EurasiaNet Eurasia Insight - Russia Debates Strategy in the War on Terrorism

EURASIA INSIGHT

RUSSIA DEBATES STRATEGY IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM
Ariel Cohen 9/26/01

In steering Russia on a cooperation course with the United States, Russian President Vladimir Putin has managed to overcome considerable opposition in several powerful constituencies in Moscow.

Putin’s aim is to establish Russia as a major US ally in Central Asia, keeping Moscow’s options open as it seeks to influence geopolitical developments. The go-slow faction in the Russian political establishment remains strong. Many in Russia’s military and security bodies have a visceral distrust of the United States, a vestige of Soviet-era confrontation and post-Soviet frustration.

Others worry that Kremlin cooperation in US strikes against Islamic radicals in Afghanistan could cause unrest among Russia’s own Muslim population, or damage Moscow’s relations with some states in the Arab world.

Hostility to Russian-US cooperation on terrorism was evident at a recent conference on international security sponsored by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, a German think-tank. Several retired Russian generals, who are currently advisors to the Ministry of Defense, were outspoken in their opposition. They reasoned that Russia should not bail out the United States from its current predicament with the Muslim world when Washington is pushing for NATO enlargement and wants to abrogate the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.

"The planned [US] system - its radar stations, its command-and-control system, and the large number of its planned interceptors - is aimed against Russia," said Maj. Gen. (Ret.) Alexander Klapovsky, Russian Representative to the Standing Advisory Commission on Missile Defense at the Russian Foreign Ministry.

"NATO has committed aggression in Kosovo and will be only less than two hundred miles from St. Petersburg [if Estonia is admitted to the alliance]," claimed Col. Gen. (Ret.) Fyodor Ladygin, the former boss of the Russian Military Intelligence (GRU).

Though retired, these men still wield a lot of clout in the corridors of Russian power, where their deputies and proteges occupy leading positions. And they often have lucrative consulting arrangements with arms manufacturers eager to sell to Iran and Iraq. They often blame the U.S. for "creating" bin Laden, then quickly change the subject to discuss some obscure technical violations of the START 1 treaty.

Many middle-class Russians share anti-American sentiments. A popular TV talk show host told me that most e-mail reactions to his show distinguished between suffering of the people and dislike of America, its foreign policy, and its culture, which is often perceived as arrogant.

More important for Putin’s ability to maintain US-Russian cooperation is the threat assessment provided by the Russian military. Russian intelligence has developed alarming scenarios, which, if they come true, would be catastrophic.

Under one scenario, "the Taliban may crush the Northern Alliance, which is leaderless after the September 9 assassination of Ahmed Shah Massoud, the military leader of the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance," according to a former GRU colonel, who now is a senior researcher at a prestigious strategic studies institute in Moscow. A successful Taliban offensive could destabilize Central Asia, and instability might reach the point where Moscow feels compelled to dispatch Russian troops to the region to prevent upheaval from spreading to Russia’s southern border.

A second scenario holds that the United States military action could result in an Islamic uprising in Afghanistan’s neighbor Pakistan. Pro-Taliban Pashtuns could potentially oust Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf. The end result might be that Islamic radicals are able to control up to 75 nuclear weapons with intermediate range ballistic missiles capable of striking at New Delhi and Tashkent.

Russia is also concerned about a broader potential use of nuclear weapons in Afghanistan and Central Asia. "The U.S. may be forced to use tactical nukes to take out Islamic atomic weapons which may fall into Bin Laden’s hands, while Russia may use weapons of last resort to stop Taliban in Central Asia," the retired colonel warns.

Another faction supporting a go-slow approach includes pro-Arab and especially pro-Iraqi circles in Moscow. Extremist members of the Russian Duma, such as Vladimir Zhirinovsky and Alexei Mitrofanov, often travel to Baghdad and reportedly have a cozy relationship with Saddam Hussein. They called on the Duma floor for confrontation the United States over the anti-terrorism campaign.

Finally, there are extremist Russian Muslims, such as Heydar Jemal, the self-appointed Chairman of the Islamic Committee of Russia. He advocates the "civilizational separation of Russia’s Muslims" and introduction of Shari’a, or Islamic law. Jemal is quoted as saying that secular laws of Russia are "from the devil."

That Putin has outmaneuvered "go-slow" proponents, at least for the time being, is plainly evident. Soon after the September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States, a leading go-slow advocate, Russian Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov, ruled out the introduction of American troops in the territory of members of the Collective Security Treaty, a regional bloc led by Russia.

However, less than two weeks later, Putin placed Ivanov in charge of implementing Russia’s strategic cooperation effort. Russia has also reportedly used its influence with Central Asian leaders to encourage their cooperation with the United States in the anti-terrorism effort.

Based on conversations with Kremlin consultants here, Putin is basing his US cooperation strategy on three points:

First, Putin sees an unprecedented opportunity to achieve a breakthrough on Chechnya and to win the propaganda war in the West. Putin apparently believes that Europe and the United States will tacitly permit Russia to realize its strategic aims in Chechnya, toning down criticism of Moscow’s human rights violations in the separatist-minded region. As a masterful public relations move, Putin announced a 72-hour window for the Chechen fighters to start negotiations with Putin’s special envoy in the South, Gen. (Ret.) Victor Kazantsev.

Secondly, the Kremlin believes that radical Islamic forces, and especially Taliban and the bin Laden organization, pose a great security risk to Russia’s neighbors in Central Asia and Russia itself. In another move aimed at winning public opinion, Putin initiated an international Islamic conference against terrorism to be run by Russian moderate Muslim leadership.

Thirdly, after seemingly calculating that the United States will ultimately achieve its objectives in the anti-terrorism campaign, Putin may be angling for maneuvering room that could result in a strategic breakthrough in Russia’s relationship with the West.

Already Putin is working hard to improve Russia’s image in the West. On September 25, he traveled to Germany to push his agenda of closer Western integration. He delivered an impressive speech - in German - before the Bundestag that won him accolades from German lawmakers.

Now Putin may ask for something more substantial, like debt forgiveness and rescheduling of the mammoth $100 billion Soviet-era debt. According to Vyacheslav Nikonov, a leading Moscow political commentator, Russia should use the unprecedented flux in international relations to speed up integration with the West and put the Cold War confrontational rhetoric firmly in the past.

Nikonov and younger analysts are dismissive of the old generals who oppose cooperation with the West. He says that Russia should ask for more quid-pro-quo for its impressive cooperation against Afghanistan and bin Laden: cancellation or postponement of NATO enlargement to the Baltics, and concessions on the ABM Treaty. And it may even work as an opening negotiating position.

In the end, Putin’s strategy may not work, especially if global economic trends work against him. But if the oil prices, the main source of his country’s revenue, hold above $20 a barrel, if Russia evades a recession, and does not shed its boys’ blood in Afghanistan, Putin may yet emerge as strategist who seized the moment to bring his country closer to the West.

Editor�s Note: Ariel Cohen, Ph.D. is Research Fellow at the Heritage Foundation and author of Russian Imperialism: Development and Crisis (Greenwood/Praeger, 1998).

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