Eurasia Insight:
TAJIKISTAN’S AMBITIOUS ENERGY PROJECTS CAUSE TENSION WITH UZBEKISTAN
10/04/06

Tajikistan’s efforts to develop its hydro-power sector and to boost aluminum production are causing a spike in tension with neighboring Uzbekistan.

Uzbek authorities have used punitive measures of late to express their displeasure with existing Tajik policies, as well as future plans. For example, Tashkent is continuing to prevent the delivery of Kyrgyz electricity to one of Tajikistan’s major industrial concerns, the Tajik Aluminum Plant, located in the southwestern city of Tursunzade.

On September 28, Tajik Prime Minister Oqil Oqilov sent a letter to the Uzbek government seeking to resolve the supply issue. Uzbek authorities curtly informed Oqilov that a response would not be forthcoming before October 9, the Avesta news agency reported. Meanwhile, Uzbekistan cut off natural gas supplies to Tajikistan in late September, and wouldn’t re-open the pipeline until Dushanbe repaid almost half of its outstanding $4.5 million debt for earlier gas deliveries.

Adding to the bilateral acrimony was a late September incident involving Tajik and Uzbek border guards. Tashkent accused Tajik border guards of opening fire on Uzbek forces “without warning,” supposedly to protect a group of Tajik civilians trying to cross the border illegally into Uzbek territory, the AVN-Interfax news agency reported. The Uzbek soldiers were reportedly trying to take the Tajik trespassers into custody when the shooting began near the Khavast border post. The deputy chief of Tajikistan’s State Committee for the Protection of the State Border, Lt. Gen Safarali Sayfulloyev, dismissed the Uzbek allegation as “not corresponding to reality,” Avesta reported.

Earlier, Sayfulloyev said Tajik border guards took an Uzbek soldier captive while disrupting an Uzbek effort to unilaterally establish a security buffer zone in a disputed area of the frontier. “This sort of border incident happens very often,” Sayfulloyev told Avesta. Only about one-third of the almost 1,000-mile-long Tajik-Uzbek frontier has been demarcated.

Tajikistan and Uzbekistan have had a contentious relationship for years, driven in large measure by perceptions in Tashkent that Tajik President Imomali Rahmonov’s administration was not strong enough to deal adequately with Islamic radicalism, which emerged as a regional threat in the late 1990s. As Central Asia’s most populous state, and possessing the region’s largest army, Uzbekistan has routinely bullied Tajikistan. But some regional observers believe the dynamic governing bilateral relations could shift significantly if Tajikistan manages to implement its economic development vision.

Over the past two years, Rahmonov’s administration has made a major push to attract foreign investment to the power-generating sector. Russia has so far shown the most interest in investment, as part of an overall effort to reestablish Moscow as Tajikistan’s chief strategic partner. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Russian financial assistance will enable completion of the Sangtuda-1 hydro-power station on the Vakhsh River. In addition, the Russian aluminum-making conglomerate, RUSAL, signed a $2-billion investment deal in 2004, under which it will finish the Rogun power station.

Iran, which shares strong cultural ties with Tajikistan, is also contributing substantial investment. During a visit by Rahmonov to Tehran in early 2006, Iranian officials agreed to provide financing for the construction of the Sangtuda-2 hydro-power station. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

Interest in the development of Tajikistan’s hydropower sector stands to grow significantly, given that Tajik electricity-export potential plays a central role in a US plan to forge stronger ties between Central and South Asia. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

Tashkent tends to view Tajik development efforts as a threat to Uzbekistan’s leadership role in Central Asia. Water politics has long been a source of regional discord. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan provide the overwhelming share of the region’s water, while Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan are major consumers. An enhanced ability to harness its water reserves would potentially give Tajikistan considerable negotiating leverage in its dealings with Uzbekistan. [For additional information see the Eurasia Insight archive].

Uzbek officials appear especially concerned over RUSAL’s investment in Tajikistan. After the Russian conglomerate announced plans to modernize the Tursunzade aluminum smelter, Uzbekistan initiated a massive media campaign, complaining that effluvia generated by the Tajik plant was causing widespread environmental damage to Uzbek agricultural lands.

Tajik experts and policymakers believe Uzbekistan’s present move to disrupt electricity supplies to the Tursunzade plant is connected with a desire to hinder the facility’s modernization. Many in Dushanbe also say Uzbek officials are exerting pressure directly on RUSAL to scale back the company’s investment plans. They suggest that Tashkent may be behind a disagreement between Tajikistan and RUSAL over the height and type of the Rogun dam. Immediately following a meeting between RUSAL chief Oleg Deripaska and Uzbek President Islam Karimov, the Russian company revised its dam plans, saying it wanted to build a 280-meter-tall dam, instead of one 335 meters tall as originally projected.