the policy changes introduced so far this year, “Karimov is telling the country’s Muslims: ‘I am not your enemy. If you want to pray, if you want to study Islam, if you want to make pilgrimage, you can do all of these things without problems - as long as you do not violate the law.’”

For much of 2007, the Uzbek government has been vigorously promoting Uzbekistan’s Islamic identity. Official Tashkent’s clear hope is that by providing Uzbeks with a conventional outlet to express their faith, even one that is subject to intense government scrutiny, the appeal of the radicals’ message will diminish.

The government’s new attitude is reflected in the rapid refurbishment a religious complex around Hast Imam Square. Located near the burial site of Hazrat Imam, a 10th century scholar and a Muslim saint, the square has long served as a magnet Muslim pilgrims. The project -- which was completed in July, after less than four months of construction -- cost a reported $500 million and was personally supervised by Karimov.

Addition evidence of a government shift came in August, when Tashkent and Samarkand played host to an international forum, titled The Place of Uzbekistan in Islamic Civilization. The gathering attracted more than 100 invited guests from over 30 countries, and Uzbek media provided saturation coverage of the events.

The recent initiatives suggest the influence of pragmatists within Karimov’s inner circle may be rising. Members of the pragmatic faction are said to favor the use of persuasive methods to counteract the radical ideology espoused by Hizb-ut-Tahrir and other groups, as opposed to the hardliner preference for the continued reliance on force. The chief architect of the divide-and-rule tactics is said to be Bahram Abduhalimov, Karimov’s state advisor on religious and ideological matters.

Members of the state-backed clergy have duly touted the softer government stance toward Muslims. “Our government has created all conditions for Muslims necessary to enjoy spiritual life,” said one official working for the Spiritual Board of Uzbekistan’s Muslims, speaking on the condition of anonymity. “The construction of the Hast Imam complex offers additional proof that our government takes seriously the concerns of Muslims.”

There is plentiful anecdotal evidence that ordinary Uzbek believers remain skeptical about the government’s sincerity. “Karimov is very good in initiating various policies and programs. They are well-drafted and their aim is very good. However their implementation often falls short of public expectations,” a Tashkent resident said.

Other Uzbeks emphasized the fact that while the government has promoted Islamic culture, it has not loosened controls governing religious expression. For example, private instruction on Islamic texts remains illegal. Meanwhile, the Norway-based religious rights group Forum 18 reports that officials are strictly regulating prayers during the holy month of Ramadan, which began on September 12.