Eurasia Insight:
AZERBAIJANI LEADERSHIP STRUGGLES TO RECONCILE OPPOSITION WITH POLITICAL SUCCESSION
Svante Cornell: 10/11/00

As the November 5 parliamentary elections approach, Azerbaijan’s leadership is encountering difficulty in reconciling its desire to maintain its international standing with the aim of ensuring domestic political continuity.

This dilemma was inherent in the October 10 ruling of Azerbaijan’s Central Electoral Commission (CEC), which reversed an earlier decision to bar a host of opposition parties, including the main opposition Musavat Party, from competing in the election. The CEC’s initial move to bar the opposition parties had provoked an international outcry.

The CEC’s pre-election maneuverings are generally related to the ruling élite’s efforts to secure continued control of the country. However, the current episode needs to be analyzed within the larger context of regime succession as well as the international standing of Azerbaijan.

Azerbaijan’s upcoming parliamentary elections are for several reasons crucial to the country’s future. Most immediately, the Council of Europe (CoE) has linked Azerbaijan’s membership in the body to the democratic conduct of the elections. Stressing its neutrality in the conflict between the two countries over Nagorno-Karabakh, the Council desires to welcome Armenia and Azerbaijan into the body simultaneously. Both countries’ memberships are on hold pending the outcome of the Azerbaijani election. A flawed vote could potentially result in Armenia being accepted in the Council, where Georgia is already a member, while Azerbaijan is left the only South Caucasian state denied membership. Such a development would be a major setback for Baku’s international standing and indeed a humiliation for the regime.

In addition, President Heidar Aliyev’s age (78), and his frail health, raise the possibility that he may not be able to serve out his presidential term. In this context, a somewhat legitimately elected parliament, where most of the country’s political forces are represented, would be a crucial asset in ensuring an orderly regime transition.

Political observers in Baku have long predicted that President Aliyev is preparing the ground to hand power over to his son, Ilham, currently vice-head of the state oil company. The parliamentary list of the ruling New Azerbaijan Party (NAP) has Ilham in its top position,

prompting speculation that the plan is to have him elected speaker of the new parliament, and thereby become first in line to succeed to the presidency. For this plan to be realized, the NAP would nevertheless need to achieve the support of a majority in the parliament. Unlike most countries of Central Asia and the Caucasus, however, Azerbaijan is home to an assertive and comparatively well-organized opposition. Although opinion polls in the country are notoriously

unreliable, few commentators believe the ruling bloc would receive a majority in a free and fair election.

In the 1998 presidential elections, the regime was aided by a boycott of most opposition candidates. This left Aliyev with only one major challenger. As Aliyev received considerably more votes than any other candidate, the leadership achieved the desired election results without major fraud. For the parliamentary elections, the opposition has learned from its mistakes. The four major opposition parties, after a time of hesitation, have opted to run in the upcoming elections. As a result, the amount of electoral manipulation necessary to produce a pro-regime majority in the upcoming elections may be substantial.

As the CoE has unambiguously linked Azerbaijani membership to the conduct of the elections, the regime is fully aware that large-scale fraud is likely to mean a rejection of its membership bid.

Throughout the 1990s, Azerbaijan has proven to be a country responsive to international criticism. Advice and suggestions from the OSCE and other international bodies have more often than not led to legislative amendments. Given its precarious geopolitical position, the imperative of exporting its oil resources, and its linkage to NATO in security matters, Azerbaijan can ill afford to dodge western criticism.

The regime has hence been confronting a dilemma for some time. Wide-scale fraud would cause irreparable damage to Azerbaijan internationally, but the alternative would be risking having a parliament controlled by the opposition. Given that Azerbaijan has a strong presidential system, that would not put the regime’s immediate control of the country in danger. Yet, an opposition-controlled parliament could ruin the prospects of Ilham Aliyev’s succession to his father.

In this context, banning the two most irreconcilable opposition parties, Musavat and the Democratic party, can be seen as an attempt by Azerbaijan’s leadership to take a middle path. The government sought to position itself strategically -- increasing its chances of securing a benevolent parliament, while reducing the risk of suffering a major international setback in the process.

The reversal of this decision reportedly occurred on direct orders of President Aliyev himself. The only plausible explanation for the move is a realization that a ‘directed election’ would be utterly harmful to Azerbaijan’s Western orientation. It seems likely that a significant amount of Western, and particularly American pressure must have been at work to bring about a U-turn of this kind. If the regime caved on this issue due to foreign pressure, the likelihood that it will falsify election results is also limited. Azerbaijan, however, is still at a crossroads. It remains to be seen whether the country is yet ripe for its first truly democratic elections—and what is more—for an opposition-controlled parliament.

Editor’s Note: Dr. Svante E. Cornell is a lecturer in the departments of Peace and Conflict Research and East European Studies, Uppsala University, and heads the consultancy firm Cornell Caspian Consulting (www.cornell.nu).