Iran's hardline political leadership is scrambling to find a way to ease growing international pressure related to Tehran's nuclear program. Iran may even be probing for a way to open direct negotiations with the United States.
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) adopted a resolution September 24 that cleared the way for the UN Security Council to take up the issue of Iran's nuclear program. Iran maintains that its nuclear research is designed solely for peaceful purposes, including increasing the country's nuclear power-generating capacity. Western nations, in particular the United States, suspect that Tehran strives to produce nuclear weapons. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].
According to the IAEA resolution, Iran must immediately undertake verifiable measures to reassure that its nuclear program is peaceful in nature, including opening up facilities to broad inspections by IAEA experts. Iranian officials lambasted the resolution as "unjust and illogical." At the same time, Tehran has given no indication that it will comply with the conditions for keeping the matter out of the UN Security Council.
The nuclear program enjoys wide support in Iran and it is unlikely that the country's political leadership, led by new President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, will significantly alter the existing research course. Indeed, most Iranian political leaders appear convinced that the issue is destined to land in the Security Council. Tehran's diplomatic attention is now focusing on an effort to dilute an increasingly likely Security Council resolution on the matter. At a news briefing on October 4, Foreign Ministry spokesman Hamid-Reza Asefi said Iran would use all resources at its disposal to secure its interests, the IRNA news agency reported.
There are several indicators that Tehran is contemplating a radical diplomatic departure, namely an attempt to open up a direct channel of communication with Iran's longtime nemesis, the United States.
In late September, following the adoption of the IAEA resolution, prominent Iranian political politician Hashemi Rafsanjani traveled to Saudi Arabia, accompanied by former foreign minister Ali Akbar Velayati, to convey a diplomatic message to members of the Saudi royal family. The Saudis have served in the past as a go-between for Iran and the United States. The precise content of the diplomatic message remains a tightly guarded secret. But it is known that Rafsanjani embarked on the mission with the apparent blessing of Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
Recent statements by influential experts and commentators with close ties to the hardliner leadership offer clues concerning the message delivered to the Saudis. In a September 28 speech, for example, Hassan Abbasi -- a former Revolutionary Guards officer who now heads the National Security and Strategic Research Center, a far-right think tank called for the normalization of relations with both the United States and Israel.
"It is self-defeating to talk with subservient or second-tier countries and stay away from the principal sources of power," Abbasi said during his speech at Karaj College. "Why should people get upset with my words? It makes no sense not to have relations with the United States and Israel."
Prior to the IAEA resolution, Iranian diplomacy had concentrated on trying to drive a wedge between the European Union led by Britain, France and Germany and the United States. After Ahmadinejad came to power in June, he reshuffled Iran's diplomatic team and reoriented Iran's international focus, trying to cultivate the backing of China, India and Russia. It was hoped that the expansion of Iran's economic ties with all three countries, in particular in the energy sphere, would translate into increased political support for Tehran's nuclear aspirations.
This so-called "Eastern turn" proved to be a diplomatic debacle, as China, India and Russia all were unwilling to support Iran in the vote on the IAEA resolution. China and Russia abstained in the voting, while India approved of the September 24 resolution. During his news conference, Asefi indicated that the IAEA resolution might prompt Iran to re-evaluate its economic ties with some countries. "Iran's economic cooperation with other states depends on political decision, but we should not make any haste," Asefi said.
Abbasi, the hardliner political scientist, characterized both Iran's cultivation of the EU-3 and its "Eastern turn" as diplomatic dead-ends. Yet, while Iranian leaders may be sounding out Washington about the possibility of a nuclear deal, there is no sign that US officials are open to dialogue on the matter.
The United States is reportedly exerting pressure on Russia to suspend nuclear cooperation with Iran, including assistance in completing the Bushehr nuclear power facility. [For additional information see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Work on the plant is scheduled to be completed in 2006.
Iran announced October 4 that it is willing to re-open unconditional talks with the EU on the nuclear issue. Those talks broke down in August after Iran resumed the conversion of uranium in violation of a late 2004 agreement with the EU-3. EU officials have said Iran must again suspend the conversion of uranium before talks can begin anew. In addition, Iranian leaders have suggested that if the nuclear issue is referred to the Security Council, Iran might consider withdrawing from the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
As Iran enters a crucial phase of the diplomatic struggle over the nuclear program, Iranian policy-makers feel that they are operating from a position of relative strength. Iran's regional geopolitical position is stronger today than it was when Iran's secret nuclear program first came to light in 2003. In particular, Iran now wields considerable influence in neighboring Iraq, a fact that potentially complicates international efforts to intensify the pressure on Iran over its nuclear program. In addition, Ahmadinejad's presidential election win has given conservatives control of the country's entire political machinery.
