Eurasia Insight:
AFTER A BRIEF THAW, NEW CHILL HITS TAJIK-UZBEK RELATIONS
Marat Mamadshoyev: 10/20/00

The recent insurgency against President Islam Karimov in Uzbekistan has helped introduce a new chill into Tajik-Uzbek relations. Uzbekistan’s imposition of a visa regime for Tajik citizens, as well as Tashkent’s decision to begin placing land mines along the border with Tajikistan, underscores how the insurgency has aggravated interstate relations.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Tajik-Uzbek relations have frequently been marked by tension. Authorities in Dushanbe have often been irritated with what they perceived as repeated Uzbek attempts to establish itself as the regional power. Tajik authorities likewise have bristled over perceived attempts by Uzbek leaders to interfere in Tajik domestic affairs, despite the fact that Tashkent provided support for Tajik President Imomali Rahmonov’s government during the most intense fighting of Tajikistan’s civil war in 1992-3.

This past June, the first signs of a bilateral thaw appeared, when Karimov paid an official visit to Tajikistan. The two countries demonstrated willingness to resolve many outstanding issues, including differences over the delineation of their common border. A sure sign of rapprochement was the resumption of direct air flights between Tashkent and Dushanbe.

However, the resumption of the Islamic insurgent activity in August snuffed out such rapprochement efforts. Uzbekistan accused Tajikistan of facilitating the infiltration of Islamic militants from their bases in Afghanistan to Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. Tajik officials vigorously denied the accusations. Nevertheless, the bilateral rift reopened. Direct flights were once again suspended, and Tajik sources report that Uzbek mining has caused casualties among the Tajik civilian population living in border areas.

A major factor in the deterioration of relations lies in the differing geopolitical orientations of the two countries. Karimov has been critical of Tajikistan’s unconcealed orientation toward Russia. (For example, Russian border guards protect the boundary between Tajikistan and Afghanistan) Meanwhile, Uzbekistan has been a forceful advocate of Central Asian self-sufficiency in the fight against Islamic militants.

The fighting in Central Asia has abated in recent weeks, as winter weather descends on the region. Many regional observers, however, believe the insurgents, reportedly belonging to the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), remain a viable fighting force. Some also believe that the insurgents’ aim this summer was to probe the defense capabilities of Central Asian governments. A large-scale insurgent offensive, they predict, could occur in 2001.

Meanwhile, the situation in Afghanistan has sharply deteriorated from the point of view of Central Asian leaders. In recent weeks, Taliban forces have scored significant gains against the Northern Alliance, led by Ahmad Shah Massoud. Taliban victories are widely seen in Central Asia as providing a boost to the IMU’s ability to conduct military operations. Areas of northern Afghanistan now coming under Taliban control are inhabited by large numbers of ethnic Uzbeks. This may improve the ability of the IMU, who are widely believed to be dependent on Taliban logistical support, to recruit new members. The territorial gains also shorten the distances between IMU sources of support in Afghanistan and their areas of military operations in Central Asia.

In addition, Tajik officials have warned that the continued battlefield success of the Taliban could push hundreds of thousands of Afghans to seek safety in Tajikistan, which, as the poorest country in Central Asia, is largely unprepared to handle such a refugee influx.

Uzbekistan has been intransigent in its pursuit of the military defeat of the Islamic insurgency, refusing to engage in negotiations with the militants. Karimov also has resisted Russian offers of military assistance within the context of the CIS Collective Security Treaty. Tashkent is widely seen as wanting to prevent Russia from using the insurgency to restore lost political and economic influence in Central Asia.

The Uzbek position towards the insurgency, as well as Russia’s role in combating Central Asian instability, is generally at odds with Tajikistan’s view. For example, portions of the Tajik political establishment, in particular UTO leaders, have advocated a negotiated settlement to the insurgency. Tajikistan is also more open to Russian military assistance.

Concern appears to be mounting in neighboring countries, particularly Tajikistan, about the Uzbek approach to the insurgency. Some observers feel that Karimov is taking dangerous risks in his approach to the insurgency, and, in turn, his actions are placing all Central Asian nations at risk of growing instability.

Such concerns appear set to grow following the recent disclosure that Uzbek officials have held talks with Taliban representatives with the aim of normalizing relations. Karimov may be hoping that his recognition of the Taliban as the rightful rulers of Afghanistan would produce a Taliban promise to stop support for the IMU. However, some observers express doubt that such an agreement would be viable, and could possibly do more to undermine stability, rather than preserve it.

Editor’s Note: Marat Mamadshoyev is a correspondent for the Asia-Plus news agency in Tajikistan.