EurasiaNet Eurasia Insight - Border Troop Controversy Underscores Tajik-Russian Tension

EURASIA INSIGHT

BORDER TROOP CONTROVERSY UNDERSCORES TAJIK-RUSSIAN TENSION
Zafar Abdullayev 10/07/03

Russian President Vladimir Putin recently dispatched birthday greetings to Tajik leader Imomali Rahmonov, offering praise for Rahmonov’s "personal contribution to the development of the friendly, allied and strategic partnership between our states," the Itar-Tass news agency reported. Political observers in Dushanbe view Putin’s salutation as perhaps more a reflection of protocol than reality. Indeed, ties between Russia and Tajikistan are now arguably more strained than ever before.

Tajikistan has long been viewed as the Central Asian nation with the closest ties to Russia, due in part to the way Russian forces influenced the outcome of the 1992-97 Tajik civil war. However, Tajik-Russian relations have been troubled by bouts of antagonism since the September 11 terrorism tragedy, which prompted the United States to dramatically raise its strategic profile in Central Asia, including in Tajikistan. [For additional information see the Eurasia Insight archive].

Of late, political analysts say, Russia has sought to punish Dushanbe for its engagement of the United States by cracking down on Tajik migrant laborers. Moscow’s move could have a profound impact on Tajikistan’s economy. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Remittances from Tajiks working both legally and illegally in foreign countries, the overwhelming number in Russia, totaled almost $250 million in 2002, approaching the size of the country’s annual budget, according to an Itar-Tass report on September 24. Over 500,000 Tajiks have worked in Russia at some point during the past two years, Itar-Tass added.

Rather than compelling Tajikistan to adhere more closely to Kremlin policies, Russia’s stance on labor migrants seems to have stiffened the resolve of Rahmonov’s administration. At a late September gathering of CIS interior ministers in Dushanbe, Rahmonov lashed out at the "lack of legal protection for CIS citizens, including Tajik citizens in CIS states."

"Unfortunately, law-enforcement agencies are themselves often promoting this situation," the Asia-Plus news agency quoted Rahmonov as saying.

An analysis article printed by the Tajikistan newspaper on October 2 characterized the Tajik leadership as feeling betrayed by Russia, suggesting that Moscow was overreacting to Dushanbe’s cooperation with the United States. Tajikistan, the article maintained, is "Russia’s strategic partner," and has been a devoted ally "as far back as in the first days of its independence."

The newspaper bitterly complained that Russia was showing a preference for Kyrgyz migrant laborers over their Tajik counterparts. "Putin has given the �green light’ to about half a million Kyrgyz labor migrants in exchange for a military base [outside the Kyrgyz capital Bishkek] and the deployment of 500 servicemen in Kyrgyzstan," the commentary said. [For additional information see the Eurasia Insight archive]. The newspaper added that Tajik laborers should be afforded similar privileges, due to Tajikistan’s traditional loyalty to Russia.

Some observers say, the US strategic presence in Central Asia, has emboldened Tajik leaders to meet Russia’s rough tactics with rough tactics of their own. In September, a senior Tajik official responsible for border control, Nuralisho Nazarov, created a sensation when he suggested that Russian border troops were no longer needed to secure Tajikistan’s frontier with Afghanistan. He went on to suggest that the presence of Russian forces were hindering Tajik efforts to intercept drug smugglers. [For additional information see the Eurasia Insight archive].

Since the Soviet collapse in 1991, Moscow has viewed the security of the Tajik border as vital to Russia’s national security � effectively serving as a bulwark against the destabilizing influences of Afghan-harvested narcotics and radical Islamic ideology. Accordingly, Russian troops have assumed most of the responsibility for patrolling the frontier. Given Tajikistan’s lack of resources, the government’s ability to control its own borders is widely viewed as inadequate.

According to Dushanbe-based observers, Afghan drug traffickers have no problems infiltrating the country in a sector along Tajik-Afghan border around Shurobod that is protected by Tajik border troops. They add that since assuming control of Tajik-Chinese border sectors from Russian troops, Tajik authorities have been unable to properly maintain the border-control regime.

While some senior Tajik officials sought to disavow Nazarov’s statement, experts in Dushanbe say it is unlikely that the border official would have voiced such opinions without first receiving clearance from top political leaders. "Making statements that touch upon the relations of Tajikistan with another country is the prerogative of the president," said Tursun Kabirov, an independent political scientist.

In addition to the labor migrant issue, Nazarov’s statement may be a reflection of Dushanbe’s displeasure over being excluded for a core group of CIS states, known as the Unified Economic Space, which came into being at a CIS summit in Yalta in September. [For background information see the Eurasia Insight archive].

Russian government officials did not publicly respond to Nazarov’s comments. Meanwhile, commentators in Moscow see Nazarov’s comments as a negotiating ploy. The 10-year framework agreement governing Russia’s role in the protection of Tajikistan’s borders expired in May. Negotiations on a new agreement have been continuing since April.

Analyst Igor Plugatarev, writing in the Moscow newspaper Nezavisimaya Gazeta, suggested that Tajikistan wanted Russia to provide 100 percent of the financing for Tajik border forces, up from the existing 50-50 arrangement. "One can assume that in the above-mentioned negotiation process, some kind of crisis occurred and Tajikistan decided to put public pressure on Russia under the guise of General Nazarov’s �personal opinion.’"

Editor�s Note: Zafar Abdullaev is a freelance journalist based in Dushanbe.

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