EurasiaNet Eurasia Insight - Electoral Politics in Georgia May Have Negative Impact on Abkazia Settlement Search

EURASIA INSIGHT

ELECTORAL POLITICS IN GEORGIA MAY HAVE NEGATIVE IMPACT ON ABKAZIA SETTLEMENT SEARCH
Karen Madoian 10/07/03

Political deal-making during Georgia’s parliamentary campaign could have a negative impact on efforts to solve the Abkhazia dilemma. As it scrambles to retain control of the legislature, the pro-government For a New Georgia coalition has embraced nationalist elements, potentially complicating efforts to reach a negotiated settlement.

On September 27, Georgians marked the 10th anniversary of the Abkhazia ceasefire, remembered as the Day of Memory and Hope. The commemoration underscored that the conflict, along with the stalled efforts at negotiating a settlement, continue to exert strong influence over domestic politics. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

Abkhazia itself remains unstable, a fact demonstrated by the recent kidnapping of a Russian member of the CIS peacekeeping forces. The peacekeeper, Grigori Derevyannikh, was freed on September 30 after three days in custody. The incident kindled new tension between Georgia and Russia. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. On September 30, Tbilisi formally complained to the CIS Executive Committee that Russian soldiers, operating under CIS auspices, exceeded their mandate when they entered two towns outside the designated Abkhaz conflict zone during a search operation for Derevyannikh.

A Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman on October 4 voiced "concern about a recent increase in tension in the [Abkhaz] conflict zone, a resumption of military rhetoric and renewed attacks on international peacekeepers." The comments followed a meeting between Russian officials and United Nations diplomats.

Domestic political maneuvering in Tbilisi during the run-up to the November 2 parliamentary vote is helping to stoke tension in Abkhazia, political experts say. At the heart of the problem is the low public opinion rating of President Eduard Shevardnadze’s administration. The lack of support from potential mainstream voters has forced Shevardnadze’s parliamentary political allies, who form the core of the For a New Georgia bloc, to embrace right-wing elements.

Among the more prominent right-wingers to join the pro-Shevardnadze coalition is Tamaz Nadareishvili, who leads the Tbilisi-based Abkhaz government in exile. Nadareishvili has been an outspoken advocate for a forceful solution to the Abkhazia issue, criticizing international mediation efforts as inadequate, and urging that Tbilisi consider an attempt to militarily re-conquer the separatist region.

The Abkhazia issue has also prompted a few centrist politicians to switch allegiances. For example, Giya Karkarashvili, an MP and former defense minister, left the pro-business New Rights opposition party to join the For a New Georgia bloc. "Abkhazia is more than politics for me. I will always be where the most instruments for a solution of this problem are," Karkarashvili explained.

Nadareishvili did not attempt to hide the fact that his decision to join the For a New Georgia bloc was based largely on political expediency. "Joining the pro-government bloc may not be the most popular move," he said, "but the divisive nature of the opposition is also not to the people’s liking." In the past, Nadareishvili had proven nettlesome for Shevardnadze’s administration, as he has sometimes porrtrayed the government as being "soft" on the Abkhazia issue. Electoral politics, however, encouraged the erstwhile antagonists to join forces.

Nadareishvili’s participation in the pro-presidential coalition has already provided an expanded forum for his views. In September, Nadareishvili was told by State Minister Avtandil Jorbenadze, one of Shevardnadze closest allies, that Georgia was inclined to file suit at the International Criminal Court in The Hague, claiming that Abkhazian carried out genocide against Georgians during the 1992-93 civil war.

Given Georgia’s fractious opposition, and with no political party expected to win an outright majority in the next parliament, there is the chance that the give-and-take of parliamentary coalition building could leave Nadareishvili and other hardliners with a disproportionately large amount of influence in Georgian domestic politics. That would likely further constrain Georgia’s room for negotiating an Abkhaz settlement.

As it stands, the Abkhazia dilemma appears to be as intractable as ever. Negotiations are effectively stalemated by Russian-Georgian differences. At the same time, Abkhaz leaders insist on recognition of the region’s independence, while Tbilisi is equally adamant that Abkhazia remain a territory with broad autonomy under Georgian jurisdiction.

A recent effort to revive the Georgia-Abkhaz dialogue stumbled when the Abkhaz delegation refused to travel to Tbilisi, citing the fear of arrest. One Abkhaz leader, Sergei Shamba, also expressed concern over the recent incendiary rhetoric of some Georgian politicians, the Prime-News agency reported October 6. The same day, Shevardnadze said during his regular weekly radio interview that the Abkhaz security concerns were misplaced. "Ensuring the security of the Abkhaz delegation in Tbilisi has never been a problem," Shevardnadze said.

UN officials were searching for a new venue for the Georgian-Abkhaz talks, which were scheduled for October 8. In addition to UN officials, representatives of the UN Secretary-General’s Friends of Georgia group -- including the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany and Russia � were expected to attend the meeting.

Editor�s Note: Karen Madoian is a freelance writer based in Tbilisi, Georgia.

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