Beholden to Bin Laden, Taliban Can't Hand Terrorist Mastermind Over to US

Afghanistan's ruling militia, the Taliban, has suggested there is a religious basis for the decision not to hand over Osama bin Laden to the United States. In reality, the choice is rooted more in politics than in Islam. Bin Laden is simply too essential to the Taliban's military capacity, economic survival, and credibility within the radical Islamic community to sacrifice.

Some Taliban leaders stated the actual decision on bin Laden's future was made by a shura, or council of Islamic clerics. In justifying its judgement, the shura could point to Pashtunwali, the code of tribal ethics followed by the Taliban. That code, which is preserved by oral tradition, requires followers to give shelter to those in flight. Since arriving in Afghanistan in 1995, bin Laden has become the Taliban's primary resource in their battle for control of the country.

Bin Laden has funded the Taliban's military machine, assured the movement's economic survival, and stoked its credibility within the radical Islamic community. Specifically, bin Laden's predominantly Arab "055 Brigade" now represents one of the largest foreign contingents in the Taliban's military force. It is widely recognized as the fiercest and most reliable fighting unit in the Taliban ranks.

Bin Laden has also recruited thousands of other Islamic extremists from outside his Arab base to fight alongside the Taliban. Most notably, he has enlisted the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, a Central Asian insurgent group that now operates under the umbrella of al-Qaeda. Bin Laden has also used his global contacts with the Islamic underworld to procure the services of the Chechen separatists, as well as Uighur separatists from China's Muslim province of Xinjiang. Despite American President George W. Bush's implication that the Taliban is in a position to "surrender" bin Laden and shut down terrorist schools, the militia is encountering opposition at home that could make him more vital than ever.

Afghanistan is a country without a central bank. Though the Taliban have de facto control of roughly 90 percent of it, pockets of resistance have reemerged outside the Panshir valley, the stronghold of the anti-Taliban forces of the Northern Alliance. Even after the recent assassination of Northern Alliance leader Ahmed Shah Massoud, Afghan politics are so volatile that anti-Taliban forces could quickly retake vast tracts of territory. As such, the Taliban can literally not afford to lose bin Laden. In addition to soldiers, he provides vital financial backing. His personal inherited fortune stands roughly at $300 million, and wealthy sympathizers continue to pour money into his network. A significant portion of that money is diverted to the Taliban.

And even if it could renounce bin Laden's personal largesse, the Taliban depends on him for support from various illegal activities, most notably narcotics trafficking. Under the Taliban, Afghanistan has become the largest source of poppy paste in a burgeoning global heroin trade. The tentacles of the al-Qaeda network facilitate the smuggling of Afghan narcotics throughout Asia and into European and North American markets, with the Taliban levying a substantial tax on the income. Bin Laden also helps the Taliban siphon funds from overt Muslim charities, and his knowledge of the banking system in the Persian Gulf region enables the Taliban to launder their money.

Regional ideological ties with Islamic fundamentalists also bond the Taliban to bin Laden. Though bin Laden associates most often with the Wahabi brand of Muslim extremism, his pan-Islamic (rather than pan-Arab) worldview is atypical of Wahabism, and is a fairly unique fundamentalist ideology. This inclusive philosophy makes bin Laden attractive to Muslims of every ethnic background. As a result, al-Qaeda enjoys substantial operational and political support from Pristina to the Philippines. If the Taliban had agreed with the US extradition request, it would seem like a betrayal of those who have made bin Laden into a Che Guevara-like figure. Not only would this extinguish international support, it might lead extremists in other countries to wage jihad on the Taliban.

Bin Laden's close personal relationship with the Taliban's leader, Mullah Omar, also would seem to preclude further negotiations on this issue. Omar reportedly told members of a visiting Pakistani delegation that bin Laden "would be the last one to leave Afghanistan." Shuras such as the one currently convened are generally little more than a political formality that confirm Omar's prior, unilateral decisions.