EURASIA INSIGHT
10/20/04
Print this article
Email this article
The Abkhazia election controversy is shaping up as a potential policy disaster for Russia. The Kremlins bungled attempt to manipulate the political succession process in breakaway region could end up depriving Moscow of a potential "trump card" in its often-contentious dealings with Georgia.
The deadlock over the results of Abkhazias "presidential" election shows no signs of an early and amicable resolution. Election officials declared Sergei Bagapsh, a relative political outsider in Abkhazia, to be the winner in the October 3 vote, amid widespread allegations of electoral fraud. Raul Khajimba, the candidate supported by incumbent leader Vladislav Ardzinba, as well as by the Kremlin, has refused to admit defeat, plunging the region into its most serious political crisis since the 1992-93 armed conflict with Georgian government forces.
The Abkhaz "supreme court" started to consider Khajimbas petition for a new vote. However, judicial proceedings were interrupted when Khajimba supporters challenged the impartiality of the judge assigned to hear the case. Ardzinba has tried, without success, to resolve the crisis in Khajimbas favor. First, the incumbent leader called on parliament to dismiss Abkhazias prosecutor-general, Rauf Korua, who had expressed support for the validity of Bagapshs election victory. Parliament, however, did not act on Ardzinbas request. In addition, Ardzinba has muzzled four independent newspapers, denying them the ability to print their latest editions, opposition editors claim.
As parliaments reluctance to move against Korua suggests, support for Ardzinba among Abkhazias political elite has eroded significantly as the political crisis has dragged on, some analysts in Moscow say.
"The reason for the split in the [Abkhaz] elite, the changing of allegiance of former supporters of Ardzinba to the side of Bagapsh, is obvious," said an October 19 commentary broadcast by Radio Russia. "First of all, it is a lack of confidence in Ardzinbas authority, and, secondly, it is pressure from the populace, for whom Bagapsh is the obvious winner."
The Kremlins approach on the Abkhaz election has been marked by several major blunders, according to a scathing analysis published by the Moscow newspaper Kommersant on October 15. "Regardless of how the Abkhaz standoff is resolved ... the main loser of the Abkhaz election is already known," the analysis stated. "It is Russia."
To start, Russian leaders ignored numerous signs that Khajimba "did not enjoy particular support in the republic [Abkhazia]," the commentary said. Some policy analysts believe Russian President Vladimir Putin decided to back Khajimba because of he is a former KGB officer. Putins background is also rooted in the former Soviet security police. The Nezavisimaya Gazeta newspaper reported in late September that the Putin administration dispatched a top Foreign Policy Department staffer to the Abkhaz capital Sukhumi to help manage the election.
The Kremlins overt electioneering for Khajimba may have needlessly alienated Bagapsh and his supporters. The Kommersant analysis indicated that it would have been wiser for Russian officials to have maintained a neutral stance, given that "none of the main contenders for the Abkhaz presidency was anti-Russian."
Moscow compounded its error by withholding recognition of Bagapshs victory, even though he "has not once in recent days given anyone [reason] to doubt his favorable disposition towards Russia."
Russian government officials have disputed the notion that Moscow bungled the Abkhazia election. Federation Council Chairman Sergei Mironov, speaking to reporters on October 12, insisted that Russian policy towards Abkhazia would not change regardless of who emerges as the regions next leader.
Some experts believe Moscow may try to produce a compromise solution, pushing for the appointment of Nodar Khashba, who currently serves as Abkhazias ‘prime minister," as provisional president. Before being elevated to his current post, Khashba served as a top official in Russias Ministry of Emergency Situations.
Since breaking free of Tbilisis authority, Abkhazia has depended heavily on Russia for political support. An estimated 75 percent of the regions residents now hold Russian passports. All the major candidates for the Abkhaz leadership, in particular Bagapsh and Khajimba, campaigned on platforms that stressed Abkhazias independence from Georgia.
Should Bagapsh emerge from the election fray as president, some analysts in Russia worry that, given recent events, his commitment to a special relationship with Russia may be weakened. The Kommersant analysis asserted that Moscow could end up losing Abkhazia as a means to exert geopolitical leverage on Georgia. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].
"Until very recently, Abkhazia was a strong trump-card for Russia in its geopolitical game with Tbilisi," the analysis contended. "Now that Moscow has backed the wrong candidate and failed to correct its position in time, the Abkhaz trump-card is, broadly speaking, in Georgias hands."
"Following the Abkhaz election, Tbilisi has realized that Moscow is far from omnipotent in Abkhazia," the analysis continued. It added that this realization could invigorate Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvilis administration in its efforts to reestablish Tbilisis authority over Sukhumi. The Georgian government has pushed a political solution under which Abkhazia would enjoy broad autonomy within the Georgian state. Ardzinbas team has refused to consider the proposal. Depending on the outcome of the ongoing political drama in Sukhumi, especially Russias role in it, the regions new leadership might be open to engaging Tbilisi.
In comments broadcast by Imedi TV on October 18, Saakashvili expressed skepticism that a political solution to Abkhazia could be reached in the near future. "However, one thing is clear," Saakashvili said. "Our worst enemies have had their plans thwarted. I am happy about that."
Editor’s Note: Sergei Blagov contributed material from Moscow for this report.
Posted October 20, 2004 © Eurasianet
http://www.eurasianet.org
|
The Central Eurasia Project aims, through its website,
meetings, papers, and grants, to foster a more informed
debate about the social, political and economic
developments of the Caucasus and Central Asia.
It is a program of the Open Society
Institute-New York. The Open Society Institute-New
York is a private operating and grantmaking foundation
that promotes the development of open societies around
the world by supporting educational, social, and legal
reform, and by encouraging alternative
approaches to complex and controversial issues.
The views expressed in this publication do not necessarily
represent the position of the Open Society Institute and
are the sole responsibility of the author or
authors.
|
|