EurasiaNet Eurasia Insight - Opposition in Tbilisi Rallies to Shevardnazde's Side But Support Seems Shaky

EURASIA INSIGHT

OPPOSITION IN TBILISI RALLIES TO SHEVARDNAZDE’S SIDE BUT SUPPORT SEEMS SHAKY
Giorgi Kandelaki 9/19/02

The intensifying Georgian-Russian crisis is granting President Eduard Shevardnadze a reprieve from domestic difficulties. Some of Shevardnadze’s most ardent critics in Tbilisi are rallying around the president, saying the need to defend Georgian sovereignty from Russian encroachment takes precedence over the internal political rivalries. But such support may prove fleeting, unless Shevardnadze alters his position on several sensitive issues, some political analysts in Tbilisi say.

The dispute between Tbilisi and Moscow over the alleged presence of Chechen fighters in the Pankisi Gorge has raised the possibility of a Russian military operation on Georgian territory. [For additional information see the Eurasia Insight archive]. On September 18, the ITAR-TASS news agency quoted Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov as saying Russian forces will not hesitate to carry out operations on Georgian territory if circumstances warrant such action. "If we see bandits [in Georgia] heading in our direction � what is there to think about?" Ivanov said. "Are we supposed to wait for them to cross the [Russian] border and disperse?"

Shevardnadze sent a defiant diplomatic note to Russian President Vladimir Putin in which the Georgian leader assailed Russia for doing "everything possible to drag Georgia into a bloody conflict."

"Public opinion is being actively shaped to believe that the problems of Pankisi are creating and fostering problems in Chechnya and in southern Russia in general," Shevardnadze wrote. "In reality, the problems in the Pankisi Gorge arose precisely because of the [Russian] military operation in Chechnya."

Shevardnadze went on in the letter to condemn Russia for harboring Igor Giorgadze, a former Georgian minister for state security who is a prime suspect in a failed assassination attempt against Shevardnadze in 1995. The Georgian leader also intimated that Russia is attempting to make Georgia a scapegoat for Moscow’s own failures in Chechnya. "What is stopping Russia from imposing order on the territory of its own state, and holding and disarming gunmen within its own borders?" Shevardnadze said in the letter, the text of which was published by the Kommersant daily September 16.

The next day Putin characterized the diplomatic note as unsatisfactory. "We need guarantees" that Georgia will bring Chechen fighters in the Pankisi Gorge under control, Putin told Itar-Tass.

Domestic opposition to Shevardnadze’s administration has intensified in recent months as Georgia drifted economically and politically. [For additional information see the EurasiaNet Insight archive.] The intensity of Moscow’s pressure against Tbilisi has struck a patriotic chord among Georgian politicians, prompting some prominent opposition leaders to announce their support for the embattled president during the crisis.

"Pankisi is just a formal reason for Russia to cultivate internal destabilization and civil confrontation in Georgia," Zurab Zhvania, the former parliament chairman, said September 18. "Russia wants the current internal disagreements to evolve like in 1991. Back than, lack of a responsible approach from the government [of former President Zviad Gamsakhurdia], as well as the [approach of the] opposition, enabled Moscow to achieve this goal easily. Our society should avoid being trapped in the same trap again."

Zhvania was referring to civil strife that gripped Tbilisi in late 1991. Street fighting between opposition forces and government troops culminated in the ouster of Gamsakhurdia, and paved the way for Shevardnadze’s return to power in Georgia. Shevardnadze had served as Georgia’s Communist Party boss during the Soviet era.

Meanwhile, Irakli Batiashvili, a co-chairman of the New Rights Party and head of parliament’s Defense and Security Committee, is also supporting Shevardnadze. Internal political maneuvering serves to assist Russia in undermining Georgian statehood, Batiashvili contends.

There are signs that the newfound support for Shevardnadze is shaky. Many opposition leaders clearly expect Shevardnadze to moderate his stance on several domestic political questions, in particular Georgia’s membership in the Commonwealth of Independent States and the takeover of Tbilisi’s gas distribution network, Tbilgazi, by the Russian conglomerate Itera.

Following a suspected Russian bombing raid in the Pankisi Gorge on August 23, the Georgian parliament adopted a resolution demanding that the government take steps to withdraw from the CIS. Parliament also insisted that Moscow be given a firm timetable for the closure of Russian military bases in Georgia, and the withdrawal of Russian peacekeeping troops from Abkhazia. [For additional information see the EurasiaNet insight archive.] "Russia should know that Georgia is ready for decisive steps politically, as well as militarily," Nino Burdzhanadze, the Chairman of the Parliament said.

Shevardnadze, calling the resolutions "premature and impermissible," declined to act on the parliamentary decisions. Shevardnadze’s reluctance to act angered many Georgians. Some local observers criticized the president for basing his stance on personal political considerations, rather than the state’s best interests.

The pending Tbilgazi-Itera deal is another sensitive topic in Georgia. Itera is Georgia’s main natural gas supplier, and the company already enjoys extensive control over much of Georgia’s pipeline network. At a September 4 government meeting, Shevardnadze urged that the privatization be accelerated.

But many politicians and policy-makers oppose the deal, saying that giving a Russian company near complete control over such a key energy sector would pose a threat to Georgia’s Western-oriented foreign policy. Others argue that the financial terms of the deal are bad for Georgia. "The most ridiculous thing is that the management rights for Tbilgazi are being transferred to Itera without it assuming any obligations, and with Georgia, at the same time, undertaking to subsidize the joint venture," Roman Gotsiridze, the head of parliament’s Budget Office said in an interview broadcast by Rustavi-2 television channel.

Some government critics say Shevardnadze seeks to buttress his political popularity by ensuring regular gas supplies, regardless of the cost to Georgian sovereignty. Others claim that business interests controlled by the president’s friends and family stand to benefit from the merger. Shevardnadze supporters alternately contend that, given Georgia’s acute energy shortages, the president is left with little choice but to accept the Itera joint venture.

If Shevardnadze’s positions on the CIS and the Tbilgazi deal do not shift in the coming weeks, opposition leaders may renew their attacks on the president. One prominent opposition politician, Mikhail Saakashvili, the head of the Georgian National Movement, has pointedly refrained from any statement of support for Shevardnadze, saying the government’s actions concerning the Tbilgazi privatization will be the best indicator of its commitment to Georgian sovereignty.

"We must indeed be united," Saakashvili said in a September 12 television interview. "But we must be united around a principled position. We should force the government to take this principled position."

Editor�s Note: Giorgi Kandelaki is a senior at the Department of Political Science at Tbilisi State University. He is a member of the Youth Atlantic Council of Georgia.

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