EurasiaNet Eurasia Insight - Kazakhstan: Astana Strives to Balance Ties with United States and Russia

EURASIA INSIGHT

KAZAKHSTAN: ASTANA STRIVES TO BALANCE TIES WITH UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA
10/06/08

The geopolitical competition between the United States and Russia in the Caspian Basin seems to be shifting away from Georgia and focusing on Kazakhstan. US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, in Astana on October 5, sought to downplay the notion that Washington is vying with Moscow for the loyalty of President Nursultan Nazarbayev’s administration. Experts and officials inside Moscow’s Ring Road do not appear to be taking Rice’s comments at face value.

Russia’s incursion into Georgia has led to a sharp deterioration of US-Russian relations. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Since August, US diplomats have been busy trying to shore up Washington’s geopolitical position in capitals all around the Caspian, including Baku, Ashgabat and Astana. Rice’s one-day visit to Kazakhstan on October 5 was part of that comprehensive American charm offensive. Yet as the United States engages in intensive diplomacy in the region, it is eager not to make its own task more difficult by exciting the suspicions of Russian officials.

Rice in Astana went out of her way to try to ease Russian concerns about US intentions, stressing that Washington expected Astana to continue pursuing a "multi-vectored" policy. "This is not some kind of contest for the affection of Kazakhstan," Rice said during a news conference, referring to her talks with Kazakhstani leaders, including Prime Minister Karim Massimov.

Rice also sought to reassure officials in Astana that strong US-Kazakhstani relations would remain a priority after the next US presidential administration takes office next January. "I am sure that the new US administration will also have good and firm relations with Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan is a very important state in the region," Rice said.

Kazakhstani Foreign Minister Marat Tazhin, appearing along with Rice at the news conference, emphasized that Astana had no intention of making any foreign policy changes in the foreseeable future. He disputed the notion that Kazakhstan would become part of either Russia’s of the United States’ sphere of influence. "Our relations with Russia are excellent, politically well established and correct. Russia is a strategic partner for us," Tazhin stated. "At the same time we have stable strategic relations with the United States of America."

Despite Rice’s comments about Washington’s modest aims in Central Asia, commentators in Russia generally see Kazakhstan as an "either-or" proposition in geopolitical terms. And many in Moscow seem confident that Russia will emerge the winner in the competition for Astana’s allegiance.

"Despite Washington’s efforts to tear Kazakhstan from Russia ? Astana will eventually make its choice in Moscow’s favor," political commentator Irina Tsaregorodtseva wrote in the October 6 issue of the RBC business daily.

The US-Russian contest may take a long time to play out, in large part because of Washington’s strategy, which is aimed at stirring up instability and thus increasing regional demand for Washington’s security umbrella, Tsaregorodtseva claimed. "Washington’s goal in Central Asia is to create multiple controlled frozen conflicts throughout the region to keep the States’ military potential in demand here. Examples of the American strategy can be seen in Iraq, Lebanon, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Kazakh and other Central Asian elites are unlikely to wish to share the fate of those countries."

Tazhin, who was in Washington earlier in October, expressed Astana’s satisfaction with US-Kazakhstani relations. At one meeting with US policy makers and opinion shapers, Tazhin spoke enthusiastically about several areas of bilateral cooperation.

In the energy sphere, Tazhin noted that Astana is following through on developing the Kazakhstan-Caspian Transportation System, which aims to deliver oil from the Kashagan and Tengiz oil fields by tanker to Azerbaijan, where it will be funneled into the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Tazhin added that economic ties were strengthening in other areas, citing the move by the state nuclear power concern, KazAtomProm, to purchase a 10 percent stake in Westinghouse, a prominent American corporation.

Tazhin praised strong bilateral security relations. He said Kazakhstan was especially active in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), a global program aimed at stopping worldwide shipments of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, and related materials. The foreign minister additionally pointed out that military and security cooperation between Washington and Astana was on the rise. Kazakhstan is the only member of the Moscow-dominated Collective Security Treaty Organization to participate in a bilateral military cooperation program with the United States. Under the program, US military personnel provide training for their Kazakhstani counterparts, and help Astana develop Kazakhstan’s military infrastructure.

Kazakhstan maintains a small contingent of troops in Iraq and is playing a more prominent role in efforts to stabilize Afghanistan. Overall, Astana is providing $3 million in development assistance to Afghanistan, including funds for the construction of a school in Samangan Province and a hospital in Bamian Province. Prime Minister Massimov is expected to travel to Kabul soon on a needs-assessment mission.

Editor's Note: Ariel Cohen, PhD., provided reporting from Washington. Cohen is Senior Research Fellow at the Heritage Foundation and the author of Kazakhstan: the Road to Independence (2008).

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